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This dissertation explores how South Koreans have creatively appropriated the 
meanings of democratic civility and national citizenship using Confucianism-
originated familial affectionate sentiments (chŏng), while refusing their liberal 
individualistic counterparts through a cross-cultural and comparative theoretical 
approach. By investigating four recent civil-action cases in South Korea, it argues that 
the chŏng-induced politico-cultural practice of collective moral responsibility (uri-
responsibility), which transcends the binary of individualism and collectivism and of 
liberalism and nationalism, represents the essence of Korean democratic civility. It 
theorizes the ethical quality that uri-responsibility generates, when practiced in the 
public sphere of a national civil society, in terms of “transcendental collectivism,” 
and claims that unlike a liberal civil society aiming to empower the independent self’s 
individual agency, the post-Confucian dialectic between agency and citizenship is 
focused on the interdependent selves’ shard cultural-political identity, collective 
  
freedom, and democratic citizenship. This dissertation generalizes the liberal yet non-
individualistic political practices that transcendental collectivism promotes in terms 
of “liberal collectivism” as opposed to liberal individualism, and argues that liberal 
collectivism has great potential to contribute to both liberal nationalism and 
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theory and, due to its multi-disciplinary and cross-cultural nature, it would be almost 
impossible to write an intelligible thesis on it without guidance from scholars versed 
in Western or East Asian political theories, or ideally both. In this respect, I am very 
fortunate to have worked with C. Fred Alford, my dissertation advisor and academic 
mentor. Since my first day at College Park, Professor Alford has been a great mentor, 
not only by virtue of his insights into both the Western and East Asian political 
traditions, but, more importantly, due to his unique way of “doing” political theory—
always striving to make it relevant to everyday life. Although my dissertation does 
not begin to reach the level of subtlety and sophistication that Professor Alford’s 
works embody, my effort to weave political theory and empirical reality is inspired by 
his philosophical commitments and greatly enhanced by his academic guidance. 
If Professor Alford was my fountainhead, other members of my dissertation 
committee helped me navigate all different and difficult terrains of political theory 
and political science. Professor Benjamin Barber was my savior, who read every line 
of my work and provided both constructive criticism and friendly encouragement. 
Without him, I would not have been able to connect my interest in Confucianism and 
Korean culture to the discourse of democratic theory. Professor James Glass taught 
me various theories of individual and group psychology as powerful lenses through 
which to shed completely new light on both classical cannons and human reality, and 
constantly reminded me of the importance of “audience” to which my thesis should 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The Conditions of Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation 
 
In Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Barrington Moore Jr. submitted a 
now famous formula: “No bourgeois, no democracy.”1 However, what propelled the 
“third wave” of democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia 
was far from bourgeois interests, which, as Moore demonstrated, paved the way to the 
first wave of democratization in Western Europe. The third wave followed a different 
logic, which has been aphorically characterized as: “No civil society, no 
democracy.” 2  As numerous empirical cases demonstrate, however, democratic 
transitions initiated by broad social movements proved to be much harder to 
consolidate.3
Larry Diamond attempts to explain the consolidation dilemma seemingly 
endemic to incipient democracies in which transition was initiated from “below.” 
Successfully consolidated democracy occurs, according to Diamond, when there is a 
condition of “democratic governability,” in which “citizen withdrawal” is necessary 
because “effective government requires some restraint in the number and intensity of 
                                                 
1 Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon, 1966), p. 418. 
2 This phrase is from Yun Fan, “Taiwan: No Civil Society, No Democracy,” Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), 
Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004). Jang-jip Choi, Minjuhwa ihu-ui minjujuui [Democracy after 
Democratization] (Seoul: Humanitas, 2002) submits a similar evaluation of the democratization of 
South Korea. 
3  See Marc M. Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-communist Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); David M. Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal 
Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia,” Comparative Politics 30:2 (1998), pp. 147-169. 
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demands upon the state and in the intensity with which conflicting parties and 
organizations press incompatible public policy agendas.” 4  In short, too much 
participation jeopardizes democratic consolidation.  
“Citizen withdrawal,” however, did not contribute to the successful 
consolidation of eighteenth-century England or North America. For, in those early 
democracies, the process of democratization involved the transformation of atomized, 
mutually isolated, interest-seeking private individuals into mutually caring and 
politically invigorated public citizens. As Alexis de Tocqueville revealed, for 
instance, it was America’s burgeoning civil society that made democracy possible 
there, a democracy understood as citizen-building.5 Certainly, the Western citizens, 
then mostly Protestant “saints,” were dually committed to capital accumulation. 
Nevertheless, as Max Weber was convinced, it was not directly the commercial 
impulse, but the ethico-religious and civic enthusiasm that empowered their social 
beings and vitalized democratic institutions. Civil Society—that was to Weber an 
essentially “sect society”—was one of them.6 Indeed, in the modern West, civil 
                                                 
4 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), p. 224. 
5 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).  
6 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: 
Scribner’s, 1958) has rarely been interpreted in relation to his general social and political theory, 
especially, his theory of civil society. Since mid 1980s when Weber’s unknown studies of American 
sect and civil society came to be translated into English, however, his social and political theory of 
modernity has been vigorously recast. See Max Weber, “ “Churches” and “Sects” in North America: 
An Ecclesiastical Social-Political Sketch,” trans. Colin Loader, Sociological Theory 3:1 (1985), pp. 7-
13; Stephen Kalberg, “Tocqueville and Weber on the Sociological Origins of Citizenship: The Political 
Culture of American Democracy,” Citizenship Studies 1:2 (1997), pp. 199-222; Stephen Kalberg, “The 
Modern World as a Monolithic Iron Cage?: Utilizing Max Weber to Define the Internal Dynamics of 
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society and the market were (and still are) profoundly entwined. In this regard, 
Hegel’s classic definition of civil society as “bürgerliche Gesellschaft” is at best 
partially correct because despite his acute understanding of civil society being “a 
realm of mutuality and reciprocal recognition” (mainly by means of money),7 this 
utterly secular definition fails to appreciate its indispensable religious underpinning 
that inculcates self-discipline in an otherwise greedy commercial “narcissist.” At the 
heart of the first wave of democratization, therefore, was the Protestant saint-citizens’ 
ethico-religious and civic zeal to engage in economic and political affairs. So grew 
mature the early modern democracies—although partisan competitions and religious 
zeal amongst Protestant sects, when too much intensified, became detrimental to 
democratic development and liberal civility.8 While reckoning the politico-economic 
and moral dynamic of modern civil society, Hegel, unlike Tocqueville and Weber—
                                                                                                                                           
the American Political Culture Today,” Max Weber Studies 1:2 (2001), pp. 178-195; Sung Ho Kim, 
Max Weber’s Politics of Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Adam B. 
Seligman, Innerworldly Individualism: Charismatic Community and Its Institutionalization (New 
Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1994). For Weber’s view on (the pathology of) 
German civil society, Max Weber, “Voluntary Associational Life (Vereinswessen),” trans. Sung Ho 
Kim, Max Weber Studies 2:2 (2002), pp. 199-209. Also see Sung Ho Kim, “Max Weber and Civil 
Society: An Introduction to Max Weber’s Voluntary Associational Life (Vereinswessen),” Max Weber 
Studies 2.2 (2002), pp. 186-198. 
7 Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 44-
47. 
8 According to Richard Boyd, Uncivil Society: The Perils of Pluralism and the Making of Modern 
Liberalism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), Tocqueville also feared the untrammeled religious 
antagonisms and rivalries amongst the (otherwise liberal-democratic) sect communities. 
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and David Hume and Adam Smith—largely dismissed what Ernest Gellner calls “the 
conditions” of liberty.9
This inextricable intertwinement of public and private and of citizenship and 
self-interest that constitutes the core matrix of Western civil societies, however, is 
absent in non-Western contexts. Rather than functioning as a regime-sustaining 
liberal-pluralist medium between the private sphere and the state, civil society there 
generally refers to large-scale social movements propelled by an active citizenry 
making demands on the state. In Vaclav Venda’s famous words, they provided a 
“parallel polis” opposed to the ossified formal political regime. The absence of the 
“conditions” of (liberal) civil society, however, presents a critical stumbling block for 
the once resurrected or (re)invented non-Western “mass-ascendant” civil societies to 
consolidate. 
What is happening is a—however implicitly—forced appropriation of those 
conditions. That is, third wave democracies are now under immense pressure to 
develop (break?) their ethically and nationally motivated civil societies into various 
sets of organized interests in order to serve “post-Hegelian” market-oriented liberal 
democracy. 10  For the most part, East Asian civil societies seem to have been 
successful in this “cultural adjustment.” For example, Taiwan’s confrontational social 
movement or advocacy NGOs that contributed greatly to its transition to 
                                                 
9 Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 
pp. 40-41, 44-47. 
10 See Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, “The Nature of Social Ties and the Future of Postcommunist Society: 
Poland after Solidarity,” John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1995); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 271-272. 
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democracy—by mobilizing political resistance, constructing counternarratives and 
ideologies, and marshaling international support for alternative elites—have mainly 
transformed into non-political service providing NGOs.11  
Even though it did not directly unfold in terms of “civil society,” the “Asian 
value” debate amongst the South Korean social scientists during the late 1990s was in 
the main focused on whether—yet more often “how”—East Asian Confucian values 
had indeed facilitated, rather than hampered, the region’s economic development, 
thus contributing to the entrenchment of a liberal civil society.12 What is ironic, 
though, is that the advocates of “Asian values” see them only instrumentally by 
treating them as a means by which to advance to modern capitalism and by extension 
a market-oriented liberal civil society. Underlying this entire debate are the key 
assumptions of a naïve, now almost outdated, modernization theory: once advanced 
to a high stage of capitalism, democracy will survive or hopefully consolidate. The 
problem is that in this scheme, culture is presented merely as an intermediary 
variable, deprived of its own intrinsic value and viability.13 In other words, South 
                                                 
11 Fan, “Taiwan,” p. 165. Also see H. M. Hsiao, “NGOs and Democratization in Taiwan: Their 
Interactive Roles in Building a Viable Civil Society,” in D. C. Schak and W. Hudson (eds.), Civil 
Society in Asia (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003). 
12 It is beyond this research’s scope to document the huge literature on the “Asian Value Debate” in 
Korea. To introduce only a few: Seung Hwan Lee et al, Asiajeok Gachi [Asian Values] (Seoul: 
Jeontong-gwa Hyeondae, 1999); Seong Hwan Cha, “Myth and Reality in the Discourse of Confucian 
Capitalism in Korea,” Asian Survey 43:3 (2003), pp. 485-506; Chaibong Hahm, “Why Asian Values?,” 
Korea Journal 41:2 (2001), pp. 265-274. 
13 The most famous champion of this instrumental advocacy of Confucianism is Francis Fukuyama. 
See Francis Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 6:2 (1995), pp. 20-33 
and his “The Illusion of Exceptionalism,” Journal of Democracy 8:3 (1997), pp. 146-149. A tendency 
to view culture as an intermediary variable between economy (independent variable) and democracy 
(dependent variable) is a key feature of modernization theory. See Larry Diamond, “Economic 
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Korean (and other East Asian) social scientists did not go farther to create a new 
political and democratic vision out of their revitalized investigations of Confucian 
cultural values. At large, they failed to envision, not to mention construct, a 
culturally-rooted modern civil society that could undergird their new democracy. 
Equally problematic is an entrenched “social scientific” tendency to see civil 
society in purely “functional” terms as “a mediating conduit between the private 
sphere and the state.” For this institutional and functional definition of civil society 
does not give full justice, or is even insensitive, to civil society’s normative 
dimension: specifically, the importance of an ethically minded and an active 
citizenry. Indeed, civil society is a public sphere that interlocks individual agency to 
citizenship. At least, it was the classic ideal of modern civil society,14 even if how to 
define concepts like “individuality” and “citizenship” and how to interconnect there 
two key normative concepts should be contextually articulated. After all, post-
communist civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe were invigorated when the 
demands of the post-totalitarian system (citizenship/statecraft) conflicted with the real 
aims of life (agency/soulcraft). There, as Vaclav Havel famously noted, “living within 
                                                                                                                                           
Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” in G. Marks and L. Diamond (eds.), Reexamining 
Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992); 
Ronald Inglehart and Marita Carballo, “Does Latin America Exist? (And Is There a Confucian 
Culture?),” in Lane Crothers and Charles Lockhart (eds.), Culture and Politics: A Reader (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
14 See John Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea (New York and London: New 
York University Press, 1999); Krishan Kumar, “Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of a 




a lie” (citizenship/statecraft) confronted “living within the truth” (agency/soulcraft).15 
The conventional, functional-institutional, definition of civil society should be recast 
against this normative backdrop.16 To repeat, the best way to integrate social science 
of civil society into its normative vision (and vice versa) in a consolidating 
democracy is to take seriously the “conditions” of civil society. 
 




Korean civil society after democratization offers a very interesting case, for wherein 
we can see how a Western institution (and vision) of civil society is, far from being 
enervated after constant confrontations and clashes with her indigenous culture, 
creatively appropriated and reinvented in a typically post-Confucian context. First of 
all, Korean civil society is empirically challenging. Unlike other civil societies of the 
third wave of democratization, Korea’s nation-wide ethical/political civil society has 
never waned. Quite the contrary: since 1988 Korean civil society, primarily 
composed of “citizens’ movement groups,” has persistently pressured Korean 
governments to make various democratic changes.17 Apparently, Diamond’s theory of 
                                                 
15 Vaclav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” in John Keane (ed.), The Power of the Powerless 
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985). 
16 Benjamin R. Barber, A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1998), p. 12 submits a similar claim. 
17 For the active role of “citizens movement groups” in consolidating Korean democracy, see Jang-jip 
Choi, “Democratization, Civil Society, and the Civil Social Movement in Korea: The Significance of 
the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Elections,” Korea Journal 40:3 (2000), pp. 26-57; Eui 
Hang Shin, “The Role of NGOs in Political Elections in South Korea: The Case of the Citizens’ 
Alliance for the 2000 General Election,” Asian Survey 43:4 (2003), pp. 697-716; Sunhyuk Kim, “South 
Korea: Confrontational Legacy and Democratic Contributions,” in Alagappa, Civil Society and 
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civil society’s post-transition demobilization and depoliticization for democratic 
consolidation (or “democratic governability”) 18  cannot explain the contribution 
Korea’s actively ethical and political civil society has made to democratic 
consolidation.19 Why then such puzzling vibrancy in Korean civil society even after 
democratization? This is in stark contradistinction to the question Marc Howard 
recently posed with regard to post-communist civil countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe: “Why such a sudden disappearance of civic energy in post-communist 
Europe?” 
Most often, as far as post-communist Europe is concerned, the inertial 
lifestyle that the previous rigid party-state had engendered over the last half-century 
has been singled out as the source of the problem. That is, blame is placed on the 
citizenry’s fundamental dependence on the party-state for virtually everything 
concerning their life: jobs, income, consumer goods, education, housing, health care, 
and social and geographic mobility.20 Howard’s research builds on this initial insight, 
when he submits that a lack of desire to participate in voluntary associations in the 
post-communist people follows from their past life experience under the ossified 
bureaucratic authoritarian regime that had widened the gap between authentic private 
                                                                                                                                           
Political Change, pp. 138-163 Dong-choon Kim, “Growth and Crisis of the Korean Citizens’ 
Movement,” Korea Journal 46:2 (2006), pp. 99-128; Kwang-yeong Shin, “The Citizens’ Movement in 
Korea,” Korea Journal 46:2 (2006), pp. 5-34. 
18  Also see M. Steven Fish, “Rethinking Civil Society: Russia’s Fourth Transition,” Journal of 
Democracy 5:3 (1994), p. 34. 
19 Many empirical (survey) data confirm the successful consolidation of Korean democracy. See, for 
example, Doh C. Shin and J. Wells, “Is Democracy the Only Game in Town?,” Journal of Democracy 
16:2 (2005), pp. 88-101. 
20 Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 24. 
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and hypocritical public lives, deepened the mistrust of formal political organizations, 
and fostered friendship networks in the private sphere.21 The question we must ask 
then is: Can the “neo-institutionalist” reasoning of the kind Howard (and Bunce) 
adopts adequately explain the current viability of Korean ethical civil society? That 
Korea’s less rigid authoritarianism of the past has anything to do with the current 
vitality of Korean civil society seems only absurd. This turns us to unique 
characteristics of Korea’s ethical civil society: “What kind of ethical energy still 
galvanizes Korean civil society?” 
What confronts us here is both an empirical and normative question. It is an 
empirical question leading us to wonder about what kind of culture-induced ethical 
mechanism is operating behind the scene, which gives Korean civil society its unique 
character, distinguishing it not only from its post-communist counterparts but also 
from other East Asian civil societies.22 But the idea that Korea’s civil society is 
energized on its own ethico-cultural bearing largely independent of its formal and 
West-imported political system has far-reaching, and normative, implications. For if 
there indeed exists such a cultural mechanism or an ethical resource conducive to 
Korea’s democratic consolidation, it opens a possibility of a uniquely Korean model 
of ethical civil society. Combining these two, empirical and normative, dimensions 
together, this research submits that in the consolidating period, Korean ethical civil 
society is functioning as an indispensable vehicle for the citizenry’s political 
                                                 
21 Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society, pp. 26-29. 
22 Robert Pekkanen, for example, contrasts Japanese civil society and Korean civil society on cultural 
terms. See his “Civil Society and Political Change in Japan and Korea,” paper presented at the 
International Political Science Association Congress, Durban, South Africa (June 2003). 
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participation and has an enormous potential to become a crucial mechanism for new 
citizen-formation. Especially, it investigates whether such new modes of Korean civil 
society and citizenship can provide a normative ideal appropriate to the ordinary 
Korean citizenry’s cultural-political sensibility as opposed to a market-oriented, 
interest-based Gesellschaft-ish civil society whose global force is threatening the 
prospect of indigenous civil society and democratic practice. In short, by exploring 
the conditions (or cultural context) of civil society in democratic Korea, this research 
searches for new, post-Confucian, visions of democracy and democratic citizenship. 
Main Thesis 
 
What then is the ethico-cultural condition that enlivens Korean civil society? This 
research finds it in Korea’s chŏng culture where chŏng refers to Koreans’ traditional 
familial affectionate sentiments.23 It argues, in Korea, chŏng functions as a vital 
                                                 
23 One of the classical studies of chŏng in Korean scholarship is found in Pyong-choon Hahm, Korean 
Jurisprudence, Politics and Culture (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1986 [This volume is composed 
of the essays that Hahm wrote in the 1960s and 1970s]). Recently, Sang-Chin Choi and his colleagues 
have produced a great deal of researches on chŏng-centered Korean social psychology although 
without referring to Hahm’s pioneering work. See Sang-Chin Choi, “The Third-Person-Psychology 
and the First-Person-Psychology: Two Perspectives on Human Relations,” Korean Social Science 
Journal 25:1 (1998), pp. 239-264; Sang-Chin Choi, Hangugin simnihak [The Korean Psychology] 
(Seoul: ChungAng University Press, 2000); Sang-Chin Choi et al., “Jeong (miun jeong goun jeong)-ui 
simnijeok gujo, heangwi mit gineunggan-ui gujojeok gwangye bunseok” [An Analysis of the 
Structural Relations between the Psychological Structure, Behaviors and Functions of Chŏng (miun 
chŏng goun chŏng)], Hanguksimnihakhoeji-sahoe mit seonggyeok [The Korean Journal of Social and 
Personality Psychology] 14:1 (2000), pp. 203-222; Sang-Chin Choi and Gyu-Seog Han, “Gyoryu 
haengwi-reul tonghae bon hangugin-ui sahoe simni” [The Social Psychology of the Korean People 
from the Perspective of Interpersonal Relations], in Gukjehangukhakhoe [The Association of 
International Korean Studies] (ed.), Hangukmunhwa-wa hangugin [Korean Culture and the Korean 
People] (Seoul: Sagyejeol, 1998); Sang-Chin Choi and Gi-beom Kim, “Hangugin selp-ui teukseong: 
seogu-ui selp gaenyeom-gwa daebi-reul jungsim-euro” [The Characteristics of the Korean Self: In 
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ethical force invigorating a national ethical civil society and empowering citizens. At 
a glance, the relevance of chŏng as a conceptual key to understanding (and using to 
normatively justify) the viability of Korean civil society is suspect considering an 
immensely individualized, rationalized, or, say, Westernized contemporary Korean 
society, into which traditional family-oriented social affect seems to be hardly 
permeable. In effect, as far as Koreans’ ordinary personal interactions are concerned, 
chŏng has been almost sapped in their “appartmentalized” everyday life. But once we 
turn to the Korean citizenry’s vibrant collective public actions, it is far from closed 
nationalism (of the kind that currently predicates many “(un)civil” societies in new 
democracies in Eurasia) or civic humanism (of the kind that once invigorated the 
post-communist civil societies). It is rather a special type of social affect—which I 
conceptualize in terms of chŏng24—that  is neither strictly parochial sentiments nor 
                                                                                                                                           
Comparison with the Western Concept of the Self], Hanguksimnihakhoeji-sahoe mit seonggyeok [The 
Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology] 12:2 (1999), pp. 79-96; Sang-Chin Choi and 
Jangju Lee, “Chŏng-ui simni-jeok gujo-wa sahoe-munhwa-jeok gineung bunseok” [An Analysis of the 
Psychological Structure of Chŏng and Its Cultural Function], Hanguksimnihakhoeji-sahoe mit 
seonggyeok [Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology] 13:1 (1999), pp. 219-234; Yeong-
ryong Kim, “Janjanhan jeong-ui nara hanguk” [Korea, A Country of Chŏng], in Tae-seop Im (ed.), 
Jeong, chemyeon, yeongjul geurigo hangugin-ui ingan gwangye [Chŏng, Chemyeon, Network, and the 
Interpersonal Relationships of the Korean People] (Seoul: Hannarae, 1995). C. Fred Alford, Think No 
Evil: Korean Values in the Age of Globalization (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999) 
offers a fresh perspective of a non-Western observer on Korean chŏng culture. But none of these 
existing studies has approached chŏng in the civil and political context. I conduct my own detailed 
discussion of chŏng in Chapter 3. 
24 In drawing a normative political vision (chŏngish civil society and citizenship) from an empirical 
reality (chŏng culture) and/or by using the same term “chŏng” to refer to both a specific type of culture 
and a certain type of political good, there is always a possibility of the conflation of two different 
categories, that is, of “what-it-is” and “what-it–ought-to-be.” Since my prime concern is not so much 
to conserve the traditional chŏng culture (to fend off, say, Western cultural influences) as to explore 
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universal humanism, but as a complex mediating factor that activates contemporary 
Korean civil society. Surprisingly, chŏng, originally interpersonal affective quality in 
the private realm (chŏng as a social-psychological quality), is not only preserved but, 
more importantly, politically reinvented and thus exercised in the Korean citizenry’s 
public and civil actions (chŏng as a civil and political practice).  
That Koreans are socially and politically mobilized in and through chŏng, 
however, does not necessarily mean that Korean ethical civil society is collectivistic 
in nature, nor that it is totalitarian and suffocating the value of individuality. In a 
social psychological study of Korean people, Sang-Chin Choi has discovered that 
Korea’s chŏng-based group-self (or uri-self where uri means “we”) is not so much 
generating an individuality-collapsing hierarchical collectivism, but, rather, that it is 
closely associated with semi-familial, horizontal relationality among the individual 
participants.25 According to Pyong-choon Hahm, chŏng refers to the “overlapping of 
egos,” rather than a “merger or fusion of egos” susceptible to collective fanaticism or 
expansionist nationalism. 26  As Alford has rightly noted, chŏng serves as a 
“transitional space” between self and other. 27  Rather than being collectivistic, 
therefore, chŏng mediates collectivism and individualism. With Markus and 
Kitayama, we can call such a(n) (chŏng-mediated) intersubjectively constituted self 
                                                                                                                                           
(and create) a viable political practice by utilizing it, whenever I associate “chŏng” with its normative 
dimensions, it must be understood as a political concept. The difference between chŏng as a social 
psychology and chŏng as a political practice is the key focus of Chapter 3, where I also attempt a full 
explanation of chŏng itself. 
25 Choi, Hagugin simnihak, pp. 152-159. 
26 Hahm, Korean Jurisprudence, p. 323. 
27 Alford, Think No Evil, p. 49. 
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an “interdependent self”28 to distinguish it from an “independent self,” a city-like, 
self-contained and self-sufficient self idealized in Western political and psychological 
tradition.29 Thus understood, the goal of Korea’s chŏng-induced ethical civil society 
is not just the empowerment of individual agency, which is the goal of Western (and 
Eastern European) civil societies, but the invigoration of interdependent self’s shared 
(political) identity, collective freedom, and eventually citizenship. 
Two points must be clarified however. First, that the Korean self is an 
interdependent self does not imply that it is merely a “partial self” (as opposed to a 
complete self), lacking in its own coherent individuality and agency. The contrast 
between interdependent self and independent self is only about the different “mode” 
of selfhood. That is to say, interdependent self denotes a special type of the individual 
self. Both independent self and interdependent self are in the Weberian sense an ideal 
type. Second, to argue that Korean ethical civil society is predicated on the cultural 
practice of chŏng is not to support that Koreans’ civil and political actions in the 
public sphere can be unmediatedly reduced to a social-cultural psychology of (semi-
primordial) chŏng. Notwithstanding the social-cultural psychological chŏng being the 
background nutrition of the politically-exercised chŏng in civil society, “chŏng 
foundationalism” or “chŏng reductionism” is a far cry from this study’s central 
                                                 
28  Hazel R. Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, “Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, 
Emotion, and Motivation,” Psychological Review 98 (1991), pp. 299-337. 
29 This tradition begins with Plato when he, in The Republic, makes the city a model of the self or, to 
use a psychoanalytical terminology, a “selfobject.” See C. Fred Alford, The Self in Social Theory: A 
Psychoanalytic Account of Its Construction in Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls, and Rousseau (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 64-65. 
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claim.30 To clarify: despite inextricable intertwinement between the chŏng as a social-
psychological quality and the chŏng as a civil and political practice in reality, my 
focus is rather—but not exclusively—on the latter. 
  At the heart of chŏng-induced civil/political action is the Korean citizens’ 
collectively shared sense of moral responsibility, which I call “uri-responsibility.” 
What is surprising and peculiarly Korean about this collective moral responsibility31 
is that it mediates Kant’s two types of responsibility (moral/criminal responsibility, 
on the one hand, and collective/political responsibility, on the other), which are the 
predominant conceptions of responsibility in the West. On the other hand, despite 
some apparent similarities, Korea’s uri-responsibility as a culture-originated political 
practice is qualitatively different from what Karl Jaspers calls “metaphysical 
responsibility,” that is essentially universalistic in nature. It is by virtue of the 
collective practice of this special, particularist, (rather than universalist) civil ethos 
that Korean ethical civil society is “politically” empowered. Through the political 
exercise of uri-responsibility, I argue, is Korean democracy made civil. 
The ethical quality (or energy) that uri-responsibility when practiced in the 
public sphere of a civil society (mainly, yet not exclusively, national civil society) 
generates, I conceptualize in terms of “transcendental collectivism.” The concept 
transcendental collectivism is of my own contrivance to serve two mutually related 
purposes. First, transcendental collectivism is the Korean and post-Confucian 
                                                 
30  For the danger of “foundationalism” in political philosophy, see Benjamin R. Barber, 
“Foundationalism and Democracy,” in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting 
the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 348-359. 
31 Chapter 3 discusses in great detail on what “collective moral responsibility” is. 
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counterpart of the Weberian concept of “transcendental individualism,” the ethical 
quality that Weber believed had vitalized the early modern Western liberal civil 
societies (originally, confessional sect communities), on the one hand, and the ethical 
force that I believe (and argue in Chapter 3) galvanized the radical Confucian civil 
societies in Korea during her agonistic democratic transition in the 1980s, on the 
other. Allegedly, the modern West’s moral individualism (the kind of individualism 
advanced by early liberals such as Locke, Kant, Hegel, and Mill) is a secularized and 
rationalized version of transcendental individualism, and equally well known is what 
Tocqueville abhorred in terms of democratic individualism (or “anomism,” or 
“atomism” in Charles Taylor’s word) is indeed transcendental individualism’s most 
deteriorated version in which a sense of dialectics between individual and society has 
been lost (hence no vision of civil society). Keeping in mind that the recent 
resurgence of civil society in Western liberal scholarship is with a view to 
revivification of transcendental or moral individualism to rescue both individual 
(agency) and community (citizenship), for the exact same purpose, I—as with most 
ordinary Koreans—rather turn to transcendental collectivism (instead of 
transcendental individualism) that is believed to offer a post-Confucian dialectic 
between agency and citizenship, a dialectic that starts with (but not ends) in collective 
identity.32
                                                 
32 My understanding of “political theory” is consistent with Sheldon Wolin’s when he writes: “Political 
theory might be defined in general terms as a tradition of discourse concerned about the present being 
and well-being of collectivities. It is primarily a civic and secondarily an academic activity.” Sheldon S. 
Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 1. 
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My second purpose is for conceptual clarification. That is, with this concept, I 
can distinguish a form of collectivism that is morally justifiable (in that it does 
promote its own individual agency, if not liberal individualistic agency) and 
democratically committed (in that it greatly contributes to collective self-government 
and citizen-empowerment) from any pejorative types of collectivism (whatever they 
are: mob rule, democratic tyranny, or pathological nationalism) that suppresses the 
value of individuality. Moreover, the concept transcendental collectivism belies a 
conventional dichotomous understanding of the relation between collectivism and 
individualism and reveals that it suffers a fundamental confusion between ontological 
and advocacy questions. In “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” 
Charles Taylor charges political theorists with insensitivity to the fact that choice of 
an ontological position (the choice between atomism and holism) does not directly 
and necessarily lead  to an advocacy of a certain moral norm or public policy. That is, 
argues Taylor, the relation between ontology (atomism or holism) and advocacy 
(individualism or communitarianism) is dialectical, entailing four practical 
possibilities: atomist individualism (Nozick), holist collectivism (Marx), holist 
individualism (Humboldt), and, albeit very rarely, atomist collectivism (B. F. 
Skinner).33 Since transcendental collectivism is not so much an ontological claim as a 
political vision, its connection with Humboldtian holist individualism is quite obvious.    
In short, just as Weber’s transcendental individualism denotes a special form 
of individualism that undergirds a civil society (co-originality of agency and 
citizenship), with the concept of transcendental collectivism I attempt to demonstrate 
                                                 
33 Charles Taylor, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” in Nancy L. Rosenblum 
(ed.), Liberalism and Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 163. 
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that there can be a type of collectivism in post-Confucian Korea that can bolster, 
rather than suffocate, individual moral and political agency. One example of political 
practice grounded in transcendental collectivism, which I grapple with in Chapter 5, 
is liberal nationalism that is predicated on and predicates what Yael Tamir calls 
“contextual individuality.”34 In this study, I generalize the forms of ethico-political 
practice nourished on transcendental collectivism in terms of “liberal collectivism” 
(as opposed to liberal individualism).  
Thus understood, my central arguments in this study can be summarized:  
 
(1) The viability of Korea’s post-democratic and post-Confucian (ethical) 
civil society is predicated on the cultural practice of chŏng; 
 
(2) The chŏng-induced “transcendental collectivism” that underlies liberal 
collectivism is qualitatively different than the modern West’s 
“transcendental individualism” that predicates rights-centered liberal 
individualism; 
 
(3) Liberal collectivism is collectively practiced by individual participants in 
the public sphere of (national) civil society in terms of uri-responsibility, 
a uniquely Korean ethos of collective moral responsibility (Therefore, 
liberal collectivism as political practice does not endorse “chŏng 
foundationalism.”); 
 
(4) Therefore, liberal collectivism has a great potential to contribute to both 




Cross-Cultural Comparative Political Theory 
 
The primary approach of this study is a “cross-cultural comparative political theory.” 
The main comparison is between South Korea’s liberal collectivism pivoted on 
chŏng-induced transcendental collectivism and the West’s liberal individualism 
                                                 
34 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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underpinned by Protestantism-originated transcendental individualism and 
liberalism’s moral individualism, transcendental individualism’s secularized yet not 
vulgarly deteriorated version. TABLE 1.1 illustrates the detailed points of comparison 
between Korea and modern West (and Eastern Europe). 
 
TABLE 1.1. The Points of Comparison between Korea and Modern West (and Eastern Europe) 
 
 Korea Modern West Eastern Europe 
Ethico-Cultural 
Background 
(neo-)Confucianism Protestantism Catholicism/Marxism 
Mode of the Self Interdependent Self Independent Self Independent Self 
Medium of 
Human Relation 































To clarify: By saying that “liberal individualism” is a predominant mode of 
political practice of the modern West, I do not mean what Michael Sandel chastises as 
“unencumbered” individualism. 35  Nor does it refer to the kinds of “possessive 
individualism” found in Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (as author of The Second 
Treatise)36 or in Milton Friedman and Robert Nozick.37 By “liberal individualism” I 
                                                 
35  Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
36 C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
37 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1982); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
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rather mean (1) the “transcendental individualism” that a self-reliant yet self-
disciplined Protestant saint-citizen once held, and (2) “moral individualism” of the 
kind developed in Locke (as author of A Letter Concerning Toleration, 
Reasonableness of Christianity, and Some Thoughts Concerning Education), Smith 
(as author of The Theory of Moral Sentiment), Kant, and J. S. Mill. Among 
contemporary political theorists, I particularly have in mind such liberal pluralists or 
political liberals like Michael Oakeshott, John Rawls, Nancy Rosenblum, and George 
Kateb.38 Of course, this list in no way exhausts such rich and complex traditions of 
modern civil society and contemporary social and political theories of civil society to 
which I will soon turn.39 Suffice it to say that, in this study, I employ the concept 
“civil society” primarily as a modern-liberal realm of “civility”—which is, according 
to Seligman, qualitatively different from ancient and Rousseauian civic virtue40—or 
what Oakeshott calls “societas” (as opposed to “universitas”).41 Put differently, I 
                                                 
38  Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975); John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and 
Morals: The Personal Uses of Pluralism in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); 
George Kateb, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1992). 
39 Dana Villa, for example, includes in the list of moral individualists Hegel and Tocqueville. See Dana 
Villa, “Hegel, Tocqueville, and ‘Individualism’,” The Review of Politics 67:4 (2005), pp. 659-686. 
40  Adam B. Seligman, “Public and Private in Political Thought: Rousseau, Smith, and Some 
Contemporaries,” in The Problem of Trust (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 103-123. 
Also see Daniel A. Bell, “Civil Society versus Civic Virtue,” in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Freedom of 
Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 239-272. 
41 That is to say, I understand the concept “civil society” as the historians of ideas understand it solely 
for the purpose of the convenience of a cross-cultural comparison. From a “normative” perspective, I 
fully agree with Barber’s discontentment with the historicist fixation of this otherwise viable concept 
when he writes that “when we use an inescapably political term like civil society, its ideal normative 
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understand civil society particularly in the peculiarly modern Western context of 
liberal pluralism, a modern tradition that emerged to cope with the “perils of 
pluralism” unleashed after the Reformation.42 Generally speaking, the civil society 
tradition (and liberal pluralism) is committed to the advocacy of freedom of 
(voluntary) association, although some theorists in this tradition sometimes include 
non-contractual, non-voluntary associations in their repertoire, yet with apparent 
reservations.43 At any rate, though, all in civil society tradition are committed to 
moral individualism. 
Therefore, the main comparisons of this study revolve around “national civil 
society versus voluntary association,” “national citizenship versus associational 
membership,” and, eventually, “chŏng versus (liberal) civility.”  
 
Intra-Cultural Comparative Political Theory 
Thus far, I have deliberately shunned employing the term “Confucian” to avoid a 
fallacy of confounding “Korean” with “Confucian,” even though I believe the social 
origin of chŏng has a great deal to do with the Confucian family tradition. The reason 
I do not use this more plausible (given the level of analysis) dyadic of “Confucian 
versus modern Western” is twofold. First, as has been discussed, the contemporary 
massively Westernized Korean society is hardly “Confucian” at least from a 
                                                                                                                                           
meaning as given by certain democratic and civic ideals is inextricably bound up with various civic 
attitudes and practices that surround it in our lives.” Barber, A Place for Us, p. 13. 
42 See Boyd, Uncivil Society; Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. xxiv-xxviii. 
43 See George Kateb, “The Value of Association,” in Gutmann, Freedom of Association, pp. 35-63. 
Mark E. Warren, Democracy and Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) offers one 




standpoint of cultural anthropology, even if political practices in Korea are still 
grounded in the main in the Confucian semiotic code (as I show in Chapter 3). But, 
more importantly, to identify the ethical resource invigorating Korea’s post-
democratic civil society in terms of Confucianism may occlude an appreciable 
difference between Korea’s democratizing (ethical) civil society in the 1980s and its 
consolidating counterpart(s) in the post-democratic stage. The differences include: 
While one is elites-led, the other is ordinary citizens-initiated; one is militantly radical 
and episodic whereas the other is deradicalized and largely quotidian. Of course, 
these differences are of secondary importance when contrasted against their 
compelling similarities: in nature (ethical), size (grandly national), and scope 
(comprehensive). Nevertheless, the contrast is both culturally and politically 
meaningful because it, as I argue, reveals an intra-cultural dynamic in Korea’s 
Confucian culture. TABLE 1.2 illustrates the major contrasts between pre- and post-
democratic civil societies in Korea.    
 
 
TABLE 1.2. Two Stages of Korean Ethical Civil Society 
 
Democratizing Civil Society Consolidating Civil Society 
Elites-led Citizens-centered 
Militant and Radical Quotidian and Deradicalized 
Ren Chŏng 
(Confucian) Transcendental Individualism Transcendental Collectivism 
 
In Chapter 3 of this study, I argue that “Confucian transcendental 
individualism,” predicated on the cultural institutions of ren, helped vitalize Korea’s 
ethical civil society during the period of democratic transition—of which experience 
is also shared (albeit in a greatly varying degree) by other Confucian societies like 
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Taiwan. But, in order to explicate a unique cultural dynamic of Korean ethical civil 
society after democratization, I present the cultural practice of chŏng as a key 
mechanism of enhancement of democratic citizenship and collective self-
empowerment. Here I reinterpret chŏng as a collectivized or popularized (or 
“routinized” to borrow Weber’s much famous sociological concept) version of ren in 
contemporary Korean interpersonal relations. My central claim is that in the course of 
democratic consolidation, chŏng-induced transcendental collectivism that is less 
individualistic and less heroic has replaced ren-originated Confucian transcendental 
individualism.   
 




In order to substantiate my cross-cultural and intra-cultural comparative approaches 
to civil society in post-democratic and post-Confucian Korea, I investigate four recent 
civil action cases:  
CASE 1: The citizens’ alliance for the 2000 general election for the National 
Congress (2000); 
 
CASE 2: The public reaction to the teenage girl Lee’s patricide (2005); 
 
CASE 3: The civil upheavals around dual citizen military dodgers (2005); and 
 
CASE 4: The candlelight vigil demonstrations for two Korean teenage girls 
struck by the US military vehicle (2002-2003). 
 
These four cases are mutually independent—that is, they are not only topically 




TABLE 1.3. Core Cases 
 
 Topic Theme 
CASE 1 Anti-corruption and anti-
regionalism campaign 
National civil consciousness 
CASE 2 Family violence Collective moral responsibility 
 
CASE 3 
(Baffled) revisions of the law 
on the status of overseas 
Koreans 
Liberal nationalism and 
democratic citizenship 
CASE 4 Revision on the SOFA (Status 
of Forces Agreement) 
Participatory politics and 
collective self-determination 
 
These cases are to show how, ostensible topical and thematic discrepancies 
notwithstanding, citizens’ movements in consolidating Korea have become amazingly 
invigorated through the cultural practice of chŏng and the political exercise of uri-
responsibility, engendering a new mode of democratic ethical civil society. So, the 
focus will be not necessarily be on what these cases self-consciously and/or officially 
set out to espouse, but, rather, on the cultural mechanisms through which Korean 
citizens are activated in the public sphere of civil society and the political effect that 
their public actions produced. Otherwise stated, with these cases I throw reflective 
light on how traditional elements in Korean society, although originally neither liberal 
nor democratic, have greatly helped (and can continue to help) to galvanize a 
democratic, modern, yet hardly liberal individualistic civil ethos, thus contributing to 
a uniquely post-Confucian mode of civil society in democratic Korea. 
 
Methodology: “Explanatory Evaluation” 
 
The primary methodology that this empirically-oriented normative theory of civil 
society employs is a philosophical interpretation. More specifically, I draw on what 
Stephen Salkever calls “explanatory evaluation,” an Aristotelian methodology that 
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aims to integrate theory into practice and facts into values.44 Salkever’s following 
statement best captures this study’s pronounced spirit of linking a social science of 
civil society (empiricality) to a political theory of civil society (normativity): 
 
The separation between political philosophy and political science, or between normative and 
empirical political theory, carries with it or implies a number of important assertions about the 
character of things known and the way they are knowable. Chief among these is the 
distinction between facts and values or goods, and the claim that facts are known empirically 
while values are either not objectively knowable or knowable in some a priori way … I have 
in mind primarily the way in which the distinction between political philosophy and political 
science (as well as the more general distinction between moral philosophy or ethics and social 
science) works to separate the processes of evaluation and explanation, of critique and 
understanding, against the intentions of many within the discipline to practice a political 
science that is both evaluative and explanatory.45
 
The methodology of “evaluative explanation” embraces the central features of 
the Platonic psychology of sōphrosunē that does not sever subjectivity from 
objectivity (thus succumbing one to the other), a separation that was initiated 
(ironically) by Plato himself with his philosophy of form and later valorized by the 
modern epistemologists, most famously Descartes and, albeit arguably, Kant. In 
Plato, explanation and evaluation were linked within the account of the human soul.46 
Sōphrosunē was the moral virtue par excellence, not because it sought the attainment 
of a Cartesian clear and distinct knowledge of the form (eidos) of the good but 
because it strived to bring back universality into particularity—that is, into the 
individual soul (therefore a moral and political agent was not thought to be isolated 
from the world, namely, polis). The theoretical aim of universalization was directed 
to explaining particular things. This implies that the Platonic soul was not so much a 
                                                 
44 Stephen G. Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy 
(Princeton: Princeton University, 1990). 
45 Ibid., p. 14. 
46 Ibid., p. 18. 
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“mirror of nature” as is the mind (tabular rasa) in the modern epistemology,47 but an 
active agent of “living,” to whom the world was the field of self-realization that was 
thought to be achieved only by means of interacting with others. 
Modern epistemology epitomized by Descartes’s famous dualism between 
subject (res cogitans) and object (res extensa) destroyed such an honorific Platonic 
harmony of the soul and the world (which created a congruence of agency (soulcraft) 
and citizenship (statecraft) on the other hand). What ensured was the fixation of the 
thusly dissociated external world, the process of which, according to Guignon, Martin 
Heidegger was most acutely aware: 
 
With the epoch-making transition that culminated in the rise of modern science and the 
Enlightenment, a constellation of ideas and ways of thinking became firmly impressed in the 
West. Ever since, Heidegger says, this framework has provided us with “a universal way of 
thinking along certain basic lines” which “holds us captive and makes us unfree in the 
experience and determination of things.” When a world-view becomes rigid and calcified, it 
becomes necessary to distance ourselves from it and re-evaluate it.48
 
The calcification of the external world, however, is only one aspect of the 
issue. On the other side of the same coin is characterized by skepticism and, more 
crucially, the valorization of the subject—a creation of “subjective individualism” 
criticized most vehemently by, among others, Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel.49 
Now, the self sees itself—however wrongly—absolutely free and unencumbered by 
any historical, social, political, and cultural “yokes.” The ethos that this liberating 
                                                 
47 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 
48 Charles B. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), p. 16. 
49  Charles Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology,” in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 1-19; Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in 
Search of Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 
1996); Sandel, Liberalism. 
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experience is accompanying is something like this: “So I am self-defining and 
autonomous, my family, religion, occupation, and national origins are appendages or 
decorations that may be cast off in my search for integration. My ethical and social 
relations are contrived, conventional devices superimposed over me through the 
demands of expedience.”50 Ironically and erroneously, though, the objectification of 
the world entailed a modern agentic notion of freedom. Hence Taylor writes, “The 
liberation through objectification wrought by the cosmological revolution of the 
seventeenth century has become for many the model of the agent’s relation to the 
world, and hence sets the very definition of what is to be an agent.”51 Or upon this 
fixation of the world, freedom has been transvaluated: the term used to label the 
isolation into which man were accidentally or punitively thrown – by rebellion, 
ostracism, uprooting, exile, noble hubris, or other cataclysms – takes on the aspect of 
liberation.52
Paradoxically, this “transvaluation” has paved the foundation of contemporary 
social science. Thus Barber observes, “The obsession of recent social-science 
empiricists with methodology has … led them to place epistemology before 
ontology.”53 The political and methodological implications of the objectification of 
the world and the radical uprooting of the subject are now well known: The agent that 
is (and ought to be) unencumbered, unbiased, and free is driven to find a “clear and 
                                                 
50 Guignon, Heidegger, p. 18. 
51  Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 5. 
52 Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, 20th anniversary 
edition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), p. 70. 
53 Ibid., p. 47. 
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distinct” knowledge of the otherwise unknowable world. Put differently, “certainty” 
becomes this free agent’s most brilliant and most urgent fascination. This quest for 
certainty, according to Barber 
 
appears to draw the theorist’s attention away from the need to render political life intelligible 
and political practice just and to divert it instead toward the need to render intelligibility 
absolute and justice incorrigible – even at the high cost of distorting or abandoning the subject 
matter under study.54
 
Arguably, such a schizophrenic separation of “subject and object,” “agent and 
world,” “values and facts,” “ontology and epistemology,” and finally “normative 
theory and political science” constitutes the core problem the Aristotelian method of 
explanatory evaluation aims to overcome. 55  Aristotle inherited from Plato the 
complex balance between subjectivity and objectivity (and between universality and 
particularity) while rejecting his mentor’s metaphysics of universal and separate 
forms and ideas—which was to be recast in the modern Cartesian (and Kantian) 
epistemology—that in his view could not serve as an explanation for the existence of 
particulars. About this Aristotelian notion of “science,” Salkever writes,    
 
The form (eidos) and end (telos) or actuality (energeia) of a thing is the primary means of 
explaining what each natural thing is (Physics 2, 193b6-18), and this explanation is at the 
same time evaluative or critical, since in giving an account of any given human being or 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 49. 
55 Leo Strauss, “Natural Right and the Distinction between Facts and Values” in Natural Right and 
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 35-80 offers a critique from an ancient 
standpoint, although his criticism of Max Weber as a value-free social scientist is problematic. He 
seems to confound Weber’s “genetic” social science and his real target, for instance, Emile 
Durkheim’s more rigorous social science that paved the way to quantitative methodologies by failing 
to fully understand the nature of “ideal type” as a middle ground between value and fact. On this point, 
see Charles Ragin and David Zaret, “Theory and Method in Comparative Research: Two Strategies,” 
Social Forces 61:3 (1983), pp. 731-754. 
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human culture we must characterize its goals or practices in terms of and relative to the goals 
that define human being as a certain kind of entity.56
 
The point is that there cannot be any pre-political Archimedean foundation of 
politics and political evaluation independent of the goals or practices of a certain kind 
of human culture. Political practice that is simultaneously cultural is both factual and 
evaluative. The task of the political “scientist” (in the Aristotelian sense) is to clarify 
such complexity in the particular context. Ultimately, to see clearly the living 
politico-cultural practice is itself evaluative. Any normative ideal of a certain political 
entity, therefore, must be drawn from such a critical evaluation of the empirical 
reality. 
In this regard, a study of civil society provides an invaluable vantage point 
because civil society is where agent and world, facts and norms, and ontology and 
epistemology constantly interact, articulating and rearticulating their dialectic 
relations. Practically, it has been one of the rare social scientific themes, in which 
empirical studies have enlisted a help for theoretical articulations from normative 
theories and normative theories for empirical vindications from empirical studies, 
thereby better coming to terms with the complex dynamics of human conduct in a 
political life. Moreover, the rejuvenated attention to civil society has led both strains 
of scholars to acknowledge the centrality of culture to the flourishing of human 
(political) life. By unraveling the cultural mechanisms underlying the four civil action 
cases introduced above, this study aims not only to show how Korean civil society 
operates but also to suggest how it ought to operate given the empirical—cultural and 
political—conditions of Korean post-Confucian society.     
                                                 




Outline of the Argument 
 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters including this introductory chapter. In 
Chapter 2, I attempt a critical examination of the contemporary discussion of civil 
society both in social sciences and political theory in order to clarify a rather plastic 
concept of civil society. Here I challenge the social scientist “institutional-functional” 
operationalization of the concept of civil society on the grounds of, first, its 
misinterpretation of the Tocquevillian ideal of associational life as meaning that the 
mere presence of intermediary organizations would contribute to democratic 
consolidation, thus dismissing the possibility of “uncivil society” or “bad civil 
society” and, second, its negligence of  the “morality of pluralism” an individual 
member experiences in multiple and shifting memberships. After identifying the 
essence of Western liberal civil society in terms of “moral individualism” that 
historically originated from Protestant transcendental individualism and showing its 
inherent connection to the univeralist conception of citizenship, however, I raise 
cultural-politically significant questions: whether it can be possible to construct a 
liberal civil society in the non-Western society like South Korea without necessarily 
embracing individualism and whether a national ethical civil society (vis-à-vis a 
Tocquevillian liberal pluralist association life) can be practically and theoretically 
justified as conducive to democratic consolidation. Chapters 3 to 6 take up these 
questions specifically in regard to Korea’s post-Confucian context. 
Although this dissertation is mainly devoted to a cross-cultural comparative 
study, Chapter 3 conducts an intra-cultural comparative investigation of Korean civil 
society in order to highlight the unique characteristics of the Korean post-Confucian 
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civil society in the stage of democratic consolidation. Here I examine why Korean 
civil society since the late 1990s has become markedly deradicalized and more 
citizen-led than the radical and elites-led democratizing civil society in the 1980s. I 
contend that whereas the democratizing civil society was propelled by ren-induced 
Confucian transcendental individualism which was aimed at the drastic moral 
transformation of the world, the consolidating civil society is in the main activated 
upon chŏng-originated transcendental collectivism that aims at more practical moral 
and political issues. While reinterpreting chŏng as a collectivized, popularized form 
of ren, I offer a thorough social-psychological analysis of the concept of chŏng and 
discuss how amongst Koreans a chŏngish relation constitutes a uniquely Korean 
group (“we”) identity in terms of “uri.” Both chŏng and uri, I argue, impart a defining 
characteristic of transcendental collectivism in Korea. After the conceptual analysis 
of the key cultural concepts, I draw special attention to the “political” dimension of 
chŏngish transcendental collectivism, exercised in terms of “uri-responsibility.” By 
liking uri-responsibility as a uniquely Korean ethos of collective moral responsibility 
to Rousseau’s general will, I show the democratic political implications of a 
collective practice of uri-responsibility in the public sphere of civil society—for 
example, a creation of democratic national civil ethos that overcomes the pathological 
regionalism that has long characterized the Korean politics before and during its 
democratization.  
In Chapter 4, I show the (Confucianism-originated) cultural characteristics of 
uri-responsibility by contrasting it to the Kantian-liberal account of responsibility—
moral, political, and metaphysical, and present a “chŏngish civil society” predicated 
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on uri-responsibility as the most appropriate form of civil society in democratic, post-
Confucian, Korea, as opposed to a juridical civil society grounded in the Kantian 
concepts of responsibility. By utilizing a recent case of family violence—a patricide 
by a young girl of her violent father, I argue that Koreans’ enthusiastic (i.e. chŏngish) 
response to this incident through the collective practice of uri-responsibility—which 
is non-liberal, non-rational, non-moral, non-political, and thus non-civil action from 
the Kantian liberal rationalist moral and political perspective—is indeed greatly 
conducive to the moral and political development of Korean “post-Confucian” 
democratic consolidation, because it is activated upon the uniquely Korean cultural—
Confucian—dynamics. Whereas in Kant civility composed of legality and liberal 
virtue is premised on the particular liberal-rational ideal of person as both an 
autonomously thinking and acting moral (and by implication political) agent, in the 
Confucian culture individual agency is defined in familial relational terms. This 
contrast, I argue, explains two completely different modes of the concept of “the 
political”: the Western concept of “the political as the contractual” and the Confucian 
concept of “the political as the familial.” My key claim is that the clash of these two 
concepts and practices of the political—namely, chŏngish society versus juridical 
society—is the central feature of Korean society after its democratization and 
“chŏngish civil society” as a creative third way can be invented by further developing 
the moral sensibility of uri-responsibility.      
Chapter 5 then discusses how the chŏngish civil society predicated on uri-
responsibility and as distinct from the juridical civil society of liberal individualism 
can be supportive of liberal nationalism. By interpreting the Korean upheaval 
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surrounding the recent attempt to revise the nationality law as an expression of liberal 
nationalism rather than of ethnic nationalism, I argue that chŏngish civil society is 
committed to and predicates a responsible national citizenship as opposed to liberal 
civil society that promotes the individualistic and universalist idea of citizenship. 
After discussing the basic tenets of liberal nationalism such as contextual 
individuality and embedded citizenship drawing on some contemporary liberal-
national theorists (especially Yael Tamir) and yet before evaluating the Korean public 
action on the nationality law in liberal-nationalist terms, I first investigate the 
uniquely Confucian origin of the modern Korean nation-state. Here I demonstrate that 
the modern Korean nation-state is indeed a modern reinvention of the traditional 
Confucian state—the “state-as-family” or kukka and argue that the democratization of 
Korean society has unexpectedly entailed the crisis of kukka that had traditionally 
functioned as a national reservoir of chŏng, thus disseminating throughout the Korean 
society the idea of liberal individualistic citizenship as an only valid form of 
democratic citizenship. My central claim is that Koreans have started to take the real 
democratic implications of citizenship seriously by disclaiming its liberal 
individualistic justifications while reclaiming their long-forgotten democratic and 
national-cultural citizenship. In short, whereas liberal nationalism is an attempt to 
contextualize the universalism of liberalism in the particularism of nationalism, this 
chapter seeks to contextualize a theory of liberal nationalism in the particularism of 
post-Confucianism.     
Although all substantial chapters of this dissertation hold the participatory 
political implications of Korean ethical civil society in the consolidating period, 
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Chapter 6 specifically focuses on re-evaluating the quality of democratic 
consolidation in South Korea from a participatory democracy perspective. In order to 
do so, I first redefine democratic consolidation in terms of the citizenry’s self-
education of citizenship and collective self-determination by challenging its political 
scientist definition in terms of stability because it overly prefers a liberal-pluralist 
civil society that is essentially market-oriented, regime-legitimizing, and hence more 
conservative than a more active, vibrant, and thus sometimes intractable form of civil 
society. With reference to Tocqueville’s and Barber’s idea of democracy—democracy 
as citizen-empowerment—I then recast a process of democratic consolidation as an 
open-ended, non-teleological, and perennial struggle for citizenship that neither 
unitary democracy, the kind that Korea’s grand national, yet elite-led, civil society 
has upheld during and after democratization, nor representative democracy, pivoted 
on liberal individualism, can fully come to terms with. Finally, by examining a recent 
upheaval of Korean civil society after the deaths of two teenage girls struck by a US 
military vehicle, I demonstrate how Koreans empower both reflective individual 
agency and collective identity and thus invigorate civil society by the collective 
practice of uri-responsibility. 
Chapter 7, which is the concluding chapter of this dissertation, revisits some 
philosophical issues that this study might raise like the tensions between cultural 
relativism and cultural anti-Occidental universalism and the problem of objectivity 




CHAPTER 2: CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC LIFE 
 
 
The State of Civil Society Studies 
 
“Civil society” is so often invoked in so many different contexts that it has acquired a 
staggeringly plastic political valence. On the one hand, it is presented as a 
revolutionary force that liquidated and later broke down the ossified bureaucratic 
authoritarian regimes of post-communist countries.1 But soon it is required to go back 
to “normality” for what Larry Diamond has called “democratic governability” so that 
it can function as a regime-sustaining intermediary between the private sphere and the 
state.2 Whereas for many Central and East European dissidents civil society was 
inherently anti-political, for Western liberal-pluralists who are largely inspired by 
Alexis de Tocqueville, it is quintessentially political in that it supplements, if not 
substitutes, the enfeebled state.3 In one place, civil society is featured as grandly 
                                                 
1 Paul Hirst, “The State, Civil Society, and the Collapse of Soviet Communism,” Economy and Society 
20:2 (1991), pp. 217-242; John Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State (New York and London: 
Verso, 1988); Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1992); Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to 
Havel (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
2 Diamond, Developing Democracy, p. 224. See also Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society; Seymour 
M. Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address,” American 
Sociological Review 59:1 (1994), pp. 1-12. 
3 Tamás’ following statement best captures the salient contrast as to the meaning of civil society 
between East and West: “[Thus,] the East European notion of civil society was pitched against the 
state, whereas the Whig idea was to complement the enfeebled state, to find new reasons for obedience 
and conformity after the wane of divinely anointed authority. The Whig idea was that voluntary, self-
governing entities help to build a relatively non-coercive order, while the East European dissidents’ 
idea was that they might help to destroy an overly coercive order. In a work, the Burkean-Hegelian-
Tocquevillian, or Whig idea was a political one; the East European dissident idea was anti-political.” 
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“national” (in size), immensely “ethical”4 (in nature), and topically “comprehensive” 
(in scope), but in the other it is deemed to be primarily local, interest-based, and more 
or less segmental (issue-oriented). 
Notwithstanding different, even contrasting, conceptions of civil society, 
social scientists of civil society of both left and right agree on the three points. First, 
for both, civil society is the answer to the governance and legitimacy crisis of the 
massively bureaucratized and overbearing states—both the West’s Keynsian regimes 
and the East’s post-communist regimes. Both the East’s antipolitical and the West’s 
political strategies of civil society were committed to rejuvenating the long-enervated 
“lifeworld” (Lebenswelt), by making the state less intrusive and more responsive to 
the individual citizens’ real aims of life. And, second, this expectation is reinforced 
by a formal-judicial understanding of civil society as embodying a set of determinate 
institutions that stand independent of, or even in opposition to, the state. Most often 
civil society was conceptualized in “spatial” terms, namely as a “realm of 
organizations, groups, and associations that are formally established, legally 
protected, autonomously run, and voluntarily joined by ordinary citizens.”5  This 
social scientific fascination of “relative autonomy of the state,” however, drove the 
social scientists of both strains to concentrate their research agenda on the relation 
between the state and civil society: squarely oppositional or reciprocal (or even 
                                                                                                                                           
G. M. Tamás, “The Legacy of Dissent,” Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), The Revolution of 1989 (London 
and New York, Routledge, 1999), pp. 189-190. 
4 “Ethical civil society” is a particular characterization originally referred to the Polish civil society. 
Linz and Stepan, Problems, p. 271. 
5 Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society, pp. 34-35. 
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symbiotic).6 In extreme, the “fuzziness” of the line between the two has made some 
social scientists question the usefulness of “civil society” as a social scientific 
concept.7  
What social scientific studies of civil society have glossed over is the 
dimension of civil society as a home of individual autonomy and citizenship, the 
central theme of the ethical civil societies in the third wave of democratization.8 
Without an explicit allusion to “civil society,” the contemporary democrats and 
liberal theorists have grappled with this issue more directly.9 One thing that they 
almost unequivocally share is that a mere presence of organized intermediary 
                                                 
6 Hagen Koo (ed.), State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); 
Charles K. Armstrong (ed.), Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy, and the State (London: 
Routledge, 2002); Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Suisheng Zhao (ed.), China and Democracy: 
Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China (New York and London: Routledge, 2000); 
Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic (eds.), Civil Society in China (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); 
Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr (eds.), The State of Civil Society in Japan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jonah D. Levy, Tocqueville’s Revenge: State, Society, and 
Economy in Contemporary France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
7 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and 
the State Effect,” in George Steinmetz (ed.), State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp.76-97. 
8 One of notable exceptions is Heath B. Chamberlain, “Civil Society with Chinese Characteristics?,” 
China Journal 39 (1998), pp. 69-81, in which he submits: “The point here is that the essential concern 
of modern civil society is not the group per se but the individual within the group … With individual 
autonomy now the target, we must ask how a given group relates not simply to the state but to society 
as well” (emphasis in original). A similar concern is found in Theda Skocpol, “Advocates Without 
Members: The Recent Transformation of American Civic Life,” in Theda Skocpol and Morris P. 
Fiorina (eds.), Civic Engagement in American Democracy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
1999); Robert Pekkanen, Japanese Dual Civil Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
9 For example, see Rosenblum, Liberalism and Moral Life. 
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associations does not necessarily promote individual agency and empower democratic 
citizenship. Put differently, a naïve Tocquevillian ideal of associational life as an 
indispensable vehicle for vibrant democratic citizenship is seen to need to be 
revamped.  
Three points can be made. First, some social organizations are largely 
detrimental to, or even diametrically opposed to, a robust liberal democratic 
citizenship, only engendering what some students of civil society call the problem of 
“uncivil society” or “bad civil society.”10 Second, the predominant libertarian account 
of civil society, which refashions civil society in the image of the competitive market 
that extols individual liberty (in terms of a right to private property) has only 
exacerbated the existing economic inequality and threatened sociopolitical 
citizenship. Besides these empirically proven problems, this market-model of civil 
society turns out to also be theoretically flawed, as it is premised on the absurd idea 
that “all normative claims about political arrangements can be derived from a single 
principle [individual liberty], which need not be compromised or balanced with any 
                                                 
10 John Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 
114-156; Simone Chambers and Jeffery Kopstein, “Bad Civil Society,” Political Theory 29:6 (2001), 
pp. 837-865; Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, “The Paradox of Civil Society,” Journal of 
Democracy 7:3 (1996), pp. 38-52; Neera Chandhoke, “The ‘Civil’ and the ‘Political’ in Civil Society,” 
Democratization 8:2 (2001), pp. 1-24; Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar 
Republic,” World Politics 49:3 (1997), pp. 401-429. Richard Boyd’s (aforementioned) Uncivil Society 
well documents how the problem of “uncivil society” propelled the early modern political theorists to 
come up with more sophisticated ideas of civility and civil society. Also see James M. Glass, “Civil 
Society: The Unanswered Question of Where Power Resides,” The Good Society 12:1 (2003), pp. 17-




other concerns.”11 Arguably, this exclusive emphasis on individual rights seems to 
reinforce a nonpolitical and foundational view of politics, thereby curtailing civil 
qualities of civil society.12 Despite its limited civil implications,13 the market relations 
that the libertarian civil society champions are hardly civil. At worst, it is anti-civil,14 
which means there is no room for a “commons.”15 Nor is there any meaning of 
                                                 
11 Lawrence E. Cahoone, Civil Society: The Conservative Meaning of Liberal Politics (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002), p. 26. 
12 Notably, Nozick writes: “To explain fundamentally the political in terms of the nonpolitical, one 
might start either with a nonpolitical situation, showing how and why a political one later would arise 
out of it, or with a political situation that is described nonpolitically, deriving its political features from 
its nonpolitical description.” Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 6-7. For one of the most poignant 
criticisms of Nozick’s foundational politics, see Benjamin R. Barber, “Deconstituting Politics: Robert 
Nozick and Philosophical Reductionism,” in The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in 
Democratic Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 91-119. 
13 Exchange of money necessitates, however minimal, mutual recognition between the participants of 
the competitive market even if underneath this apparent “civility” is hidden their narcissistic desire of 
the domination of others. See Alford, The Self in Social Theory, pp. 126-132. Ironically, it is where 
Hegel saw a great ethical potential in bűrgerliche Gesellschaft. Contrast Hegel’s optimistic view of 
bourgeois civil society to Marx’s pessimism (see note 14). 
14 In fact, it is Marx’s core claim: “He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a 
communal being, and in civil society where he acts simply as a private individual, treats other men as 
means, degrades himself to the role of a mere means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers.” Karl 
Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edition 
(New York and London: Norton, 1978), p. 4. In p. 43, Marx continues, “None of the supposed rights of 
man, therefore, go beyond the egoistic man, man as he is, as a member of civil society; that is, an 
individual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his private 
interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice.” For Marx, therefore, “political revolution is 
a revolution of civil society” (p. 44). 
15 Quite the contrary, exchange facilitates “depersonalization” by abstracting away all features of the 
transactors. One way it can contribute to the common good of society is that it can supply equal 
opportunity regardless of one’s gender, racial, religious, or ethnic background. Loren E. Lomasky, 
“Classical Liberalism and Civil Society,” in Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka (eds.), Alternative 
Conceptions of Civil Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 63. But this “negative” 
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citizenship as a collective politico-cultural identity that in turn buttresses individual 
agency. It is for this reason that some democratic theorists grew convinced that a 
robust liberal democratic regime requires certain kinds of virtues and characters in its 
citizens that capacitate and motivate their active civic engagement.16  
Third, and all the more problematic (as far as democratic theory of civil 
society is concerned), the democratic effect of associational life is found in great 
variance not only with the associational purpose but, more important, with the 
possibility of free exit and the constitutive media of association (social, economic, 
political).17 In this view, the art of association is singularly drawn to the enrichment 
of the individual member’s personal moral life.18 Whether it has democratic effects 
that the liberal democratic regime aims to produce in its citizens can be assessed only 
ex post facto. That is to say, membership holds its own intrinsic moral value—which 
Nancy Rosenblum calls the “experience of pluralism”—distinct from the public 
standing of citizenship. Accordingly, soulcraft is not to be understood as subject to 
statecraft. The republican-liberal request of civic virtue is then seen to be too 
                                                                                                                                           
conception of common good is far from offering a place to express the citizens’ commonality in any 
active ways. For a similar view, see Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, p. 21. 
16 Barber, A Place for Us; Peter Berkowitz, Virtues and the Making of Modern Liberalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999); Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican 
Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, 
Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Stephen 
Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990). 
17 Warren, Democracy and Association. 
18  Kateb, “The Value of Association”; Nancy L. Rosenblum, “Compelled Association: Public 




demanding because it pursues the congruence between soulcraft and statecraft 
without a due respect of a personal moral experience in his or her private life in 
various associational ties.19 Hence Rosenblum states, 
 
The meaning and value of associations is not coextensive with the stability or well-being of 
liberal democracy, with justice, or with cultivating civic virtue. It is as extensive as human 
flourishing, self-development, and self-affirmation … My subject … is the effects of 
associational life on the moral disposition of members personally and individually, and the 
often indirect and unintended consequences for liberal democracy.20
 
What worries Rosenblum most is not the Tocquevillian atomism that the 
equality of democratic conditions would engender. The real danger, according to her, 
is “the undisciplined multiplication of associations that amplify self-interest, 
encourage arrant interest group politics, and exaggerate cultural egocentrism.”21 She 
then continues: “The prescription that flows from this diagnosis is not “connection” 
but disassociation: loosening the hold of gripping affiliations so that members have 
the psychological latitude to look beyond the group and identity themselves as 
citizens. What is needed is a stronger assertion of liberal democratic values in both 
public and private life.”22 Which means, at the center should be the individual as a 
person capable of the use of morality rather than as a citizen. The Tocquevillian-
Deweyan vision of democracy that rests on the assumption that dispositions and 
practices shaped in one association spill over to other contexts, cultivating democratic 
                                                 
19  “Nothing provokes anxiety like the proposition that in American democracy “statecraft is 
soulcraft.”” Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, p. 13. 
20 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
21 Ibid., p. 32. 
22 Ibid., p. 33. 
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mores and habits in the otherwise atomized individual’s hearts, is, argues she, 
empirically questionable. 
 
Social scientists have had more success demonstrating the moral (typically ill-) effects of 
incongruence between associational life and liberal democracy in particular instances than the 
logic of congruence. If we cannot show conclusively where or how “participation begets 
participation,” there are a host of good reasons, moral but also practical and organizational, 
why an absence of participatory experience can make collective action harder.23
 
This uniquely Americanized Millian valorization of a person’s soulcraft 
within associational life,24 however, seems to be ill-equipped to coherently address 
Tocqueville’s real fear: the democratic tyranny of the majority and the centralized 
power of government.25 In Rosenblum, everything becomes downsized: citizenship to 
membership, (public) civil society to private association, citizen to private person, 
and public-spiritedness to self-respect, in the course of which the traditional ideas of 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 39. 
24 But, again, Rosenblum is constantly vigilant of the self-constituting force of the group: “No matter 
how emotionally identified we are (or imagine we could be) with a particular group, associations do 
not “constitute” us. Nor for that matter does public standing as citizens, no matter how fulsome official 
rituals of recognition.” Ibid., p. 183. 
25 However ironic, for Robert Putnam, of whom some think as the contemporary incarnation of 
Tocqueville, the central Tocquevillian theme of power is almost absence as well. While for 
Tocqueville association is an alternative locus of power, for Putnam it is deemed as a release or relief 
from private life. It is evident when he says, “Social capital appears to be a complement, if not a 
substitute, for Prozac, sleeping pills, antacids, vitamin C, and other drugs we buy at the corner 
pharmacy. ‘Call me [or indeed almost anyone] in the morning’ might actually be better medical advice 
than “Take two aspirin” as a cure for what ails us.” Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse 
and Revival of American Community (New York: Touchstone, 2000), p. 289. My criticism of Putnam 




self-government and citizenship (political liberty) have severely dwindled.26 Despite 
her Millian nobleness that regards every individual as a respectable person privately 
capable of the use of morality, Rosenblum seems to downplay the fact that the private 
space can become vulnerable to the formal power of the state unless it is bolstered by 
active civic engagement, a public demand on “living in truth.” Perhaps, just like Mill, 
a post-Lockean political theorist, Rosenblum as a post-Rawlsian, could presuppose 
the presence of a basic structure of justice in the state level (i.e. a legitimate liberal 
government). But this condition is not easily available to new democracies in which 
people have yet to consolidate their own legitimate citizenship.  
What implications can we draw from these three points regarding the 
contemporary discussion of civil society? How can we situate contemporary political 
theories of civil society that we have just explored in the political-scientific discourse 
of democratic consolidation? It seems that political scientists regard as a critical mark 
of consolidated democracy the transformation of the grandly national ethical civil 
society in the period of transition into a various (fragmented) forms of self-
aggrandized associational life. That is, without concerning with the personal moral 
life (or individual agency) within the associations, they tend to see organized interests 
(i.e. the libertarian or market-model civil society) as tantamount to “liberal pluralism” 
predicated on liberal individualism. Or, at least they are often confused between 
libertarianism and liberal pluralism. Apart from this confusion in the political science 
                                                 
26 “[I]t is a failure of moral imagination to think that public standing is the sole, chief, guaranteed, or 
necessary condition of self-respect. After all, the dynamic frequently works in reverse. Self-respect 
bolsters us against slights and prejudice, social exclusion, second-class membership, and even second-
class citizenship.” Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, p. 181. 
42
 
literature (which is due in part to its exclusive focus on the relative autonomy of civil 
society vis-à-vis the state), a sudden demand of liberal pluralism (associational life) 
as a single criterion of democratic consolidation is simply daunting for those who had 
long lived in a forced incongruence between statecraft (“living in a lie”) and soulcraft 
(“living in truth”) under the authoritarian political environment. In fact, their political 
ideal is hardly a liberal incongruence, but a democratic congruence between 
individual agency and citizenship.27  
More important, individual-centered liberal pluralism 28  is by no means 
culturally neutral.29 Quite the contrary is often the case. According to Chris Hann, 
civil society has a fundamental and historical Western ethnocentric bias that is poorly 
transferred to non-Western parts of the world. His central claim is that “civil society 
debates hitherto have been too narrowly circumscribed by modern western models of 
liberal-individualism” and that “the exploration of civil society requires that careful 
attention be paid to a range of informal interpersonal practices overlooked by other 
disciplines.”30  Even though Marc Howard expresses deep worry that infelicitous 
                                                 
27 According to Timothy Ash, the revolution of 1989 was “a springtime of nations, but not necessarily 
nationalism; of societies, aspiring to be civil; and above all, of citizens.” T. G. Ash, “The Year of 
Truth,” in Tismaneanu, The Revolutions of 1989, p. 119. 
28 In practice, liberal pluralism does not have to be grounded in liberal individualism. In fact, the 
understanding of liberal pluralism itself is plural in contemporary democratic theory. See William A. 
Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” Ethics 105:3 (1995), pp. 516-534. 
29 For the (modern) Western-origin of civil society, see John A. Hall, “In Search of Civil Society,” 
Hall, Civil Society, pp. 1-31; John Duncan, “The Problematic Modernity of Confucianism: The 
Question of “Civil Society” in Chosŏn Dynasty Korea,” in Armstrong, Korean Society, pp. 36-55. Also 
see Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society. 
30 Chris Hann, “Introduction: Political Society and Civil Anthropology,” in Chris Hann and Elizabeth 
Dunn (eds.), Civil Society: Challenging Western Models (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 
43
 
“conceptual stretching”31 of the concept “civil society” by including qualitatively 
different social patterns might cost its social-scientific studies not only conceptual 
clarity but also theoretical usefulness, 32  I generally agree with Hann’s 
characterization of civil society in terms of a (cultural) practice rather than a 
historically fixed cultural entity crystallized in the modern West. Nevertheless, I 
strongly believe that the concept “civil society” as a cultural product of the modern 
West, which laid the foundation of contemporary liberal pluralism, needs to be more 
rigorously delineated so that we can conduct a meaningful comparison between the 
West and the non-West.  
More specifically, instead of drawing on the conventional (social-scientific) 
definition of civil society as a set of formal-judiciary institutions between the private 
sphere (including the family) and the state, I employ the concept “civil society” as a 
public sphere that interconnects individual agency to citizenship (even though liberal 
pluralism loosens this connection and redirects individual agency primarily to 
membership) as it did in the West’s early modernity. While holding this 
conceptualization of civil society to be cross-culturally applicable as a point of 
comparison, I suggest that the practical connotations of the terms “individual” and 
                                                                                                                                           
3. For a similar argument, see Wayne Hudson, “Problematizing European Theories of Civil Society,” 
in Schak and Hudson, Civil Society in Asia, pp. 9-19. 
31 The problem of “conceptual stretching” in comparative political science (especially in regard to a 
scientific measurement of the concept) was first raised by Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misinformation 
in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review 87:4 (1970), pp. 1033-1055. See also 
David Collier and James Mahon, Jr., “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited: Adapting Categories in 
Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 87:4 (1993), pp. 845-855; David Collier 
and Steven Levisky, “Democracy with Adjective: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” 
World Politics 49:3 (1997), pp. 430-451. 
32 Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society, p. 49. 
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“citizenship” and their cultural and political mode of connection, namely “civility,” 
can vary across culture. In other words, investigating the West’s modern imaginations 
of the individual, civility, and citizenship that constituted the core of civil society 
provides an invaluable vantage point in illuminating: first, why individualistic liberal 
pluralism has become a predominant mode of contemporary civil society, making 
republican or civic virtue traditions somewhat outdated; and second, how unique 
Korea’s non-individualistic ethical civil society predicated on the practice of chŏng is.  
 
Civil Society and Liberal-Individualistic Citizenship 
 
What then is civil society as opposed to civil society? By the most authentic 
definition, civil society is a place where civility is in need and resides.33 TABLE 2.1 
shows the location of civil society in the Western political tradition.  
 
                                                 
33 It is almost strange that “civility” has not been given sufficient attention in civil society studies. 
Some important exceptions include: Stephen L. Carter, Civility: Manners, Morals, and the Etiquette of 
Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1998); Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Democratic Civility: The History 
and Cross-Cultural Possibility of a Modern Political Ideal (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1998); Eiko Ikegami, Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese 
Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Leory Rouner (ed.), Civility (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2000); Edward Shils, The Virtue of Civility: Selected Essays on 
Liberalism, Tradition, and Civil Society, ed. Steven Grosby (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997); Robert 




Table 2.1. THE LOCATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 
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I place civil society only where “soulcraft” intersects “private,” that is, in the 
realm of liberal pluralism (and liberal moral individualism). What seems to be odd in 
this way of locating it is that civil society is not presented as a public space.34  
However ironic, this is the point. Civil society is a private space that exerts profound 
public implications, instead of being schizophrenically severed from the public. 
Likewise, civility, rather than being directly a civic virtue, is an individual’s moral 
quality that yields public effects in broader social relations. How can we come to 
terms with this ironical and convoluted dimension of civil society? What is civility as 
a defining constituent of civil society?  
First, civility is not negative freedom. In Hobbesian liberal realism or 
libertarianism a la Nozick and Friedman, a powerfully protective, if not intrusive, 
                                                 
34 Notably, the idea that civil society is a public sphere is Jűrgen Habermas’s central theme in his The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. 
Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991). 
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state goes hand in hand with possessive individualism. Here civil society has no 
coherent place of its own; oftentimes it is envisioned in terms of the competitive 
market or at worst a league of bourgeois. In this system, negative freedom is the 
operative principle par excellence. According to Adam Smith, one of the important 
originators of modern civil society, negative freedom is closely associated with 
justice as a system of punishment.  
 
Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting 
our neighbour. The man who barely abstains from violating either the person or the estate, or 
the reputation, of his neighbours, has surely very little positive merit … We may often fulfill 
all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing.35
 
By the way of contrast, civility is a certain moral-psychological mechanism by 
which to associate otherwise mutually disinterested or even hostile individual 
strangers in the market. It “stuffs” a profound lacuna that mere lawfulness can hardly 
fill in. 
Second, since civil society is diametrically opposed to any forms of the 
authoritarian regime—be it communist totalitarianism, military dictatorship, 
bureaucratic authoritarianism or absolutist monarchy, civility simply does not (and 
cannot) germinate there. People “living in a lie” tend to be entangled in the regime-
induced “neo-traditionalism” or “institutionalized clientelism.” 36  By contrasting 
“real” political activities based on groups (or associations) that share common 
interests to a highly institutionalized network of patron-client relations the party-
                                                 
35 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), II.ii.2.9 (p. 95, hereafter TMS). 
36 Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 
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regime structurally encourages in Communist China, Andrew Walder insightfully 
captures its psycho-cultural implications. 
 
[I]nstead of social atomization and the destruction of social ties not subordinated to the 
party’s aims, the neo-traditional image posits a rich subculture of instrumental-personal ties 
… In sum, instead of the totalitarian image of impersonal mobilization and social atomization, 
the neo-traditional image stresses a formally organized particularism in the distribution of 
goods, income, and career opportunities, a network of patron-client relations maintained by 
the party, and a rich subculture of instrumental-personal ties independent of the party’s 
control.37
 
Civility presupposes a uniquely modern type of individual agency that Ernest 
Gellner called a “modal self.” Originally, Gellner had in mind the “tyranny of cousins 
and of ritual” that suppresses individual moral autonomy as an antipode of the 
“conditions of liberty,” namely, civil society.38 But Walder qualifies this “tradition-
modernity binary,” for neo-traditionalism is a uniquely modern kind of the “tyranny 
of cousins.” Civility is clearly distinguished from this modern institution-originated 
socio-cultural tyranny as well. 
Thus far, I have not directly grappled with the positive definition, or 
attributes, of civility except that it is closely related with a modern type of moral 
agency. Finally, by way of contrasting civility with civic virtue we can have a better 
understanding of what is civility and what is not. Despite their common interest, that 
is, “the communal locus of individual life,” civility is qualitatively different from 
civic virtue, the central political value in classical republicanism and contemporary 
                                                 
37 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
38 “Traditional man can sometimes escape the tyranny of kings, but only at the cost of falling under the 
tyranny of cousins, and of ritual. The kin-defined, ritually orchestrated, severely demanding and life-
pervading systems the ‘ancient city’ in Fustel de Coulanges’s sense, may indeed succeed at least for a 
time in avoiding tyrannical centralization, but only at the cost of a most demanding culture, one which 
modern man would find intolerably stifling.” Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, pp. 7-8. 
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communitarianism.39 The major dividing line between the two is while civic virtue is 
self-government (soulcraft) toward the public, civility is inner-directed soulcraft, 
which produces what Adam Seligman calls “innerworldly individualism.”40 Whereas 
in civic virtue tradition what is moral is the community, in civility tradition that 
culminated in the Scottish moral psychology in the eighteenth-century (particularly in 
Adam Smith), morality denotes a private commercial man’s “sociability” (trust, 
reciprocity, mutual recognition, etc.), which constitutes the essence of civility. With 
the advent of civil society, “sociability” replaces “virtue” as the foundation of moral 
community. In the former conscience is rooted in the individual self; in the latter it is 
in a social being. In Benjamin Constant’s words, the civil society tradition embraces 
(if not being directly analogous to) the “liberty of the moderns,” while civic virtue 
tradition is predicated on the “liberty of the ancients.” 41  Seligman’s following 
statement is highly instructive on this point: 
 
This concept of man as the “complete citizen” or what can be alternatively rendered as the 
“totalization” of man as citizen was far from that tradition of social thought that we associate 
with the idea of civil society, at least as it developed in the eighteenth century among the 
                                                 
39 I conceptually distinguish classical republicanism and liberal republicanism advanced by Barber, 
Galston, Macedo, Berkowitz, and Dagger (see note 16 in this chapter) in that the latter does not attempt 
to restore a moral community of a kind that some contemporary communitarians support, even if I 
admit that the line sometimes gets fuzzy. See Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism 
and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Amitai Etzioni, 
The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (New York: Basic Books, 
1996); Mary A. Glendon and David Blankenhorn (eds.), Seedbeds of Virtue: Sources of Competence, 
Character, and Citizenship in American Society (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1995); Alasdair 
MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981); Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent. 
40 Seligman, Innerworldly Individualism. 
41 Benjamin Constant, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns,” in Political 
Writings, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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Scottish moralists. While recognizing the virtue of ancient republican government, these 
thinkers were more sensitive to the irremediable nature of historical change, and their thought 
was, consequently, more attuned to posting a new foundation for reciprocity, mutuality, and 
cooperation (and so, ultimately for virtue) and less to a return to a form of social organization 
whose efficacy in the support of virtue in eighteenth-century commercial society was 
increasingly in doubt.42
 
Stated briefly, civility is a civic virtue adapted to the modern commercial 
social condition. Attributing Rousseau and Smith to each tradition (that is, 
Rousseau’s general will to civic virtue and Smith to civil society), Seligman writes:  
 
For while subjection to the volontē gēnērale is a rational act that guarantees (public) virtue by 
the suppression of all partial (private) interest (through, we may add, the creation of a new 
corps collectif), the idea of the impartial observer is but an individual (psychological) 
mechanism through which, for Smith, the workings of mutual sympathy progressed.43
 
Whether as Seligman assumes, Rousseau’s “general will” (volontē gēnērale) 
suppresses individual wills and interests remains controversial in the contemporary 
reinterpretations of Rousseau among political theorists.44 At issue at the moment is 
the ethical ideal of civil society is “a private one, realized within the hearts, minds, 
and acts of exchange of individual social actors.”45 In the end, the idea of civil 
society, as we learn very well from Kant and Hegel, “comes to rest on the idea of 
autonomous, moral, and agentic individual as standing at the foundation of the social 
                                                 
42 Seligman, “Public and Private,” p. 108. 
43 Ibid., p. 112. 
44 Benjamin R. Barber, “Political Judgment: Philosophy as Practice,” in The Conquest of Politics, pp. 
203-211 overtly parts company with the (a la Seligman) conventional view of Rousseau as an advocate 
of romantic republicanism. See also his Strong Democracy, pp. 200-202. Charles Taylor in “Politics of 
Recognition,” in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 
albeit on a different reason, supports the modern aspect of Rousseau. 
45 Ibid., p. 114. 
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order,” which paved the way to liberal-democratic politics.46 Therefore, it is “moral 
individualism”—as opposed to “atomism” that Tocqueville feared most—that was the 
springwell of civil society. 47  This is to say that this uniquely modern type of 
individualism predicated civil society rather than was the other way around. At the 
heart of modern moral individualism was civility understood in terms of sociability. 
Therefore for the early modern moral agent, the soul of civility consisted in its 
“inwardness.” 48  Good manners and etiquette, its externalization, was indeed of 
secondary significance.  
Ultimately, what we get is a new “universal” and increasingly 
“individualistically” defined basis for the construction of communal life and 
therewith the basis of liberal-individualistic principles of citizenship. So with civil 
society the social meaning of citizenship has altered. Previously citizenship was the 
citizens’ common fate in the polis to which thick and vehement affection was central. 
In contrast, the citizenship in modern civil society embraces the irrevocable reality, 
namely, “a fatherless world” that entailed from the disintegration of the great chain of 
being as a departing point of social imagination. Hence, modern citizenship is 
premised on what Adam Smith calls “strangership,” an imagined civil tie amongst 
                                                 
46 Ibid., p. 119. 
47 Tocqueville, Democracy, pp. 479-485. On “moral individualism,” see Villa, “Individualism.” Also 
see Kateb, The Inner Ocean. On an “atomistic” interpretation of modern individualism, see Charles 
Taylor, “Atomism,” in Philosophy, pp. 187-210. 
48 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov (eds.), 
Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1999), pp. 43-44. Also see Nathan Tarcov, Locke’s Education for Liberty (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 1998), 137-141. For some deliberative democrats like Mark Warren, inward civility 
in terms of reciprocity, trust, and recognition is one of the important developmental effects of 
associational life on individuals. Warren, Democracy and Association, pp. 72-75. 
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mutually disinterested or even mutually hostile individuals. 49  Again, liberal 
individualism, instead of thick social affect, is the moral and social buttress of 
strangership. 
To summarize: First, civility is more than negative freedom but less than 
positive freedom. Second, civility does not abdicate possessive individualism, but still 
has in it a longing for civic virtue. Third, civil society endorses the market 
(Gesellschaft), but still has in it a vision of communal life (Gemeinschaft).50 Fourth, 
civil society is private, but has profound implications on the public. Fifth, civil 
society (civility), in effect, mediates those dichotomous qualities: between negative 
freedom and positive freedom, between possessive individualism and civic virtue, 
between market and community, and between private (individuality) and public 
(citizenship). Sixth, the key that makes possible such alchemy lies in a uniquely 
modern type of individualism—that is, “moral individualism.” And seventh, in civil 
society, citizenship is redefined in terms of “strangership.”    
  
The Transcendental Basis of Civil Society: A Weberian Thesis 
 
                                                 
49  On Smith’s idea of “strangership,” see Lisa Hill and Peter McCarthy, “On Friendship and 
Necessitudo in Adam Smith,” History of the Human Science 17:4 (2004), pp. 1-16; Allan Silver, 
““Two Different Sorts of Commerce”—Friendship and Strangership in Civil Society,” in Jeff 
Weintraub and Krishan Kumar (eds.), Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a 
Grand Dichotomy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
50  Ferdinand Tőnnies’s classic Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft has long been misinterpreted that 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are mutually exclusive and civil society is a contractual Gesellschaft 
that has superseded a traditional Gemeinschaft. In Tőnnies, however, the two are empirically (if not 
conceptually) inseparable from each other. That is, in a modern civil society, both Gesellschaft and 
Gemeinschaft are profoundly interwoven. See his Community and Civil Society, ed. Jose Harris and 
trans. Jose Harris and Margaret Hollis (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001), pp. 64-65. 
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Finally, it is to be added, civil society is beyond secular and sacred. Or, civil society’s 
modern and secular nature is deeply rooted in its sacred origin. It is worth special 
attention because without it the other seven aspects of civil society that I have just 
enumerated cannot be materialized. In fact, Ernest Gellner’s Conditions of Liberty 
revolves around this very theme, in which he points out the Protestant citizen-saints’ 
religious enthusiasm as the source of self-discipline and, however ironic, as the 
condition of liberty. 
 
…enthusiasm is a friend to liberty after all! Individualist, doctrine-centred, serious faith, 
which abolishes priesthood by turning every man into his own priest, and lays upon him the 
burden of his own surveillance and the perpetual and intense anxiety this brings in its train—
strangely but indubitably, all this is the ally of freedom!51
 
Undoubtedly, Gellner makes a Weberian point. The Protestant citizen-saints’ 
enthusiasm was propelled by their onto-epistemological anxiety (“Am I among the 
saved?”) that resulted from the collapse of the medieval Christendom, the traditional 
basis of onto-epistemology. What was occasioned in the course of resolving this 
critical onto-epistemological, ethico-religious crisis was the reorientation of the man’s 
onto-epistemological basis, from the external to the internal, which gave rise to the 
highly subjective self. Gellner writes: “Unable to ensure that the will of God be done 
on earth as it is in heaven, they turn inward, impose it on themselves, and in the outer 
world turn towards productive activity as much as to religious zeal.”52 What Gellner 
implies is the strong subjectivism, instead of leading to the conclusion of 
unsociability and/or nihilism, turned into, what Kalberg calls, “world mastery 
                                                 
51 Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, p. 46. 
52 Ibid., p. 48. 
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individualism.” 53  Its economic implication is well-known: The religious anxiety 
propelled capital-accumulating asceticism as self-assurance of the predestined 
salvation. Gellner makes just this point, associating (free) economic activity to 
political liberty. But its far-reaching “political” implications are hardly revealed—that 
is, a strong, activity-oriented individualism required that the devout hold others 
responsible for their conduct, which further justified his or her right to political 
resistance in terms of a “religious obligation.” Kalberg submits, 
 
All, in the new ‘City on the Hill’, must now demonstrate allegiance to God and uphold His 
Commandments, for in His community ‘weakness and ‘worldly evil’ must be mastered. A 
passive acceptance of evil was prohibited: the faithful must ‘be strong’ and act against evil. 
Moreover, with Reform Calvinism, believers now stood under a religious obligation, should 
rulers violate God’s decrees, to protest against and overthrow such ‘illegitimate’ authority.54
 
This is to say that the subjective self accompanied a unique and peculiar 
principle of association that guaranteed mutual surveillance and self-discipline. 
Weber called such a newly empowered self “Berufsmensch,” who is “strong, goal-
oriented, confident, controlled, methodical, ethical, and yet free from debilitating 
angsts.”55 What is important is, as Kim has recently argued, that “this type of self was 
cultivated in a society predicated on recalcitrant individuality that does not 
necessarily negate, and in fact actively promotes, social bonding.”56 This special form 
                                                 
53 Kalberg, “Tocqueville and Weber,” pp. 205-208. 
54 Ibid., p. 207. 
55 Kim, Max Weber’s Politics of Civil Society, p. 48. 
56 Ibid., p. 59. Even though Tocqueville was right in his fear about the tyranny of the majority that 
stems from atomistic individualism in the democratic conditions of equality, his view of the individual 
as fundamentally passive and timid should be reconsidered. This is because it was rather the self-
disciplined and religiously enthusiastic “citizen-saints” that constructed and enlivened associational 
life in New England, the aspect Tocqueville admired. As an aristocrat, Tocqueville failed to see the 
54
 
of individualism can be called “transcendental individualism,” central to which is the 
fact that individual and society are mutually enhancing. It was indeed the 
transcendental tenets of individualism such as self-discipline, mutual recognition and 
respect (originally in the way of mutual surveillance), and trust (originally on the 
basis of sectarian ties) that pave the way to “moral individualism” in the more 
secularized modern West. Put differently, sect society was the modal form of modern 
civil society and civility as private and individual quality was profoundly grounded in 
religious soulcraft. Seligman well captures the Protestant origin of moral 
individualism that underlies a modern civil society when he says, 
 
The doctrine would undergo radical changes during the Protestant Reformation. Indeed … our 
notion of the ethically autonomous individual—upon which the idea of civil society rested—
is predicated on the introjection within the individual of a particular dimension of grace which 
had previously been in otherworldly terms.57
 
The fact that civil society was originally a “charismatic community” where 
the Protestant saints’ pure charisma was institutionalized in society58 and that moral 
individualism is rooted in transcendental individualism provides an important insight 
into the nature of the modern Western civil society. Both the atomism that horrified 
Tocqueville a century-and-a-half ago and the “unencumbered,” “right-centered” 
individualism that worries many today’s social and political theorists result from the 
evaporation of the transcendental quality of individualism. And it is this special type 
of individualism that the most non-Western parts of the world cannot readily avail 
                                                                                                                                           
moral capacity of burgeoning individualism, thus mistaking the result (associational life) for the cause 
(individual-empowerment). See Kalberg, “Tocqueville and Weber,” pp. 208-209. 
57 Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, p. 67. 
58 Seligman, Innerworldly Individualism, p. 6. 
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themselves of. Understandably, for the social theorists in the neo-Weberian strain, the 
single most important moral task is how to reinvigorate such transcendental 
individual agency that is in accordance with a drastically altered social order. 
Likewise, for the contemporary advocates of Weberian-Millian (or Kantian-Hegelian) 
moral individualism, the revivification of the transcendental forces of modern 
individualism is critical in overcoming the “liberal versus communitarian” 
schizophrenia.  
But what options do non-Westerners have, to whom the discourse of 
individualism and civil society is in its entirety so new? Without complicating the 
issue by asking whether non-Western societies had its own indigenous form of civil 
societies, the question I want to ask is, Can we construct a liberal civil society without 
necessarily embracing individualism? Or, how can we achieve individual agency and 
citizenship without positing transcendental (or moral) individualism? My search for 
liberal collectivism or a transcendental collectivistic civil society in post-Confucian 










In the mid 1980s, university students supported by various intellectuals including 
professors, teachers, pastors, and journalists have played a crucial role in leading pro-
democracy movements against the authoritarian regime in Korea.1 Even Korea’s 
vehement labor movement of that period could not have garnered such a strong 
popular support without their alliance with the student movement.2 On the surface, it 
appears to have been revolutionary socialism and anti-imperialism inspired by 
Marxist theories that drove the students to the street—two pillars of the Korean 
student activism, Proletarian-Democratic (PD) and National-Liberation (NL) 
movements. Certainly, both the PD’s unflagging demands of social justice upon the 
late capitalistic bureaucratic authoritarian regime and the NL’s adamant espousal of 
(substantial) national independence from the imperialistic power (i.e. U.S.) in part 
helped to erode the legitimacy of the authoritarian governments practically backed by 
the US, whose foreign policy was then concentrated on winning in the Cold War, 
sometimes at the expense of siding with pseudo liberal-democratic regimes.  
Therefore, the year 1987 is for many Koreans marked by a puzzle. It is 
because Marxist activism is seen to have contributed not only to the breakdown of the 
                                                 
1  Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea; Namhee Lee, “The South Korean Student 
Movement: ‘Undongkwŏn’ as a Counter-public Space,” Armstrong, Korean Society, pp. 132-164; Park 
Mi, “Organizing Dissent against Authoritarianism: The South Korean Student Movement in the 
1980s,” Korea Journal 45:3 (2005), pp. 261-289.  
2 See Namhee Lee, “Representing the Worker: The Worker-Intellectual Alliance of the 1980s in South 
Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies 64:4 (2005), pp. 911-937. 
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authoritarian regime, but, ironically, to the transition to a liberal democracy, which 
they (even including student activists) believe to be the pillar opposite of Marxism. It 
is for this reason that Korean political scientists have rather stressed the significance 
of the role played by a series of labor movements that followed students-led national 
demonstrations in actualizing democratic transition. In this view, while radical 
student movements precipitated the regime erosion, it was the collisions of class 
interest that in effect made the democratic transition real.3 But can’t we explain the 
contribution of the student activism to the democratic transition more directly without 
implicating it in the controversy of ideology, i.e., the incompatibility of Marxist 
socialism and liberal democracy? 
What has been largely dismissed in the existing explanations, however, is the 
role of “ideal interests” in the dissenting activists’ social and political action. 
According to Max Weber, “Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern 
men’s conduct.” “Yet,” continues Weber, “very frequently the ‘world images’ that 
have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which 
action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.”4 But what is “ideal interests” 
as—at least conceptually—opposed to material interests? In unraveling this enigmatic 
concept, Ann Swidler has offered a helpful guideline when she submits: “Ideal 
interests, such as the desire to be saved from the torments of hell, are also ends-
                                                 
3  For a theoretical support, see Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens, 
Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Also see Hagen 
Koo, “Middle Classes, Democratization, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea,” Theory and 
Society 20:2 (1991), pp. 485-509. 
4 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. & ed. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 280. 
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oriented, except that these ends are derived from symbolic realities.”5 Here Swidler 
reinterprets what Weber calls “the dynamic of interest” in terms of “symbolic 
realities.” Upon this insight, she suggests conceiving of culture as a “tool kit” of skills 
and habits, a repertoire from which “strategies of action” can be derived.6
Swidler’s understanding of culture as a repertoire of strategies of action 
provides a profound insight into the symbolic (hence more than ideological) 
dynamics played in the democratic transition in Korea. For what indeed imparted 
“legitimacy” to the students’ political demands derived from the moral and ethical 
discourse embedded in Korea’s Confucian culture.7 What is distinctive in Korea’s 
democratizing student activism, however, is that in the course of action the students 
grew to embody proactively the cultural meaning of their political action and, 
furthermore, became equipped with a particularly Confucian set of ethico-political 
conviction, namely, “anti-autocracism.” Put differently, Confucian ethic, if not 
Confucian ideology, was reinstated in their heart, empowering their individual 
agency. So the puzzle mentioned above needs recast: it is not so much students’ 
Marxist doctrines and platforms (i.e. anti-capitalism or anti-imperialism) but their 
Confucian conviction (i.e. anti-autocracism) that ignited the students’ heroic 
democratizing actions. 
                                                 
5 Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review 51:2 
(1986), p. 274. 
6 Ibid., pp. 276-277. 
7 Without alluding to civil society, Helgesen brilliantly demonstrates how Confucianism has been a 
crucial cultural undercurrent of contemporary Korean democratic politics, furnishing all varieties of 
culturally articulated political languages and practices. Geir Helgesen, Democracy and Authority in 
Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 1998).  
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Interestingly, since 1988, Korea’s nation-wide ethical/political civil society 
has never waned. Is “Confucian activism” still in operation? Can we call Korean 
ethical civil society a “Confucian civil society”? Notwithstanding the salient 
similarity between the democratizing ethical civil society and the consolidating civil 
society,8 though, there are two appreciable differences between them in terms of 
initiative and character. First, while Korea’s democratizing civil society was 
organized and led by social elites (i.e. intellectuals composed of university students, 
professors, pastors, and journalists), its consolidating counterpart is in the main 
organized and activated in terms of “citizens’ movement” (simin undong). The 
initiative has shifted from the elites to the citizens. Second, the militant radicalism 
that characterized Korea’s democratizing civil society has been at large subdued. 
Instead, Korea’s consolidating civil society is remarkably deradicalized and is more 
quotidian, although it is still far from the West’s much more quotidian, localized, and 
membership-oriented associational life. What makes Korea’s consolidating civil 
society distinct from its democratizing counterpart? If a consolidating civil society is 
qualitatively different from its “Confucian” predecessor, how, and in what sense, does 
this contribute to distinctively Korean citizenship?  
In this chapter, I argue that the “Confucian transcendental individualism,” predicated 
on the cultural institution of ren, helped to vitalize Korean ethical civil society during 
the period of democratic transition.9 But to explain and illuminate a unique cultural 
                                                 
8 Kim, “South Korea.”  
9 Taiwan, another important Confucian country, is also reported to have had a similar Confucian 
influence in its makeup of an ethical civil society during the democratic transition. See Thomas B. 
Gold, “Civil Society in Taiwan: The Confucian Dimension,” in Tu Wei-ming (ed.), Confucian 
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dynamic in Korean ethical civil society after democratization, I present a cultural 
practice of chŏng—“familial affectionate sentiments”—as a key mechanism of 
enhancement of democratic citizenship and self-empowerment. By reinterpreting 
chŏng as a collectivized or popularized (or in a Weber’s language “routinzed”) 
version of ren in contemporary Korean social condition, I maintain that chŏng-
induced transcendentalism, which I call “transcendental collectivism,” is less 
individualistic and less heroic than ren-induced transcendental individualism. My 
central claim is that it is chŏng-induced transcendental collectivism that has greatly 
contributed to democratic consolidation in Korea. The chapter is divided into two 
main parts. In the first part, I investigate what is Confucian transcendental 
individualism and how it facilitated Korea’s democratic transition, while in the 
second I examine how chŏng-induced transcendental collectivism contributed to 
citizen-empowerment in democratized Korea. Therefore, this chapter embarks upon 
an intra-cultural comparative political analysis and theorization. 
 
Confucian Transcendental Individualism and Democratizing Civil Society 
 
 “This Culture” and Democratic Martyrdom: Korean Civil Society in 1987
Traditionally, Korean intellectuals regarded the role of an intellectual as “the 
conscience of society” or as “a watchman in the darkness.”10 In fact, this image of the 
pure embodiment of morality (as opposed to corrupted political power) is typically 
Confucian. According to Lunyu, (The Analects of Confucius), a wise man who 
                                                                                                                                           
Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four 
Mini-Dragons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 244-258. 
10 Namhee Lee, “Making Minjung Subjectivity: Crisis of Subjectivity and Re-writing History, 1960-
1988.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001, pp. 18, 45. 
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interviewed Confucius is alleged to have said to Confucius’ distressed disciples, 
“Why worry over the loss of office, my friends? All under tian 天 [Heaven] have long 
been since lost their way (dao 道), and tian is going to use your Master [Confucius] 
as a wooden bell-clapper.”11 One of the most famous stories about the hardships that 
Confucius endured as a “wooden bell-clapper” to the world is as follows: 
 
When the Master was surrounded in Kuang, he said, “With King Wen 文 long dead, does not 
our cultural heritage (wen 文) reside here in us? If tian 天 were going to destroy this legacy, 
we latecomers would not have had access to it. If tian is not going to destroy this culture, what 
can the people of Kuang do to me!12
 
 
Of course, this Confucian defense of moral culture (“This Culture”13 or si wen 
斯文), to which political criticism is central, is hardly a feature unique to Korean 
Confucianism. But, as Lucian Pye observes, among the four post-Confucian countries 
(China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan), in Korea under the Joseon dynasty (1392-
1910)—where neo-Confucianism, a revivified Confucianism in Song China (960-
1279) that was more orthodox in its scholarly interpretation of the Confucian canons 
and more rigorous in its moral stance, was fully-blown—“the tension between 
morality and force [political power] was most extreme.”14  According to Pye, in 
                                                 
11 Analects 3:24. 
12 Analects 9:5. 
13 For the cultural implications of the concept “This Culture” in the Confucian intellectual history, see 
Peter K. Bol, “This Culture of Ours”: Intellectual Transitions in T’ang and Sung China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1992). 
14 Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 83. 
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Korea, “Confucianism contributed to a concept of power which accentuated the 
purposefulness of the Japanese approach and the elitist sense of virtue of the Chinese, 
a combination which has produced a bold, risk-taking style of action.”15 Nothing can 
more clearly illustrate “a bold, risk taking style of action” in Korean Confucianism 
than the four-time literati purge in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Joseon Korea in 
which young, more ideologically committed, neo-Confucian scholar-bureaucrats, 
backed by rural Confucian scholars, were brutally persecuted by the autocrats.16 In 
my judgment, despite multiple factors that contributed to the pulling-down of Korea’s 
military authoritarian regime in 1987, the proximate cause that “triggered” the 
ordinary Koreans’ grand collective action was the recurrent cultural (Confucian) 
image of the struggle between the ruthless autocrat and the righteous young 
intellectuals.  
In this regard, two events were singularly instrumental in bolstering the power 
of the democracy coalition between the opposition New Korean Democratic Party 
and social groups in civil society and maintaining the high level of mass mobilization. 
First, on January 14, 1987, Bak Jong-cheol, a Seoul National University student, was 
tortured to death during a police interrogation. Initially, the police announced that 
Bak had died of a heart attack. On May 18, however, the National Catholic Priests’ 
Corps for the Realization of Justice disclosed that Bak had died under torture and the 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 58. 
16 On the literati purges in the Joseon dynasty, see Edward W. Wagner, The Literati Purges: Political 
Conflict in Early Yi Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974) and Sungmoon Kim, 
“Between Confucian Ideology and the State: A New Approach to Understanding the Literati Purge of 
1519,” The Review of Korean Studies 5:2 (2002), pp. 233-260. 
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police and the Chun Doo-hwan regime had attempted to conceal the fact.17 Bak’s 
innocent murder and the revelation of the regime’s conspiracy to cover up the crime 
outraged Korean citizens, giving colossal impetus to civil society groups to establish 
the National Movement Headquarters for a Democratic Constitution. The most 
impending purpose of this grand civil coalition was to protest against Chun Doo-
hwan’s abrupt announcement on April 13, 1987, that he would cancel negotiating for 
constitutional revision, which was to disband a competitive presidential election and 
sustain the authoritarianism of the ruling party. 
Civil outrage hit its zenith when Yi Han-yeol, a junior at Yonsei University, 
was hit by tear gas bomb fragments on June 9 and injured critically (Yi died on July 5 
due to brain damage.). As university students were brutally attacked and killed by 
police, it became crystal-clear to the entire Korean nation that Chun’s regime was not 
essentially differentiated from the autocracy of the kind against which their 
Confucian ancestors unflaggingly protested, even jeopardizing their own lives. On 
June 18, the National Movement Headquarters declared “A Day to Expel Tear Gas,” 
upon which thousands of Korean mothers took to the street, holding the pickets that 
read, “Don’t Shoot Tear Gas [and] Please Save Our Children” or “Bring Back Our 
Beloved Han-yeol!” On June 26, it held a “peace parade” in which one million people 
participated nationwide; this eventually elicited from the regime the “June 29 
Declaration” to hold a direct presidential election.  
Certainly, Bak Jong-cheol’s murder and Yi Han-yeol’s injury (and subsequent 
death) brought to the minds of ordinary Korean citizens vividly the cultural (as well 
                                                 
17 Kim, “South Korea,” p. 146. 
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as political) implications of the “war” they were drawn into. On the surface, it was a 
battle between illegitimate, violent, and repressive dictatorship, on the one side, and 
legitimate, peaceful, and democratic citizenship, on the other. But, underneath, it was 
a familiar image of the martyrdom of moral heroes who sacrificed their innocent lives 
to protect “This Culture” (si wen 斯文), a civil culture opposed to the military 
authoritarian ruling. Put differently, under the slogan “Down with the Military 
Authoritarian Regime and up with a Civil Government” (Gunjeong Jongsik Munmin 
Jeongbu), a recurrent theme of moral martyrdom was reproduced in terms of 
“democratic martyrdom.”18
Where did such remarkable moral and cultural heroism come from? Thus far, I 
have only hinted at its Confucian origin. But, does Confucianism really furnish such 
an intense ethical tension? Moreover, does Confucianism truly underpin such strong 
moral individualism to the extent that it can even transform the political world? But 
isn’t the idea “radical Confucianism” an oxymoron as much as is the concept 
“Confucian democracy”? Notably, Samuel Huntington best summarizes the received 
wisdom of Confucianism: “Confucian heritage, with its emphasis on authority, order, 
hierarchy, and supremacy of the collectivity over the individual, creates obstacles 
democratization.”19 As will be shown shortly, Huntington’s view of Confucianism is 
not only superficial but, more problematic, misrepresenting its essence, that is, its 
“thisworldly transcendental” quality. Huntington is simply silent about this aspect of 
Confucianism.  
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 147. 
19 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 




Ren, Transcendental Individualism, and Moral Heroism in Confucian Moralpolitik 
 
The conventional authoritarian image of Confucianism was provided by, among 
others, Max Weber.20 Famously, Weber defined Confucianism in terms of a religion 
of “worldly adjustment,” and saw in it no ethical momentum of transcendental 
tension between worldly and sacred, which in his view offered a powerful locomotive 
to modernity in the West.21 According to Weber, modernity as a special ethico-
religious, sociopolitical and economic arrangement can be made possible only if 
transcendence (or God) has been internalized within the self.  Of course, for him its 
                                                 
20  For the classic presentation of the “authoritarian” image of Confucianism, see Etinne Balazs, 
Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) and Karl Wittfogel, 
Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). 
But these earlier studies of Chinese civilization tend to mistakenly confuse Confucianism and 
Legalism, although after the Qin and especially Han dynasties, so-called “Legalistic Confucianism” 
held a position of state ideology. Even though some contemporary social scientists occasionally 
mistake “Legalistic Confucianism” for the authentic representative of Confucianism, Tu Wei-ming 
argues that “Legalistic Confucianism” is merely a “politicized Confucianism,” that is, a certain 
degeneration from its original form, not a type of Confucianism. See Tu Wei-ming, “Probing the 
“Three Bonds” and “Five Relationships” in Confucian Humanism,” in Walter H. Slote and George A. 
DeVos (eds.), Confucianism and the Family (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 
122-124. According to Levenson, the perennial tension between Confucianism and Legalism was the 
defining characteristic of China’s traditional politics. Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its 
Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), especially, vol. 2. For the 
concept of “Legalistic Confucianism,” see Chaibong Hahm and Wooyeal Paik, “Legalistic 
Confucianism and Economic Development in East Asia,” Journal of East Asian Studies 3:3 (2003), pp. 
461-491. 
21 Weber famously writes: “Confucianism, like Buddhism, consisted only of ethics and in this Tao 
corresponds to the Indian dharma. However, in sharp contrast to Buddhism, Confucianism exclusively 
represented an innerworldly morality of laymen. Confucianism meant adjustment to the world, to its 
orders and conventions. Ultimately it represented just tremendous codes of political maxims and rules 
of social propriety for cultured men of the world.” Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism 
and Taoism, trans. & ed. Hans H. Gerth (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 152. 
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model case was the Protestant “saint” in seventeenth-century New England. 22  
Moreover, for Weber, a civil society that was to him actually “sect society” was 
typically a modern phenomenon that intersects the secular and sacred.23 Accordingly, 
since he believed Confucian ethic shows only an “elective affinity” with modern 
transcendental ethic (as it lacks the agonizing onto-epistemological crisis that 
occasions the internalization of transcendence—hence calling it “an innerworldly 
morality of laymen”), Weber thought Confucianism could never breed modernity 
from within. Whether modernity or civil society, in Weber’s complex ethico-religious 
and sociopolitical framework, the point is always concentrated on this enigmatic 
theme, the “internalization of transcendence,” which produces a special and uniquely 
modern type of individualism, namely, “transcendental individualism.”24
However, some contemporary students of Confucianism, who are, for their 
sociological perspectives on religion, greatly indebted to Weber himself, roundly 
reject this Weberian thesis. Finding in Confucianism a special mode of transcendental 
tension, these scholars characterize Confucianism as faith of “thisworldly 
transcendentalism.”25 S. N. Eisenstadt presents its most classic statement: 
                                                 
22 Weber, The Protestant Ethic. 
23  Weber, ““Churches” and “Sects””; Kim, Max Weber’s Politics of Civil Society; Seligman, 
Innerworldly Individualism. 
24 Seligman, Innerworldly Individualism. Also see Kalberg, “Tocqueville and Weber”; Seligman, The 
Ideal of Civil Society, pp. 59-99. 
25 S. N. Eisenstadt, “This Worldly Transcendentalism and the Structuring of the World: Weber’s 
‘Religion of China’ and the Format of Chinese History and Civilization,” Journal of Developing 
Societies 1 (1985), pp. 168-186; SangJun Kim, “The Genealogy of Confucian Moralpolitik and Its 
Implications for Modern Civil Society,” in Armstrong, Korean Society, pp. 57-91; Benjamin I. 
Schwartz, “The Age of Transcendence,” in China and Other Matters (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 




There did, however, develop in China a special mode of definition of this tension, as well as a 
special conception of its resolution. In the classical Chinese belief system this tension between 
the transcendental and mundane order was couched in relatively secular terms, i.e., in terms of 
a metaphysical and/or ethical—not a religious—distinction between these two orders.  … This 
“secular” definition of such tension and the rationalizing tendencies involved became here 




The central point is this: the internalization of transcendence of the sort that 
was occasioned in the modern West took place—of course in a culturally nuanced 
way—in “the classical Chinese belief system,” namely, in Confucianism. And, 
according to Benjamin Schwartz, it happened when Confucius “turned inward to the 
source of ren.”27  
Although ren casually refers to humane sentiments like pity, compassion, 
and/or commiseration in a phenomenological level,28 in the Mencian Confucianism 
that had comprised the mainstream of the Confucian tradition, it is understood to be 
more basic, forming a deep moral presence that pervades and informs the 
fundamental nature of human beings.29 That is to say, ren takes on universal ethical 
                                                                                                                                           
University of New York Press, 1990); Tu Wei-ming, Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in 
Confucian Thought (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979). 
26 Eisenstadt, “This Worldly Transcendentalism,” p. 171. 
27 Schwartz, “The Age of Transcendence,” p. 67. 
28 D. C. Lau (trans.) Mencius (New York: Penguin, 1970), 2A:6: “The heart of commiseration is the 
phenomenological clue of ren” (my translation). Put differently, Mencius informs that moral 
sentiments like compassion, pity, and commiseration are not ren itself, but only its phenomenological 
manifestations. 
29 On the bifurcation of Confucian philosophy into two competing schools—the school of ren (inner 
morality) led by Zengzi, Zi Si, and above all, Mencius, on the one hand, and the school of li 禮 (ritual 
propriety) spearheaded by Xunzi, on the other—after the demise of Confucius, see Hsiao Kung-chuan, 




significance and moves beyond the confines of humane feelings.30 According to 
Mencius, ren engraved a priori in human nature is originally endowed by tian, or 
Heaven understood as a totality of cosmic and moral order, thus making human 
nature inherently good and moral. 
 
‘As far as what is genuinely in him is concerned, a man is capable of becoming good,’ said 
Mencius. ‘That is what I mean by good. As for his becoming bad, that is not the fault of his 
native endowment. The heart of compassion is possessed by all men alike … Benevolence, 
dutifulness, observance of the rites, and wisdom do not give me a luster from the outside; 
they are in me originally …The Odes say: “Heaven produces the teeming masses/And where 
is a thing there is a norm./If the people held on to their constant nature,/They would be 
drawn to superior virtue.” …’31
 
 
Famously, Mencius conceptualized morality that is innate in human beings in 
terms of four categories: ren made manifest as compassion and/or commiseration (ce 
yin zhi xin 惻隱之心),  i 義 as righteousness or dutifulness (xiu wu zhi xin 羞惡之心), 
li 禮 as observance of the rites/rituals (ci rang zhi xin 辭讓之心), and zhi 智 as right-
wrong judgment or wisdom (shi fei zhi xin 是非之心). But, ren is not to be 
understood as merely one of the cardinal moral virtues in Confucian philosophy. In 
fact, as Wing-tsit Chan has noted, in Mencius (and Confucius for that matter) ren, 
while being one of them, encompasses all other categories of morality. 32  Put 
differently, ren is not only a particular moral virtue that is made manifest in particular 
                                                 
30 For this pre-phenomenological, metaphysical, nature of ren, see Alan K. L. Chan, “Does xiao come 
before ren?,” in Alan K. L. Chan and Sor-hoon Tan (eds.), Filial Piety in Chinese Thought and History 
(London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 154. 
31 Mencius, 6A:6. 
32 Wing-tsit Chan, “The Evolution of the Confucian Concept Jen,” Philosophy East and West 4:4 
(1955), pp. 295-319. 
69
 
modes of sentiments such as pity, compassion, love, etc. but, more important, it is 
what makes other moral virtues (i.e. i, li, zhi) possible. All other moral virtues are in 
turn to fulfill the ethical mission of ren in each moral action. Therefore, in the 
Mencian Confucianism, ren is considered a comprehensive system of morality. Or, 
ren is simply equated with morality. 
For Mencius, that ren (or morality) that is Heaven-given is innate in human 
nature has a far-reaching, “political,” implication beyond the philosophical 
justification that human nature is originally good.33 It was what took place in all 
“Axial Age” civilizations, “a far-reaching restructuring of the conception of the 
relation between the political and the higher, transcendental order.” About this 
general pattern of moralpolitik, Schwartz writes: 
 
The political order—as the central locus or framework of the mundane order—in these 
civilizations has usually been conceived of as lower than the transcendental one and 
accordingly had to be restructured according to the premises of the latter … Accordingly, 
there appeared the possibility of calling a ruler to judgment in the name of higher order to 
which the rulers are accountable.34
 
 
In the Confucian tradition, the cosmic moral order of Heaven and the 
philosophy of ren that is predicated on it formed a uniquely Confucian mode of the 
reconstruction of the order between the sacred (or the transcendental) and the secular 
(or the political). Thus understood, the Confucian secular order is simultaneously and 
inherently sacred. Following Herbert Fingarette’s famous characterization, it can be 
                                                 
33 Recently, Ackerly has proposed to revivify the political dimension of ren to (re)invent a Confucian-
style democracy. See Brooke A. Ackerly, “Is Liberalism the Only Way toward Democracy?: 
Confucianism and Democracy,” Political Theory 33:4 (2005), pp. 547-576. 
34 Eisenstadt, “This Worldly Transcendentalism,” p. 173. 
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called “secular as sacred.”35 What is acquired is a very strong individual agency, a 
new type of carriers of the cultural and social order, namely, of “This Culture.”  
 
For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own nature, and a 
man who knows his own nature will know Heaven. By retaining his heart and nurturing his 
nature he is serving Heaven. Whether he is going to die young or live to a ripe old age 
makes no difference to his steadfastness of purpose. It is through awaiting whatever is to 
befall him with a perfected character that he stands firm on his proper destiny.36
 
 
The Confucian transcendental individualism seems to be even more intense 
than is the Protestant transcendental individualism, when Mencius says: 
 
Life is what I want; righteousness is also what I want. If I cannot have both, I would choose 
righteousness rather than life. On the one hand, though life is what I want, there is 
something I want more than life. That is why I do not cling to life at all costs. On the other 
hand, though death is what I loathe, there is something I loathe more than death. That is why 
there are troubles I do not avoid … In other words, there are things a man wants more than 
                                                 
35 See Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). 
Despite his insightful characterization of Confucius’ thisworldly transcendental teaching, however, 
with Schwartz, I find Fingarette’s idea problematic that Confucius was completely indifferent to the 
self’s inner-world and that ren (morality) is merely derivative from li (ritual performance). That is, 
Fingarette—albeit consciously because of his strong opposition to the Western analytical philosophical 
tradition’s reductionism—dismisses the transcendental dimension of ren (and of the self) in the ancient 
Confucianism. For Schwartz’s criticism of Fingarette, see Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of 
Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 
1985), pp. 78-85. Certainly, having in mind Fingarette’s powerful interpretation of the relation 
between ren and li, Tu Wei-ming most clearly defends the inherent value of ren (that is, at least 
philosophically, independent of li) and its thisworldly transcendental quality. Tu writes: “The 
Confucianists, especially in the Neo-Confucian tradition, therefore, refuse to accept the relevance of a 
personal God in the transcendental sense but add a transcendental and religious dimension to the 
“subjectivity” of jen [ren] that is both functional and substantial in the self-decision-making process … 
Accordingly, jen is not primarily a concept of human relations, although they are extremely crucial to 
it. It is a rather a principle of inwardness. By “inwardness,” it is meant that jen is not a quality acquired 
from outside … Hence, jen as an inner morality is not caused by the mechanism of li from outside.” 
Tu, Humanity and Self-Cultivation, p. 9. 
36 Mencius, 7A:1. 
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life and there are also things he loathes more than death. This is an attitude not confined to 
the moral man but common to all men. The moral man simply never loses it.37
 
 
Ultimately, a strong commitment to “This Culture” enables an otherwise 
powerless man of ren (mostly a Confucian intellectual) to transform himself into a 
vehement critic of the existing political order. Hence, Schwartz writes: “The non-
political elites tended to view themselves as being on a par with and even superior to 
the political authorities as potentially accountable to themselves.”38 Julia Ching’s 
following statement is more detailed although her focus is particularly on neo-
Confucian intellectuals: 
 
The authority to which they gave adherence was higher than the state, which saw itself as 
guardian of classical exegesis, higher even than the classics. They relied primarily on their 
own authority, as self-appointed interpreters of the sacred message. Their claim was to solid 
classical learning, but particularly to their own insights into the spiritual meaning of the 
texts. For this reason, in the political realm, they acted as moral judges of their sovereign 
rather than as dutiful ministers.39
 
    
But nothing is more striking than Mencius’ own words, when he said to King 
Xuan of Qi: “If a prince treats his subjects as his hands and feet, they will treat him as 
their belly and heart. If he treats them as his horses and hounds, they will treat him as 
a mere fellow-countryman. If he treats them as mud and weeks, they will treat him as 
an enemy.”40
Admittedly, the transcendental tensions between the political and the moral 
became far intensified as the philosophy of ren grew full-fledged in the neo-
                                                 
37 Mencius, 6A:10. 
38 Schwartz, “This Worldly Transcendentalism,” p. 175. 
39 Julia Ching, “The Goose Lake Monastery Debate,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1:2 (1974), p. 
175. 
40 Mencius, 4B:3. 
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Confucianism, the reformed Confucianism that emerged in the eleventh-century in 
Song China (960-1279) and fully-blown in Joseon Korea (1392-1910) since the 
sixteenth-century, which—by drawing and creatively developing upon the Mencian 
metaphysical Confucianism—transformed classical Confucianism into a 
comprehensive metaphysical system that constructs within it a seamless continuum 
from human nature (xing 性), to cosmic/moral principle (li 理), and to Heaven (tian 
天) or the Heavenly Way (tian-dao 天道).41 In neo-Confucian political reality, the 
inherent tension between the cosmic/moral order and the mundane/political order 
unfolded in terms of an “institutionalized” rivalry between the monarchical power 
(based on the Princely-Line or wang-tung 王 統 ) and the Confucian scholarly 
authority (underpinned by the Sagely-Line or dao-tung 道統 ). 42  Zhu Xi (1130-
                                                 
41 For a very good summary of the system of neo-Confucian philosophy, see Masao Maruyama, 
Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, trans. Mikiso Hane (Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1974), pp. 19-68. Also see Wm. Theodore de Bary, Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the 
Learning of the Mind-and-Heart (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 67-185. For the 
(neo-)Confucian transformation of Korea, see Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of 
Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology (Cambridge, MA: The Council on East Asian Studies of the 
Harvard University, 1992) and Wm. Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Haboush (eds.), The Rise of 
Neo-Confucianism in Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). 
42 For a political theoretical investigation of this rivalry, see Sungmoon Kim, “Too Rational To Be 
Modernized?: Confucian Rationality and political Modernity in Traditional Korea,” The Review of 
Korea Studies 9:4 (2006), pp.135-168. For an intellectual historical discussion of the tensions between 
the rulership and the ministership, see, for China, John W. Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy: 
Professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1983) and Alan Wood, Limits to Autocracy: From Sung Neo-Confucianism to a Doctrine of Political 
Rights (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995); for Korea, see Kim Don, Joseonjeongi 
gunshingwollyeokgwangye yeongu [A Study on the Power-Relation between the Rulership and the 
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1200)’s preface to his famous Commentary to Zhongyong 中庸 (The Doctrine of the 
Mean) most vividly demonstrates this tension, the part of which can be recapitulated: 
 
The legendary Sage King Yao transmitted to his Sagely heir Shun four esoteric characters 
which implied the core meaning of the Way. Shun added twelve characters to it and 
transmitted them to the next Sagely heir Yu. The meaning of the now sixteen characters was 
too deep and subtle for any plain minds to understand. The transmission of the Sagely Way 
continued, albeit intermittently, to Confucius and Mencius. After Mencius, the transmission 
was discontinued until the mysterious emergence of Neo-Confucian founders.43
 
 
The Sagely-Line—unlike the Princely-Line which merely represents the 
hereditary lineage of the throne—symbolizes the authentic lineage of orthodox Dao. 
While the Princely-Line is associated with political power, the Sagely-Line is the 
source of the moral power.44 In antiquity the sage-king represented the embodiment 
of both these powers. However, at some historical point (probably after the 
emergence of autocracy), the Sagely-Line, and the moral authority that it came to 
represent, left the political realm to become more closely associated with the 
scholarly line. Hereafter, the Confucian moral agent is not the political ruler, but the 
Confucian scholar; who, in their quest for Dao, can rediscover his unspoiled Heaven-
endowed nature. Only a man of ren, who has repossessed Dao in himself, is entitled 
                                                                                                                                           
Minstership in Early Joseon Korea] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1997); Jongryn Mo, “The 
Challenge of Accountability: Implications of the Censorate,” in Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong 
(eds.), Confucianism for the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 54-
68. 
43 Kim, “The Genealogy,” p. 66. For a lengthier, albeit not full, English translation of it, see Wm. 
Theodore de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 
13. 
44 This separation between political power and moral authority is reminiscent of the medieval Western 
theory of the “two swords”—the Emperor’s potestas versus the Pope’s auctoritas. For a medieval 
theory of the two swords, see Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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to sagehood, thus achieving a cosmic and moral harmony between his inner-self and 
Heaven.45
In their commitment to a civil and moral culture (“This Culture”) and 
alienation from the centers of power, the Confucians emerged as radical critics of 
autocratic power.46 And they carried their ethico-political and cultural “mission” in 
multifaceted capacities: as teachers, advisors, censors, ministers, or as bureaucrats. 
Thus, Tu Wei-ming submits: 
 
The Confucian intellectual was an activist. His practical reasoning urged him to confront the 
world of realpolitik and to transform it from within. His faith in the perfectibility of human 
nature through self-effort, the intrinsic goodness of the human community, and the possibility 
of the unity of man and heaven enabled him to maintain a critical posture toward those who 
were powerful and influential.47
 
 
As Confucius himself admits, however, a Confucian commitment to “This 
Culture” would turn out to be a lonely and agonizing personal pilgrimage.48 His voice 
could easily be brushed away as a “voice in the wilderness.” Yet, as a “wooden bell-
clapper” to the corrupt world, this seemingly powerless voice, nonetheless, functions 
                                                 
45 On the “Chinese” (including Confucian) ideal of sagehood, see Julia Ching, Mysticism and Kingship 
in China: The Hearts of Chinese Wisdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
46 The most famous and radical anti-autocracy statement was presented by the Ming scholar-official 
Huang Zongxi (Huang Tsung-Hsi). See Wm. Theodore de Bary (trans.), Waiting for the Dawn: Huang 
Tsung-Hsi’s Ming-I Tai-Fang Lu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
47 Tu Weiming, Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1993), p. 11. 
48 See Chaibong Hahm, “The Ironies of Confucianism,” Journal of Democracy 15:3 (2004), pp. 102-
104. Again, Mencius offers a very instructive statement for this, when he says: “That is why Heaven, 
when it is about to place a great burden on a man, always first tests his resolution, exhausts his frame 
and makes him suffer starvation and hardship, and frustrates his efforts so as to shake his deficiencies. 
As a rule, a man can mend his ways only after he has made mistakes. It is only when a man is 
frustrated in mind and in his deliberations that he is able to innovate.” Mencius, 6B:15. 
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as a “prophetic voice” that anticipates a new world.49 Mencius calls such a prophetic 
person a “heroic scholar” (hao jie zhi shi 豪傑之士).50 In my view, the honorific 
individualism that this ethico-political hero represents indeed offers a uniquely 
Confucian form of transcendental individualism. 
May we conceptualize Bak Jong-cheol and Yi Han-yeol and other intellectual 
dissidents during the democratic transition in contemporary Korea as Confucian 
heroes? Surely not, if we understand “Confucianism” as a historically fixed and 
culturally reified substance. However, the political discourses of “morality versus 
power” and “purity versus corruption” in which these dissidents defined their 
confrontation with the state, and the strategies deployed in confronting the state, were 
most certainly Confucian. In other words, their unabated moral criticism towards the 
military authoritarian regime was grounded in the culture of “radical Confucianism,” 
which was the defining characteristic of Korean neo-Confucianism during the Joseon 
period. 
  
Democratic Civility and Consolidating Civil Society 
 
Korea’s Dual Civil Society and Its Cultural Background 
 
                                                 
49 See de Bary, Liberal Tradition, pp. 14-15. 
50 For the Mencian ideal of “heroic scholar,” see Sungmoon Kim, “Confucian Charisma and the True 
Way of the Moral Politician: Interpreting the Tension between Toegye and Nammyeong in Late 
Sixteenth Century Joseon,” The Review of Korean Studies 7:3 (2004), pp. 205-209. 
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Robert Pekkanen characterizes Japanese civil society as “dual civil society” due to its 
contrasting feature of “membership without advocacy.”51 Albeit on different grounds, 
the same characterization can be applied to post-democratic Korean civil society. On 
the one hand, as a direct offspring of the civil uprisings in 1987, Korean civil society 
in a consolidating state is still immensely “ethical” (in nature), grandly “national” (in 
size), and topically “comprehensive” (in scope). The goals and the tactics of the 
Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and the People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD), two key civil organizations of the social 
movement, are illustrative of contemporary Korean civil society. Though they started 
as specific-agenda-focused voluntary associations (one economic justice and the other 
ordinary people’s political participation), over the 1990s, both organizations evolved 
into what Jang-jip Choi calls “catch-all movement associations” that deal with 
national problems, mostly those related to legal justice and moral-political corruption 
in politics.52 Yet, on the other hand, Korea’s post-democratic civil society is marked 
by its far less contentious, more quotidian character than its predecessors in the 
1980s. According to Dong-choon Kim, the Korean citizen’s movement differs from 
the previous anti-regime democratization movement in that it “pursues institutional 
reform instead of pursuing the radical transformation of the institutional.”53
                                                 
51 More specifically, Pekkanen is puzzled over the marked contrast between the plethora of viable 
neighborhood civil societies and the virtual absence of advocacy NGOs in Japan. See Pekkanen, 
Japanese Dual Civil Society. 
52 Jang-jip Choi, “Democratization, Civil Society, and the Civil Social Movement in Korea: The 
Significance of the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Elections,” Korea Journal 40:3 (2000), p. 
38. 
53 Kim, “Growth and Crisis,” p. 107. 
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To be sure, the changed domestic and international environments (i.e. 
democratic transition and the collapse of real socialism) greatly facilitated this shift in 
movement goals. However, political scientists often gloss over that during the period 
of democratic consolidation, a remarkable rearrangement in the relation between the 
individual and the political world (including civil society) took place. Put differently, 
the empirical question of the autonomy of civil society as a political “institution” 
located between the private sphere and the state has obviated its normative 
dimension, the telos of civil society: the empowerment of individual agency and the 
enhancement of citizenship. From a normative perspective, civil society is not merely 
a mediating institution, but a public space that dialectically interconnects individual 
agency to citizenship; the autonomy of civil society is valuable only if it is guided by 
this normative vision. 
What happened in the course of democratic consolidation was an ardent search 
for a new “democratic” citizenship alongside self-empowerment in the given context 
of (post)Confucian culture. Under democracy, militant radicalism predicated on 
cultural (“Confucian”) heroism had to be replaced or, at least, supplemented by a less 
heroic and more moderate participatory cultural mechanism that pertained to 
“everyone.” As will be shown shortly, it was chŏng (Koreans’ traditional familial 
affectionate sentiments) that operated as that cultural-political mechanism, creating a 
new, democratic, civility. Even though (Korean) social scientists rarely take the 
question of “civility” (and normative questions in general) seriously, Hagen Koo, a 





Civil society means more than autonomous organizations or group activities but implies a 
certain set of norms and value orientations including pluralism, individualism, relativism, or 
more generally, civility. Civility is a core normative element of a civil society, and the main 
reason why civil society is presumed to play such an important role in promoting democracy 
and a good society is because of this cultural aspect of civil society.54
 
 
My argument, however, challenges Koo’s skepticism, because he says:  
 
To what extent, does civility or pluralism characterize the attitudes of most civic organizations 
in Korea today? Although hard evidence is unavailable, enough soft evidence suggests that 
civility is not only lacking in many civic group activities but also is not a widely shared goal 
of value commitment among their participants. Rather than demonstrating tolerance, 
pluralism, or compromise, South Korea’s civic organizations often engage in an exclusive, 
uncompromising, and maximalist pursuit of their goals. It might be due to the Confucian 
cultural tradition, or due to their germination under harsh authoritarian rule.55
 
 
Koo draws his definition of “civility” from Edward Shils, understanding it 
solely in terms of Western liberal values like pluralism, individualism, and 
relativism. 56  Ironically, though, Shils himself is open to the possibility of non-
Western, non-liberal/Confucian modes of civility.57
Chŏng is far from liberal-individualistic values, however. Nor does it directly 
stem from Confucian transcendental individualism or cultural heroism, either, for it is 
essentially intersubjective and collective (if not collectivistic) in its characteristics. 
Nevertheless, it generates its own transcendental ethic, or what I call “uri-
responsibility”58: that is, “transcendental collectivism” as opposed to transcendental 
individualism. FIGURE 3.1 illustrates how transcendental collectivism in 
                                                 
54 Hagen Koo, “Civil Society and Democracy in South Korea,” The Good Society 11:2 (2002), p. 45. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society,” in The Virtue of Civility. 
57 Edward Shils, “Reflections on Civil Society and Civility in the Chinese Intellectual Tradition,” in 
Tu, Confucian Traditions, pp. 38-71. 
58 In English, “uri” translates into “we.” 
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contemporary Korea is distinguished from (both Confucian and modern 
Western/Weberian) transcendental individualism. 
 




Modern West: Otherworldly Transcendentalism →  Transcendental Individualism  
                             (Internalization) 
 
Contemporary Korea: (Confucian) Transcendental Individualism →  Transcendental Collectivism 




Before further investigating chŏng and transcendental collectivism predicated 
on uri-responsibility, I will briefly showcase one recent civil movement episode to 
show how these concepts operate in actual Korean civil society. 
 
The Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Election (CAGE): A Case 
 
On January 12, 2000, nearly three months before South Korea’s 16th general election 
for the National Assembly, about 400 (later joined by an additional 100) small and 
large citizens’ movement organizations nation-wide formed the Citizens’ Alliance for 
the 2000 General Election (CAGE). CAGE was formed to prevent the political parties 
from nominating “unqualified” candidates (rejection campaign), and then, ultimately, 
to defeat those who were nonetheless nominated to run in the election (defeat 
campaign). More generally, however, CAGE was formed to reform “political society” 
which, over a decade after democratization, was still rife with factionalism and 
nepotism based on chronic regionalism, a lack of democracy within political parties, 
money-involved corruption, and an insufficiency of accountability.59 Indeed, from the 
                                                 
59 For the concept of “political society,” see Linz and Stepan, Problems, pp. 8-10. 
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viewpoint of ordinary citizens, the period of democratic consolidation turned out to 
be a period of failure for political parties and elected representatives.60
On January 24, as part of a plan to pressure political parties to withhold 
nomination of particular candidates CAGE unveiled on its internet homepage 
(www.ngokorea.org) a list of 67 unqualified candidates.61 In a nation-wide opinion 
poll taken right after this revelation, over 80% of Korean citizens supported the 
CAGE’s rejection campaign, while more than 60% said that they would not vote for 
those “unfit” candidates.62 On January 30, despite the current election law (i.e. items 
58, 87, 254) that banned all citizens’ organizations except labor unions from election 
campaigning activities, with support from thousands of unaffiliated citizens, CAGE 
took to the street for national support to assert their constitutional right of freedom of 
association and assembly, which they claimed should trump the outdated election 
laws.63
On February 2, 2000, CAGE revealed a second list of 47 unqualified 
candidates, and began to pressure political parties to revise the election law so that it 
could better correspond to the democratic state of Korean civil society. 
Notwithstanding, however, lawmakers of both the ruling and opposition parties 
                                                 
60 Choi, “Democratization,” p. 42. Also see Byung-Kuk Kim, “Korea’s Crisis of Success,” in Larry 
Diamond and Marc F. Platter (eds.), Democracy in East Asia (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998). 
61 The criteria were destruction of the democratic constitutional order through anti-humanity activities 
(specifically, collaboration with the past authoritarian regimes), corruption, election law violation, 
instigation of regionalist sentiments, tax evasion, and conscription irregularities. 
62 OhMyNews, 1/25/2000. 
63 The election law at issue was made in 1989 in order to prohibit from political activities such anti-




collaborated across party lines to protect their vested interests by revising the law 
only minimally, rendering the issue items almost intact (February 8, 2000). Those 
who were uneasy with the grass-roots challenge to the national congress aligned 
themselves with the conservative news media, and raised the possibility of 
“conspiracy” between the citizen’s organization leaders and the incumbent Kim Dae-
Jung government to stage the rejection campaign.64
Nevertheless, CAGE’s rejection campaign greatly influenced the major 
political parties’ nomination process. For instance, the opposition Grand National 
Party, the offspring of Democratic Justice Party (the ruling party under Chun Doo-
Hwan’s authoritarian regime), excluded a number of candidates who had allegedly 
used regional antagonisms to further their political careers.65 This caused a massive 
                                                 
64 OhMyNews, 2/4/2000, 2/5/2000. 
65  Regionalism is one of the most salient features of Korea’s contemporary politics. In Korea, 
“Regionalism” refers to “political antagonisms among regions primarily manifested as confrontational 
regionalist voting in which voters cast their vote for candidates or parties only because they are based 
on their own regions.” Keedon Kwon, “Regionalism in South Korea: Its Origins and Role in Her 
Democratization,” Politics & Society 32:4 (2004), p. 547. Despite disagreements on its origin among 
Korean social scientists, it, in its contemporary, intensely politicized form, is widely agreed to have 
emerged since the 1971 presidential election, where the incumbent president Park Chung-Hee from the 
Gyeongsang province confronted the opposition party leader Kim Dae-Jung whose regional basis was 
the Jeolla province. Korea’s political regionalism hit its apex in 1987 when four presidential candidates 
(Roh Tae-Woo from northern Gyeongsang, Kim Young-Sam from southern Gyeongsang, Kim Dae-
Jung from Jeolla, and Kim Jong-Pil from Chungcheong) competed for presidency. Ever since 1971, 
intense and antagonistic political regionalism has been pinpointed as the most troublesome anti-
democratic element of contemporary Korean politics. Even though Kwon sheds new light on its 
positive role played in Korea’s democratic transition, I do not share Kwon’s optimism as far as its role 
in Korea’s democratic consolidation is concerned. For the political implications of Korean regionalism, 
see Seung-Kuk Kim, “The Formation of Civil Society and the Rise of Regionalism in Korea,” Korea 
Journal 28:6 (1988), pp. 24-34; Sallie Yea, “Regionalism and Political-Economic Differentiation in 
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party defection, in which the new Democratic National Party emerged. This new 
Gyeongsang-province-based party made clear that it would compete with the Grand 
National Party for regional supremacy in Gyeongsang province (especially its 
southern part) in order to win the next presidential election over the incumbent Jeolla-
province-based New Millennium Democratic Party, thereby further provoking 
regional antagonisms. 
The reemergence of regional divides infuriated many, especially young, 
Koreans aspiring for a new national and civic Korea transcendent of parochial 
regionalism. Korea’s well-developed cyberspace provided an open and public outlet 
in which the ordinary, previously alienated Koreans could freely express their 
political opinions. During this period more than 900,000 netizens visited CAGE’s 
homepage, while over 15,000 essays were posted. 66  A typical message read as 
follows:                    
 
As opposed to autocracy, the defining characteristic of democracy is that responsibility falls 
on the people. If there are corrupt politicians in democracy, its responsibility is to the people 
who elected them. Frankly speaking, the quality of our politicians are very low; yet it is also 
true that our [democratic] quality is equally low because [after all] it is we who elected them 
on the grounds of regional attachment, nepotism, or our blind tendency to select the 
incumbent party. It is our inadvertent votes that have produced such corrupt politicians … 
Therefore, we might not be entitled to criticize them. But we must take responsibility for our 
democracy. To be responsible for the democracy that we have corrupted, we must take an 
action not to have such unqualified politicians in the political arena … No one has done 
anything [for this]. We have just watched things happening … [But] because of this very fact, 
citizens’ political reform movement that we are now engaging in is of great significance.67
  
 
                                                                                                                                           
Korean Development: Power Maintenance and the State as Hegemonic Power Bloc,” Korea Journal 
34:2 (1994), pp. 5-29. 
66 Hangyeorye Sinmun, 5/15/2002. 
67 From http://www.peoplepower21.org/article/article_view.php?article_id=752 (my translation). 
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Note the writer is appealing to a national democratic sentiment transcendent of 
the individual Korean citizen: “We should take responsibility for which we are not 
directly accountable.” “I” is never pronounced here; rather it is hidden (rather than 
suppressed) behind “We.” Furthermore, that “we” is by no means to claim a specific 
(regional) group’s political “right” to political hegemony in central politics. 
Undoubtedly, the focus is on shared “responsibility”—however tormenting it is—by 
“us,” because the democracy is our democracy; because the corruption of our 
democracy falls on us. This very “fact” obligates us to collective political and moral 
responsibility: uri-responsibility. 
After the major political parties had announced their official nominations, 
CAGE’s strategy was shifted to “defeat” those who had nevertheless been “wrongly” 
nominated. CAGE’s “rejection-defeat” campaign proved a great success: Of 86 
candidates on CAGE’s blacklist, 59 were defeated. Furthermore, 94 out of 207 
incumbent congressmen who ran in the 16th general election failed to be reelected. 
Meanwhile, 112 new candidates ran successfully in the elections to enter the National 
Assembly, taking 41 percent of all seats. Perhaps most dramatically, CAGE’s dual 
campaign successfully (despite its obvious limits in Gyeongsang province that 
(re)elected most candidates from the Grand National Party) rearranged a political 
landscape that was previously structured on parochial regional interests. 
Was CAGE’s citizens’ movement in 2000 a “civil revolution” or “the second 
June Uprising,” as many Koreans call it? Korean scholars are cautious in evaluating it 
because they wonder whether CAGE’s negative strategy that purported to screen the 
unfit candidates did not, albeit unintentionally, help reinforce the existing 
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conservative political landscape, thus failing to direct popular interest to such issues 
as labor problems, which a positive campaign could have mobilized.68 More crucially, 
some scholars are skeptical as to how much impact it in effect brought to the 
democratization of the party structure in particular and party politics in general; a key 
indicator of democratic consolidation.69 Nevertheless, from a normative perspective, 
the CAGE-led citizens’ movement in 2000 was successful not only because of the 
actual political results that it was able to draw, but, more important, because of its 
role in revivifying a new type of national civil ethos transcendent of parochial and 
uncivil regional attachments.70 In other words, the CAGE-led citizen’s movement 
infused Korean citizens with an uri-responsibility derived from chŏng.               
 




Korean uri-responsibility is in many ways similar to the type of civic republicanism 
that Michael Sandel advocates. 71  Nevertheless, there are several appreciable 
distinctions. For example, it should be recalled, by “encumbered self” Sandel only 
intends to stress that a self is a sociopolitical, cultural and historical, hence contextual, 
“product.” That is to say, Sandel never denies an inscrutable inner-world of the self 
                                                 
68 Choi, “Democratization,” p. 53; Kim, “Growth and Crisis,” p. 112. 
69 See Choi, Minjuhwa; Damond, Developing Democracy; Linz and Stepan, Problems. With a case 
study of Weimar Republic, Sheri Berman has warned that a vibrant civil society, when it is not 
supported by a well-developed institutional politics (i.e. party politics), could endanger a democracy 
itself. Berman, “Civil Society.” 
70 According to Edward Shils, civility is primarily a “civil collective self-consciousness,” and by 
“collective” he frequently means “national.” See Shils, The Virtue of Civility, p. 71. 
71 Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent. 
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and his key concept “self-government” is predicated on the classic or republican 
image of the city that is independent (if not autonomous in a Kantian and/or Rawlsian 
sense). In a profound sense, Sandel’s self is not so different from Tocquevillian civic 
self upon which Weber later built his theory of civil society; most notably the idea of 
“sect man” (Sektenmensch). 
The Korean self is qualitatively different from the independent self, however. 
As many Korean social psychologists claim, what constitutes the Korean “I” is the 
“interdependent self.”72 According to Sang-Chin Choi, Koreans understand we to 
include “identity, oneness, mutual dependence, mutual protection, and mutual 
acceptance.”73 In other words, the “Korean’s private self (or individual self) and 
social self (or collective self) overlap.” This means that, in Korean social psychology, 
the line between “I” and “We” is frequently blurred. Thus Pyong-choon Hahm 
understands the Korean “we” or uri in terms of “inter-ego relationship”:  
 
Where egos overlap and interlock however, there may be interpenetration and existential 
continuum, but no dependence. The shamanistic person would find a life in which egos are 
all autonomous, separate, discrete, and self-sufficient too cold, impersonal, lonely, and 
inhuman. It should be noted, however, that the overlap of egos in shamanistic culture does 
not signify a merger or fusion of ego. Rather, the overlapping egos interpenetrate one 
another, forming a commonly shared area, while leaving the remainder different and 
distinct. The resulting condition is neither a single ego nor two discrete ego, but something 
indeterminate which can only be described as something more than one but less than two.74
 
Notably, in his famous rebuttal against Hein Cho who finds the origin of 
contemporary viability of Korean civil society in her traditional Confucian culture, 
David Steinberg chastised Koreans’ “we-ism” because in his view it has served to 
foster a “spirit of conformity” as the single greatest obstacle to the establishment of 
                                                 
72 Choi and Kim, “Hangugin selp.” 
73 Choi, “Two Perspectives,” p. 246. 
74 Hahm, Korean Jurisprudence, p. 323. 
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truly “civil” society in Korea.75 Implicit in Steinberg’s criticism is that the Korean 
“we” or uri is so fundamentally and overbearingly a primordial and pre-political 
group identity that it is incompatible with the basic requirements of the authentic civil 
society to which social and political pluralism is central. To be sure, the social-
psychologically constituted uri in Korean society is qualitatively different from the 
social group in the West’s liberal tradition, which is more of a “collective pool” 
wherein the personal identity of the independent, autonomous, and discrete self is 
preserved, because uri is accompanied with the group-specific self-transformation of 
individual participants, generating a unique group dynamic of which a mere collective 
pool cannot avail itself.76
But to argue that individuality-annihilating social conformism is the only and 
the most salient characteristic of the group dynamic of uri is not only far-fetched, but 
also misleading. What Steinberg overlooks is that the social formation of uri has 
nothing to do with “deindividuation” in which the self identity simply collapses 
within the group. What Korean uri entails is rather “depersonalization” to which the 
retaining of individual self-identity is absolutely indispensable. 77  To see the 
difference between deindividuation and depersonalization more clearly, it should be 
noted that the Korean self is hardly the entity-like, self-containing, and autonomously 
functioning “independent self” as customarily conceptualized in the Western 
scientific psychology and as naturalized in the West’s modern political theory (most 
                                                 
75 David Steinberg, “Civil Society and Human Rights in Korea: On Contemporary and Classical 
Orthodoxy and Ideology,” Korea Journal 37:3 (1997), p. 151; Hein Cho, “The Historical Origin of 
Civil Society in Korea,” Korea Journal 37:2 (1997), pp. 24-41. 
76 Choi, Hagugin simnihak, p. 145. 
77 Ibid., p. 149. 
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notably social contract theory). For the independent self, depersonalization is no 
different than deindividuation,78 which is tantamount to the total collapse of the self 
or the self’s complete fusion with the group, which was the case with the German 
“ordinary men” during World War II.79 In this psychological process, the individual 
egos are enmeshed in the “group-ego,” enabling the latter to be the only meaningful 
and living, yet often immensely violent, agent.80
In marked contrast, the “interdependent self” that constitutes the Korean “I” 
scarcely undergoes a total collapse of the self, which generates a massive fusion with 
the group-self that forms a pathological group-ego. Since it does not attempt at the 
containment of the pure self (a rationally controlled self-sufficient self) from others 
and since it does not see interdependence as pathetic dependence, the interdependent 
self seldom experiences a violent eruption of the group-ego.81 Instead, the personal 
empowerment of the interdependent self is made possible by forming uri-relationship 
with other equally interdependent selves. As such, uri is the fundamentally relation-
centered group-self, unlike the self-contained, power-seeking group-ego, that emerges 
when the self-contained independent self disintegrates. Therefore, while the latter is 
the fusion of egos, the former only refers to the overlapping of egos. 
                                                 
78 It is typically so in Kantian liberal philosophy. For a detailed argument on this, see Chapter 4, where 
I contrast the Kantian ideal of individual (“person”) with that of Confucianism. 
79 Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Politics Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in 
Poland (New York: Harper, 1998). For a full political and philosophical theorization of this 
phenomenon, see Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin S. Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002). 
80 For the classical analysis of group-ego, see Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of 
the Ego, trans. James Strachey (New York: Bantam Books, 1960). 
81 This is, in my view, why a group-psychology is still unpopular in Korea. 
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That Korean uri is qualitatively different from the pathological group-ego is 
not to insist that uri is immune from its own problems. As Steinberg rightly points 
out, downward social conformism is one of its negative functions. Nevertheless, the 
following must be remembered: First, uri, as a social-psychological construct, is not a 
pure primordial group identity as some critics assume; second, uri is primarily 
concerned with internal affective relations among the participants; and finally, heavy 
social conformism is one negative factor, however occasionally, that accompanies 
uri, and not, by any means, its full essence. All in all, uri cannot be identified as the 




Roughly speaking, chŏng is what makes such “intersubjective overlapping” possible 
by providing an emotional glue or a “transitional space,” in and through which 
interdependent selves can connect with each other.82 Although chŏng is oftentimes 
spoken of in terms of a person’s inner characteristic (chŏng as personality), its more 
significant and widely performed usage is as affectionate “relationality” in Koreans’ 
ordinary interpersonal relations. In the latter sense, chŏng is a uniquely Korean mode 
of social affect. But, this analytical distinction should not be too rigidly held because, 
in reality, the two are inextricably entwined. That is, personal chŏng is what makes an 
otherwise monadic and container-like closed-self the interdependent self that is 
marked by a porous and relational chŏng. This chŏng, in turn, by constantly situating 
an interdependent self in intersubjective uri-relationships, helps to internalize such 
intersubjective relationality within the self, making relationality integral to 
                                                 
82 For the social scientific studies on chŏng, see note 23 in Chapter 1. 
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personality. In the most profound sense, the Korean interdependent self is a chŏngish 
self and the Korean self is fundamentally relational. 
That chŏng is relationality, however, does not imply that any relationality is 
directly analogous to chŏng, just as any interdependent self could not be the Korean 
self. For a certain social relationality to be a chŏngish relationality, it should be 
oriented toward the creation of uri-relationship. That is, chŏng is a felt uri-ness and 
uri-ness is a recognized chŏng.83 This seemingly tautological explanation, however, is 
neither illogical nor irrational if we consider that the relational boundary that uri-ness 
(or uri-self) sets up is, in essence, a cultural-epistemological boundary as well. In 
other words, the social function of the uri boundary is not limited in separating uri 
from the other, which could constitute exclusive uri-ness. Its further-reaching social 
implication is that it produces its own verbal and non-verbal semiotic practices which 
foreigners, who are not immersed in Korean culture, often find difficult to master. 
Chŏng is the very key to such semiotic cultural code. In short, chŏng is an 
emotionally cognitive uri-oriented relationality. Only within uri is chŏng enlivened. 
Outside uri is the realm of mu-chŏng (the absence of chŏng); the realm of mu-chŏng 
is where relation ends and an “evil” prevails. For Koreans, outside is evil.84
What then is the “cultural-epistemological boundary,” which uri-self is 
modeled after and is to reproduce in broader social relations? Among Korean 
scholars, it is widely echoed that traditional Korean family relations present the 
prototype of uri-self and they are strongly convinced as well that chŏng originates 
from them, particularly from a strong psychological attachment between parents 
                                                 
83 Choi and Lee, “Jeong,” p. 224. 
84 Alford, Think No Evil, p. 104. 
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(typically mother) and children.85 Furthermore, given the allegedly strong connection 
between chŏng and the family, some are not hesitant to affiliate chŏng with 
Confucian family relations and even with the Confucian family structure.86 Rather 
than delving into a still controversial socio-historical origin of chŏng,87 however, I 
want to stress that (traditional) family is the most important social metaphor of the 
Koreans’ collective identity of all sizes. That is to say, when it is applied to the entire 
nation, “family-relational uri” constitutes the core of the “imagined community” of 
ordinary Koreans. 88  More importantly, what distinguishes Korea’s uri imagined 
community from other imagined communities is that it is a chŏng-based ethico-
cultural and cultural-epistemological entity.89
                                                 
85 Choi and Lee, “Jeong,” p. 230. Also see Choi and Han, “Gyoryu haengwi”; Choi et al., “Jeong (miun 
jeong goun jeong).” 
86 Bong-young Choi, Hangugin-ui sahoejeok seonggyeok, Vol. 1 [The Social Character of the Korean 
People 1] (Seoul: Neutinamu, 1994). Also see Haejoang Cho, “Male Dominance and Mother Power: 
The Two Sides of Confucian Patriarchy in Korea,” in Slote and DeVos, Confucianism and the Family, 
pp. 187-207. 
87 Suffice it to say that while Pyong-choon Hahm and Sang-Chin Choi cautiously speculate the origin 
of chŏng as pre-Confucian, hence as a key feature of the less elitist and authentically indigenous 
Korean folk culture, others including Bong-young Choi, Geung-ho Jo and Deuk-woong Han interpret 
it as a directly “Confucian” psychological phenomenon. Nevertheless, there is an agreement among 
Korean scholars that traditional, especially Confucian, familial relations present the typical model of 
the chŏng-relation. For Jo’s and Han’s works, see Geung-ho Jo, Hanguin ihae-ui gaenyeomteul [A 
Conceptual Framework for an Understanding of the Korean People] (Seoul: Nanam, 2003) and Deuk-
woong Han, “Hangukyuhak-ui simnihak” [The Psychology of Korean Confucianism], in Sang-Chin 
Choi (ed.), Dongyangsimnihak: Seogusimnihak-e daehan daeanmosaek [The East Asian Psychology: 
In Search of an Alternative to Western Psychology] (Seoul: Jisiksaneopsa, 1999). 
88 See Chapter 5. 
89 On how this special cultural entity operates, see Choi, Hangugin, pp. 102-120 and Sang-Chin Choi 
and Chung-woon Kim, “Jiphapjeok uimi guseong-e daehan munhwasimnihark-jeok jeopgeun-
uiroseoui munhwasimjeong simnihak” [The Cultural Emotional Psychology as a Cultural 
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Having found that chŏng is uri-building (semi-)familial relationality, we can 
finally come to a better grasp of the internal structure of chŏngish relationality. Since 
the family, except in the case of marriage, is a natural given allowing no (easy) “exit,” 
chŏngish relationality can hardly be equated with the affectionate sentiment (goun 
chŏng) per se, because immense psychological tensions that tend to engender 
devastating mental illness among the family members are no less significant and, in 
effect, integral to family relation, the best example of which is the chronic conflict 
between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law in the Korean family. 90  What is 
interesting about the ordinary Koreans’ social psychology is that, when it has been 
fairly long and constantly experienced, they count (and experience) a feeling of 
hatred toward their intimate ones, as another form of affection. Koreans call it “miun 
chŏng” (affectionate hatred).91 This oxymoronic sentiment is generated when the 
people have long experienced all aspects of human relations (good or bad and joyful 
or painful) and then maturely sublimated them into their relational, interdependent 
selfhood. It is, for example, a sort of mixed feeling that a daughter-in-law would feel 
after she has departed from her husband’s family to start her own nuclear family: “I 
have come to have both miun chŏng and goun chŏng with my mother-in-law while 
having been entangled in all sorts of tensions and conflicts over the years.” 
                                                                                                                                           
Psychological Approach to Collective Meaning Construction], Hanguksimnihakhoeji—sahoe mit 
seonggyeok [The Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology] 12:2 (1998), pp. 79-96. 
90 See Bou-young Rhi, “Mental Illness in Its Confucian Context,” in Slote and DeVos, Confucianism 
and the Family, pp. 285-310. 
91 For miun chŏng, see Choi et al., “Jeong (goun jeong miun jeong),” which is the only literature that 
deals with this particular concept up to now. 
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Denser and deeper chŏng is one that has been steadily accumulated by the 
interlocking of miun chŏng and goun chŏng. If one attempts to look at the Korean 
family relation and by extension Korean uri-relation in terms of “power” as the 
liberal feminists like Susan Okin would be tempted to, the internal mechanism of 
chŏng, especially its miun chŏng aspect, can be easily eclipsed.92 Then, it would be 
impossible to appropriately make sense of uri-responsibility of the kind that we have 
seen in the case above, because uri-responsibility is nourished on chŏng that includes 
not only goun chŏng but, more crucially, miun chŏng. 
Chŏng (especially miun chŏng) is an inherently ambivalent feeling, which is 
best expressed in the phrase: “I hate my father who is simply a drunkard. But, 
nonetheless, he is still my farther to whom I owe a (filial) responsibility.”93 This 
interfamilial tension-ridden affection is illustrative of the relational dynamic between 
contemporary Korean citizens and their democracy. In effect, the torment felt by the 
Korean netizen quoted above was essentially miun chŏng. Indeed, the logic is the 
same: “I/We hate my/our democracy that I/We have now. Nonetheless, I/We, as a 
member of our political community, have a responsibility for it.” Rather than actively 
rectifying the current wrongs incurred by others (“politicians”) by pressing them, by 
transferring political and moral responsibility to “us” who are not directly 
responsible, it would seem to let those who are really responsible off the hook. Yet, 
by saying “nonetheless,” the netizen (and many Korean citizens for that matter) did 
not fatalistically affirm the reality-as-it-is. By “we” the (young) Koreans in 2000 
never meant a random collectivity. What they meant by “we” was a new civil nation 
                                                 
92 Susan M. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 
93 See Chapter 4. 
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in that democratic civil society as opposed to uncivil, parochial regionalism that had 
bedeviled Korean politics for decades. For Koreans, uri-responsibility provided a new 
civility that could undergird the national consciousness, which according to Shils is 
the backbone of civil society and the matrix of citizenship.94
 
Uri-responsibility and Uri-world: A Shift to Transcendental Collectivism 
 
Uri-Responsibility for Uri-World 
 
Thus far, I have examined the social psychology of uri and the basics of chŏng and 
chŏngish relationality in the course of problematizing the conventional, negative, 
understanding of uri. The point is that uri as a complex social-psychological construct 
cannot be identified to be an overweening primordial collective identity that simply 
promotes conformism. Nor can it be the same thing with the tyranny of majority or 
mob rule. One more important point that many, including Steinberg, tend to gloss 
over is that uri is not only a socio-psychological or psycho-cultural construct, but it is 
also a “political” practice when uri-responsibility rooted in chŏng is exercised in the 
public space. Of course, the political uri is profoundly predicated on the various 
levels, and types, of social practice of uri-formation. But the political practice of uri-
formation is occasioned in the course of political action in civil society, an open and 
all-seeing public space. From this perspective, the recent invigoration of civil society 
in Korea cannot be approached in terms of a natural and unmediated extension of the 
psycho-cultural uri. The case above (and throughout the chapter in this study) 
presents another, namely “political,” dynamic of uri-formation that cannot plainly be 
reduced to social-psychology alone. 
                                                 
94 Shils, The Virtue of Civility, pp. 207-209. 
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Then, how can we make sense of uri-formation in civil society? In order to do 
so, I enlist the help of Rousseau whose famous notion of general will, just like 
Korean uri, has encountered mounting criticisms because of its allegedly 
undifferentiating, undemocratic, or anti-political characteristic. But first let us see 
how Rousseau defines this controversial concept. 
 
‘Each one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers under the supreme 
direction of the general will; and as a body, we incorporate every member as an indivisible 
part of the whole.’ Immediately, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, 
this act of association creates an artificial and collective body composed of as many members 
as there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act that body acquires its unity, its 
common ego, its life and its will.95
 
 
The point Rousseau’s critics make is that the general will featured in The 
Social Contract advocates a total dissolution of the self into collectivity or the 
complete negation of difference, hence contributing to the formation of a power-
seeking, pathological group-ego. But, in The Government of Poland, by which 
Rousseau attempted to apply his social contract theory to Poland’s actual political 
setting, the meaning of general will is rendered to be far more pragmatic: 
 
[Now] the law, which is merely the expression of the general will, is certainly the product of 




Rousseau clarifies that the general will is “the product of interplay of all 
sectional interests” rather than the coercive annihilation of private interests. 
Therefore, Benjamin Barber understands the general will in the context of legitimacy. 
                                                 
95 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston (New York: Penguin Books, 
1968), p. 61. 
96 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Government of Poland, trans. Willmore Kendall (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1985), p. 42 (emphasis added). 
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According to Barber, what is important for Rousseau is not so much a schizophrenic 
splitting between individuality (private interests) and collectivity (common interests) 
or a zero-sum relation between the two, but how to create legitimacy through a 
dialectical interplay of them. So, Barber submits, 
 
Legitimacy here is awarded not to the virtuous interest but to the general will, the will that 
incarnates a democratic community that is comprised in turn of the wills of autonomous 
citizens. The issue is not “I want” versus “you want” but “I want” versus “we will” … But 
wills cannot all be equally legitimate in the same sense, because by willing one affects the 
world, and the world is finally one—our world—and can only be as legitimate as the 
process that willed it into being.97
 
 
Here, the key word is “our world.” What Barber (and Rousseau) tries to argue 
is that our-world to which the general will is directed has nothing to do with the 
suppression of individual wills (and interests), but it is the political product of 
collective will-formation.98 The most critical problem of traditional liberal democratic 
theory is that it does not take into account the possibility of self-transformation in 
democratic will-formation process. 99  It claims that man is an inherently private 
individual, man’s preference is fixed, man’s natural right is absolute, and therefore 
                                                 
97 Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 200-1 (Italic added and other emphases in original). 
98 In another place, Barber writes: “Rousseau’s particular inspiration was to envision a form of political 
interaction—conditioned by consensual mores and a simple and austere socioeconomic environment—
in which the psychology of particular interests guided by appropriate participatory institutions could 
produce public goods (the general will) even where individuals quo individuals failed to distinguish 
these public good from their private interests … Common willing, not private reasoning, was to be the 
key. Autonomy for Rousseau was a concomitant of political interaction, produced in part by it, rather 
than its necessary prelude, just as self-legislation was a feature of common action rather than of 
individual self-scrutiny. In short, for Rousseau the problem was not one of private knowing but of 
public doing, which is presumably why Rousseau preferred a Sparta that knew how to act aright to an 
Athens that knew how to think aright.” Barber, The Conquest of Politics, pp. 12-13. 
99 For this critique, see Mark E. Warren, “Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation,” American 
Political Science Review 86:1 (1992), pp. 8-23. 
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the primary role of politics is to secure self-preservation by denying (anarchist 
democracy) or suppressing (realistic democracy), or tolerating (minimalist 
democracy) the conflict among self-seeking individuals.100 But it can hardly come to 
terms with transforming the conflict. Democratic theories of self-transformation 
emphasize that the self as a willing agent can transform itself from a private 
individual to a public citizen by creating a public forum (or our world) in civil 
society. So by transforming the conflict, these theories mean to transform the self 
“temporarily” in order to resolve the incumbent common problems. 
Is the Korean uri tantamount to the Rousseauian general will? Yes and No. 
No, if uri is meant by the psycho-cultural uri because the overlapping of egos is 
qualitatively different from the creation of common interest (and common good) out 
of conflicting individual interests. In fact, the general will as the common interest can 
be susceptible to a sort of the free-rider problem, as Rousseau himself acknowledges 
it when he observes: 
 
For every individual as a man may have a private will contrary to, or different from, the 
general will that he has as a citizen. His private interest may speak with a very different voice 
from that of the public interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence may make 
him regard what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which 
would be less painful for others than the payment is onerous for him; and fancying that the 
artificial person which constitutes the state is a mere rational entity (since it is not a man), he 
might seek to enjoy the rights of a citizen without doing the duties of a subject.101
 
 
In contrast, uri-responsibility as a moral commitment to “doing one’s own 
share” and/or to “shouldering one’s social burden” has little to do with an exercise of 
“interest” vis-à-vis “a mere rational entity.” Instead, uri-responsibility that is 
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exercised through palpable chŏng is rooted in one’s sense of shame, a shame that his 
or her indifference to reality would have helped injustice and/or moral corruption, or, 
at least, it would be “somewhat” or “unwittingly” related with the infelicitous status 
quo.   
But if our focus is placed not on common interest but on collectively-shared 
responsibility, if it is admitted that political problems include moral issues as well as 
material questions, 102  and if it is persuaded that private individuals can build 
citizenship not only by transforming the conflict, but also by creating shared 
responsibility,103 the Korean uri—in this case, the political uri—can be construed as a 
uniquely Korean mode of general will. In short, in Korea, collective will-formation 
can be directed at the creation of uri-responsibility. It is especially so in a society like 
Korea in which almost every political issue is entangled in the question of moral 
justification unlike in Western societies wherein the separation between morality and 
politics has been firmly established at least on a public rhetorical revel. 
 
Chŏng and Transcendental Collectivism 
 
In civil society, chŏng brings a multitude of otherwise separated and disjointed “I”s 
into a common forum, and impels them to reflect upon their sociopolitical identity 
through various forms of talk, and, finally, helps them revitalize citizenship by 
reconstructing “our” world. In turn, civil society acquires its substantial sociopolitical 
                                                 
102 Or, it can be argued that political problems are at once moral and material because the two cannot 
be clearly separated in reality. 
103 But the two ways of self-transformation are not mutually exclusive. Rather they are complementary 
in the actual political situation. 
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meaning pertinent to Korea’s unique civil ethos. Put differently, in democratic Korea, 
chŏng and civil society are mutually constitutive. 
More specifically, chŏng plays a critical social role by motivating people to 
voluntarily form variegated kinds of groups, assemblies, associations, and 
organizations to resolve collective problems. The CAGE movement in 2000 presents 
the most exemplary case, but it is not the only case. In fact, not only was the CAGE 
movement re-galvanized for the 2004 general election, but also many separate, but 
similar, national civil actions followed its lead after 2000, which will be investigated 
in the subsequent chapters. These chŏng-induced and citizens-led movements are 
markedly differentiated not only from an interest-centered libertarian (or neoliberal) 
civil society, but also from elite-led social movements in the 1980s. 
What was salient in the democratizing civil society in the 1980s was the 
emergence of ethico-politically driven, self-sacrificing, and even prophetic 
individuals that risked their young lives in the anticipation of a new political/moral 
world. It is not to say that the kind of “moral heroism” that I have related with 
Confucian transcendental individualism was the only ethical locomotive that enabled 
the people to pull down Chun’s authoritarian regime. Eventually, it was chŏng that 
ethically and emotionally prompted the otherwise timid and apolitical ordinary 
Koreans to the street. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the initiative of the grand 
civil society in that period was taken by more ethically committed, politically radical, 
and culturally sensitive extraordinary individuals. In my view, Alice Miller’s 
following statement on the protesters against the totalitarian regime (for her 




[I]ndividuals who refuse to adapt to a totalitarian regime are not doing so out of a sense of 
duty or because of naïveté but because they cannot but be true to themselves. The longer I 
wrestle with these questions, the more I am inclined to see courage, integrity, and a capacity 
for love not as “virtues,” not as moral categories, but as the consequences of a benign fate.104
 
 
However, “a benign fate” and “virtues” do not have to be opposed. After all, 
for the Korean Confucians (and those political dissidents during the democratic 
transition), a benign fate was thought to come from Heaven (or be embedded in “This 
Culture”) and the awareness of that fate constituted the very core of their moral and 
political virtues. 
On the other side of the same token, it is not to argue that Korea’s 
consolidating civil society is activated solely by the ordinary citizens or enlivened 
exclusively in and through chŏng. Of course, many civic organizations in post-
democratic Korea have been organized by the former political dissidents or, although 
very rarely, by those still enchanted by political radicalism. The point is that despite 
remarkable deradicalization, Korean civil society in the democratic condition has 
never been completely disenchanted from its thisworldly transcendental ethical aura, 
rather than being helplessly submitted to the global mechanism of modernization (i.e. 
globalization) that is now inflicting virtually all new democracies of the third wave. 
What prevails in post-transition Korea, though, is not so much transcendental 
individualism as transcendental collectivism predicated on chŏng. 
Ultimately, the transcendental collectivism in Korea’s democratic civil society 
is a routinized and popularized form of the transcendental individualism of the 
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democratizing civil society in the 1980s. 105  In transcendental collectivism, an 
originally unstable and volatile individual charisma is subdued and furthermore 
replaced by a more moderate and quotidian charisma, a collective charisma exercised 
by uri. It is an ironic process, however, in that while the transcendental individual’s 
inner anxiety and his or her claim to moral truth have been steadily diluted, another 
type of moral agency that is co-original with the political formation of “uri” has been 
increasingly invigorated. At the heart of transcendental collectivism is that it mediates 
individuality (freedom) and collectivity (citizenship) through the practice of a 
collective moral responsibility, 106  namely, uri-responsibility. Put differently, in 
chŏng-induced transcendental individualism, individual agency can be empowered by 
virtue of the shared practice of uri-responsibility. More important, since the collective 
action is exercised through the mediation of an ethic of responsibility to which 
reflexivity is central, transcendental collectivism hardly leads to untrammeled 
nationalism or to a pathological group-ego, or to a mob rule, although it does promote 
a civil collective consciousness of the nation. Despite the collective sentimentalism 
that it occasionally breeds, chŏng-induced transcendental collectivism is in the main 
self-corrective.   
 
                                                 
105 Whether chŏng is directly a routinized version of ren is arguable given the controversy about the 
social origin of chŏng (pre-Confucian or Confucian). But, nevertheless, this indecisive (philosophical) 
relation between ren and chŏng does not belie that, from a sociological and political perspective, 
transcendental collectivism is a routinized mode of transcendental individualism. Throughout this 
research, I posit that while ren is a(n) (individual) moral virtue, chŏng is what it has collectively 
coalesced into a form of social affect or mores. 




Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to conduct an intra-cultural comparative investigation 
of Korean civil society by contrasting Korea’s consolidating civil society to its 
democratizing civil society in the 1980s. The major focus was, despite conspicuous 
continuity between pre- and post-democratic civil society in Korea in terms of 
“national ethical civil society,” why the consolidating civil society has become 
notably deradicalized and mainly citizen-led and more quotidian than its 
democratizing counterpart, which was in the main elites-led, ideologically radical, 
and militantly confrontational. My central argument was whereas the democratizing 
civil society was fueled by ren-induced Confucian transcendental individualism that 
enchanted more morally sensitive and culturally committed elite intellectuals into the 
unflinching confrontation with the authoritarian forces, the consolidating civil society 
is frequently activated upon chŏng-originated transcendental collectivism. Drawing 
on Weber, I interpreted chŏng as a collectivized, popularized form of ren that is 
more—of course only in a relative sense—individualistic. The corollary that 
followed, accordingly, was that the consolidating civil society in democratic Korea is 
a routinized mode of the “Confucian civil society” of the democratizing period, hence 
a “post-Confucian civil society.” At the same time, though, keeping in mind both 
Korean reality and Weber’s theory of charisma that admits the actual co-existence of 
pure charisma and its routinization (as a form of tradition), by the distinction between 
“Confucian” and “post-Confucian,” I never intended their mutual incompatibility, 
because ren-originated individualism (pure charisma) and chŏng-induced collectivism 
(routinized charisma) are not mutually exhaustive and, rather, complementary.   
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After thoroughly examining the Korean social-cultural psychology of chŏng 
and uri (the social unit of chŏng relations) that proffers a defining characteristic of 
transcendental collectivism in contemporary Korea, I drew special attention to the 
“political” dimension of chŏngish transcendental collectivism, exercised in terms of 
uri-responsibility. Rather than arguing that uri-responsibility is a natural and 
unmediated outgrowth of the social-cultural psychology of chŏng and hence to avoid 
the charge of chŏng reductionism (and to challenge the primordial and conformist 
image generally implicated in uri), by comparing uri formed in the public space of 
civil society with Rousseau’s general will, I argued that the political uri should never 
be seen as a overweening conformist cultural identity that annihilates individual 
agency, but, rather, it must be understood as a democratic “our world” of common 
will that not only respects but, further, encourages voluntary individual willing (in 
this case, an active assumption of uri-responsibility).  
The subsequent chapters will investigate in detail the democratic implications 
of the political practice of uri-responsibility. But what exactly is uri-responsibility? 
How culturally unique and distinct is it compared with the West’s conceptions of 
responsibility? On what ground can it be safely called “political” (other than 





CHAPTER 4: BEYOND A JURIDICAL SOCIETY                                        
URI-RESPONSIBILITY AND CHŎNGISH CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
 
Introduction: Rule of Law, Agency, and Civil Society 
 
Classical civil society is predicated on liberalism, which pivots around the idea of 
individual liberty, defined largely as freedom from government interference in private 
lives.1 At the heart of the classical liberal vision of civil society, especially Locke’s 
theorization of dual contracting processes erecting civil society and then the 
government, is the idea of limited government. In this perspective, civil society is 
everything other than the government.2
However, the stark dichotomy of civil society and the government (or the 
state), a view from which most contemporary political studies of civil society are 
drawn, does not convey the entire story of the liberal vision of modern civil society.3 
This is because the classical liberals never intended to pit civil society against the 
government.4 Indeed, as liberals such as Scalet and Schmidtz admit, the question 
                                                 
1 Lomasky, “Classical Liberalism”; Steven Scalet and David Schmidtz, “State, Civil Society, and 
Classical Liberalism,” in Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post (eds.), Civil Society and 
Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Tom G. Palmer, “Classical Liberalism and 
Civil Society: Definitions, History, and Relations,” in ibid. 
2 Scalet and Schmidtz, “State, Civil Society, and Classical Liberalism,” p. 27. 
3 According to Sudipta Kaviraj, “In Search of Civil Society,” in Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani 
(eds.), Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), the 
concept of civil society in modern Western social theory can be approached in terms of three contrasts: 
civil society and natural society, civil society and the state, and civil society and community 
(Gemeinschaft). 
4 But, it should be admitted that in contemporary political life, a big bureaucratic government has 
grown into a serious obstacle to the citizenry’s political freedom and self-government. For this point, 
see Barber, A Place for Us. 
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Locke confronted was whether civil society, understood as government-ordered 
society, was justifiable. For him, just like for Hobbes, the more critical contrasting 
line was between civil society and the state of nature, or what Smith called “fatherless 
society.”5
The state of nature can be understood in two different ways. First, as Barber 
does, we can take the anarchy of the state of nature as literal: “a condition of 
lawlessness where there are no governors, no agreements, no contracts and hence no 
property, no voluntary market exchange other than those negotiated by force and 
fraud.” Then, as it was the case with Hobbes, these conditions dictate “the necessity 
of politics and the indispensability of law.”6 Second, as Smith did, we can take it 
“socially” (and “psychologically”). Here the state of nature is interpreted as the 
breakdown of the medieval order of “great chain of being” (alongside ancient cities 
and, more fundamentally, God as man’s onto-epistemological foundation) and 
therewith the (psychological) disintegration of the self.7 While in the first case civil 
society denotes a “juridical society” that undergirds the political community (or the 
body politic), in the second, civil society implies individual agency. Coupled together, 
the concept “civil society” can be understood as a juridical society where individual 
agency is (not only protected but also) realized. On this account, what makes a civil 
society “civil” is the voluntary consent to the law by free individuals. Therefore, the 
                                                 
5 TMS, VI.ii.3.2.  
6 Benjamin R. Barber, Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy (New York and London: W.W. 
Norton, 2004), p. 88. 
7 Also see Alford, The Self in Social Theory, pp. 89-94. 
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rule of law is a defining characteristic of civil society as a field of an autonomous 
agent’s self-realization. 
Of modern contractrians, Kant offered one of the most refined and coherent 
discussions about the nexus of the political, the legal, and the moral in his theory of 
civil society.8 Unlike his British predecessors preoccupied with the constitutional 
reconstruction of political society, which was occasioned due to their immediate 
witness to the complete breakdown of the existing body politic,9 Kant—reflecting on 
the political order under the reign of Frederick the Great on the one hand, and 
philosophically inspired by Rousseau on the other, particularly his ideas of morality 
and civil freedom10—concentrated on how to realize the individual’s political and 
moral agency within the politico-legal, and moral framework, namely, civil society.11 
For Kant, accordingly, criminal law held no less political significance than 
constitutional law, for it was understood to directly engage in the “social” contract 
amongst the citizens in civil society. Paradoxical as it may sound, the gist of modern 
liberalism, predicated politically and legally on the social contract theory, consists of 
                                                 
8 Most importantly, see Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. & ed. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) [hereafter MM]. 
9 It should be reminded that for the British contractrians (perhaps save Locke but still ambiguously) 
civil society (societas civilis) was frequently equated with a political society or a commonwealth. Even 
Adam Ferguson who initiated the modern discussion of civil society with his Essay on the History of 
Civil Society (1767) remained closest to the older republican model.  
10 Kant’s following words are surely Rousseauian: “And one cannot say: the human being in a state has 
sacrificed a part of innate outer freedom for the sake of an end, but rather, he has relinquished entirely 
his wild, lawless freedom in order to find his freedom as such undiminished, in a dependence upon 
laws, that is, in a rightful condition, since this dependence arises from his own lawgiving will.” MM, p. 
93.  
11 As will be shown, Kant achieves this uniquely modern nexus between the political (or the legal) and 
the moral by means of his modern metaphysics of practical reason.  
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the person’s right to punishment. 12  That is to say, in contractrian liberalism 
(especially in its Kantian version), civil freedom, a key expression of the individual’s 
politico-legal and moral agency, can never be more clearly manifested than when one 
is punished. In short, criminal punishment is an indispensable political right of the 
citizen, the legitimate member of the contractual civil society.  
However, in the West’s modern liberal political tradition, civil society is 
essentially a juridical society and civility primarily refers to what Kant calls 
“legality,” which poses a great political and cultural challenge to consolidating Korea, 
where there is a search for the kind of civil society that can buttress a new democratic 
life in the post-Confucian context. Admittedly, to Confucian culture, the kinds of 
agentic individualism and rule of law that Kant articulated and was enthusiastically 
embraced by the modern West are completely alien. The fact of the matter is that until 
recently when the Confucian family-head system was officially renounced and 
replaced by the individual registry system in the Korean Civil Code, Korean society 
had indeed been grounded in “Confucian familism,” in which the basic social unit 
was not so much a discrete individual as a(n) (extended) family. Given such a rapid 
and drastic social and politico-legal change over Korean society after democratization, 
democratization is surely more than a political regime change for ordinary Koreans. 
Democratization is rather experienced as a cultural mechanism that abruptly replaces 
a family-based affectionate Gemeinschaft by a rule-based rationalist Gesellschaft.  
Thus understood, the most imminent practical question in Korea is how to 
balance these two historically and culturally distinctive social arrangements in its 
                                                 




accommodated democratic and civil life. In other words, how ought one creatively to 
incorporate the Korean family-oriented social affect into the legal skeleton of 
Western civil society, namely, the rule of law? Can Korea’s post-democratic civil 
society proactively assume the title of “post-Confucian civil society” by acculturating 
a modern juridical society premised on the idea of individual agency with chŏng? 
In this chapter, I explore how Korea’s consolidating ethical civil society 
actively encompasses both tradition and modernity, creating a new cultural amalgam, 
a post-Confucian civil society. By investigating how ordinary Korean citizens made 
sense of and reacted to a recent case of domestic violence that resulted in patricide, I 
argue that for Koreans, civil society is not so much a rigorous juridical society as an 
“imagined (extended) family” moderating cool rationalism embodied in the rule of 
law through the social practice of chŏng. My central claim is that uri-responsibility, 
as a uniquely Korean civil ethos of collective moral responsibility, provides a 
quintessentially important acculturating middle ground between chŏng (social affect) 
and rule of law (reason), and between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft by mediating 
individualism (agentic freedom) and collectivism (collective responsibility). I 
conclude this chapter by arguing that chŏng is a great cultural asset for Korean 
liberalism because it can buttress “liberal collectivism,” as opposed to “liberal 
individualism,” by inculcating uri-responsibility.   
   
Chŏngish Civil Society and Its Kantian Critique 
 
The Lee Case and Chŏngish Civil Society 
 
On April 16, 2005, a 14-year old Korean girl named Lee was arrested on the charge 
of patricide. Her father, an alcoholic, had been beating his ill parents and Lee, his 
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only child, over the past decade. Lee’s mother, sick of the husband’s drunken 
rowdiness and frequent violence, ran away when Lee was just over three months old, 
and had not been heard from since. On the day of the incident, Lee’s father, drunk, 
was beating his elderly parents as well as Lee, who was trying to hold him back. So 
afraid of the father, who was running amuck while wielding a kitchen knife, Lee took 
hold of his hands, and as he flailed about trying to get free, she strangled him with a 
necktie. It is reported that while Lee was attempting to hold her father from beating 
her grandparents, she called 112 (the police emergency number) twice for help. The 
police found Lee’s father unconscious and carried him to the hospital, who soon died. 
Lee immediately confessed her deed, and did not resist as she was arrested on the 
charge of patricide. In addition, though widely perceived as unnecessary,13 the 14-
year-old was sent to an adult criminal jail. (According to Korean Criminal Law, a 
person above 14 is legally liable for punishment.) 
After Lee’s case was publicized in the media, it soon drew heated attention 
from many Koreans, and, surprisingly, the public discourse was drawn to discovering 
who was truly responsible for Lee’s action and what should be done collectively to 
resolve this particular case. Outraged yet simultaneously saddened, thousands of 
Koreans posted electronic petitions on the Gangreung police office’s official 
website,14 pointing out the harshness in the legal execution of Lee. Respondents 
chastised the law executioners’ failure to distinguish juvenile from adult criminals, 
                                                 
13 According to Clause 70 of the Korean Criminal Law, imprisonment should be occasioned when at 
least one of the followings is fulfilled: (1) uncertainty of residence, (2) destruction of evidence, and (3) 
probability of runaway. It was widely voiced among the Koreans that none of these could justify Lee’s 
imprisonment to the adult criminal jail. 
14 Gangreung is a coastal city on the East Sea, where the incident was occasioned. 
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and additionally asked for a lessening of punishment considering the misery and 
hardship Lee endured for years. Some further argued that Lee was not culpable for 
her desperate action, which was obviously an act of self-defense. Others justified 
Lee’s acquittal on the basis of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  
In the meantime, four regional civic groups, mainly engaged in women’s 
rights and domestic violence, voluntarily formed a joint committee for Lee. The 
committee included a legal advisory group that demanded an investigation without 
holding Lee under custody on account of self-defense, and launched a signature-
collecting campaign both off- and on-line.15
What is quite puzzling is that no one seemed to perceive Lee as the only 
responsible actor for the incident. But if she alone was not responsible for her actions, 
who else could be? Were Koreans insensible or simply confused? Obviously, neither 
was the case, because whether siding with her (albeit on divergent grounds) or strictly 
adhering to the rule of law, Koreans were almost unequivocal about the criminality of 
Lee’s action, and with that regard, held that Lee should accept the consequences of 
her part. At least, that is what the letter of the law says and Koreans were well aware 
of it. However, concerning domestic violence, the West’s liberal individualistic nexus 
of “crime-guilty-responsibility” did not settle the issue for many Koreans.16 Rather, 
Koreans reframed an otherwise individual, domestic, and apparently private issue as a 
                                                 
15 The on-line site can be found at http://www.hotline.or.kr/noViolence. 
16 According to Hegel, crime guilt is the single most important psychological asset of one’s self-
consciousness and thus of individuality because through the mind of guilty one attains a “right” as a 
doer. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), pp. 283-285. Also see Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000), pp. 31-32. 
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collective, public, and essentially sociopolitical question by transferring—albeit 
partly—the source of responsibility from the person who committed the crime to that 
of the Korean collective. That is to say, they created a collective moral responsibility, 
or “uri-responsibility,” to supplement Lee’s individual moral responsibility or 
(criminal) guilt. This ethos is best (but not exclusively) shown in the passage read in 
the press conference jointly held by the joint committee for Lee, Korea Women’s Hot 
Line and its 26 regional branches, and 16 members of the Korean National Assembly: 
“[Retrospectively] thinking of whether our society has ever shown any hope to Lee, 
we feel far graver social responsibility.”17
The “Lee case” could have faded away after some social commotion, like 
many cases of domestic violence. But once Lee’s diary was made public, the issue 
elicited nation-wide attention.18 A couple of passages read: 
 
Today was tough. It is now 10:15 p.m. Daddy drank again and acted aggressively. What 
would it be like if he didn’t drink? I hate alcohol. Poor daddy … Anyhow, today was tougher 
than usual. I don’t know why. Am I an idiot? My pretty grandma says she will soon make a 
Pibimbap (boiled rice with assorted mixture). Yay! Let’s quit today’s writing for I don’t want 
to care any more. (January 17, 2005, emphasis added) 
 
The weather is bad today. But daddy went fishing [for work]. Must be tough! But since he is 
not around, it feels good. Too relieved and too good. I wish it would last forever. (January 25, 
2005, emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
17 This is my translation and emphasis is added. It seems that by “social responsibility” it was also 
meant to include “political responsibility” because the fifth clause of the document proclaims the 
comprehensive efforts by the government at the propagation of social awareness of the seriousness of 
family violence and the compelling needs of its prevention and eradication as well as the legal and 
institutional efforts by the legislature that could facilitate them. 




From a liberal individualism’s rationalistic standpoint, Lee’s feeling towards 
her violent father is marked with contradictions: great sympathy and at the same time 
unavoidable enmity—although it was transferred toward drinking, not directly toward 
the father himself. It seems that she could not direct her enmity to her father because 
doing so would be unimaginable and worse, it would prove her lack of filiality, a 
cardinal moral quality in Confucian ethics.19  So, it appears that Lee tried to be 
responsible to her filial duty while transferring the source of her misery to something 
that she can legitimately blame, allowing her to escape guilt. These heavily 
ambivalent sentiments which include both sympathetic affection (goun chŏng) and 
affectionate hatred (miun chŏng), Koreans call “chŏng,” a uniquely Korean mode of 
social affect which allegedly originated in traditional Korean familial relations, 
especially between parents and children. 20  In traditional Korea, all meaningful 
relations (including social and political ones) were modeled after the familial 
relations grounded in chŏng. In Korean chŏng culture, therefore, the authentic human 
being meant being a chŏngish man, an articulate master of complex human relations.  
Chŏng is a heavily intricate set of sentiments, however, because even though 
chŏng is primarily an affective attentiveness to human relationship, all human 
relationships are not as affectionate as they should be, as Lee’s case demonstrates. 
Miun chŏng (affectionate hatred) is a torn chŏng developed in such cases. It is still a 
                                                 
19 In Confucian ethics, filial reverence toward the parents is the moral virtue par excellence. See 
Qingping Liu, “Filiality versus Society and Individuality: On Confucianism as “Consanguinitism”,” 
Philosophy East and West 53:2 (2003), pp. 234-250. For a daughter’s (and/or a daughter-in-law’s) 
filial responsibility toward her own parents (and/or parents-in-law) in the Confucian tradition, see Sor-
hoon Tan, “Filial Daughters-in-law: Questioning Confucian Filiality,” in Chan and Tan, Filial Piety, 
pp. 226-240. 
20 See note 23 in Chapter 1. 
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form of chŏng, however, because the long-shared common experiences that a 
particular (often agonizing) relationship has entailed turns the relations-incurred 
torment into a kind of torn affections. In Korean chŏng-relations, therefore, family 
violence constitutes a special ethical problem, for it signifies a destruction of the very 
fundamental of chŏng. Upon family violence, the most basic human relation, from 
which all other kinds of ethical relations stem, dissolves into no-relatedness, the 
complete absence of affectionate ties. If evil has any meaning for Koreans, it is 
nothing but unrelatedness.21 Seen in this way, it is apparent that it was to Lee’s 
chŏng—particularly her miun chŏng—that the ordinary Koreans strongly responded. 
That is not to suggest, however, that Koreans were completely without regret. 
They were terribly torn despite their immense empathy with Lee’s chŏng, because 
they could not completely dismiss the facticity of her crime. This ambivalence was 
clearly seen in one Korean netizen’s (ID: 24udea) electronic petition to one of the 
largest Korean portal websites (www.naver.com): “I wish that Lee would be allowed 
to still study at school although the crime she committed itself is culpable.” On the 
other hand, drawing on exactly the same reasoning, a completely contrary conclusion 
was reached in Daily Chosun’s on-line forum, in which one (ID: rhwlgns) claimed, 
“Even though I sympathize with Lee, who committed patricide, a crime is a crime”. 
In my view, the ambivalence that divided Koreans into these two groups, a 
sympathizing group and a group claiming strict application of criminal law, 
emblematically represents the tension between traditional Korean chŏng-relations and 
                                                 
21 Alford, Think No Evil, p. 104. 
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the modern West’s rule of law.22 More generally, it can be recaptured in terms of the 
tension between chŏng and justice.  
 A Kantian Critique 
 
From liberalism’s rationalist perspective, however, this sort of tension is not only 
irrational, but it is indeed far from moral. Kant writes: 
 
It is very beautiful to do good to human beings from love for them and from sympathetic 
benevolence or to be just from love of order; but this is not yet the genuine moral maxim of 
our conduct, the maxim of our conduct, the maxim befitting our position among rational 
beings as human beings, when we presume with proud conceit, like volunteers, not to trouble 
ourselves about the thought of duty and, as independent of command, to want to do of our 
own pleasure what we think we need no command to do.23
 
In the same spirit, Kant dismisses the moral value of feelings of compassion 
and tender sympathy: “[I]f it precedes consideration of what is duty and becomes the 
determining ground, [it] is itself burdensome to right-thinking persons, brings their 
considered maxims into confusion, and produces the wish to be freed from them and 
subject to lawgiving reason alone.” 24 Criticizing the Scottish moral philosophy’s 
(particularly Hutcheson’s) moral sentimentalism, Kant distinguishes pathological 
pleasure that in his view precedes one’s observance of the law (even) in order for him 
or her to act in conformity with the law (the moral law, but also the positive law in his 
doctrine of right) from moral pleasure. And he warns that “[i]f this distinction is not 
observed, if eudaemonism (the principle of happiness) is set up as the basic principle 
                                                 
22 But one should be cautioned that the division of these two groups is by no means exhaustive. More 
accurately, they are not categorically distinguished two groups, but one group that ambivalently 
encompasses the other. Therefore, the difference between these two groups is only in a relative sense 
and it is through this ambivalence that the Koreans searched for a third way. 
23 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. 70 [hereafter CPrR]. 
24 Ibid., p. 99.  
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instead of eleutheronomy (the principle of the freedom of internal lawgiving), the 
result is the euthanasia (easy death) of all morals.”25 Of course, Kant’s words here are 
concerned with the individual agent’s internal lawgiving (rather than outer 
lawgiving) and virtue (rather than right). But his dismissal of moral sentiments as the 
foundation of moral law leads to its irrelevance in criminal law (i.e. social contract) 
when he states:  
 
The law of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who crawls through the 
windings of eudaemonism in order to discover something that releases the criminal from 
punishment or even reduces its amount by the advantage it promises, in accordance with the 
pharisaical saying, “It is better for one man to die than for an entire people to perish.”26  
 
In light of Kant’s moral and political philosophy, Koreans’ chŏngish 
ambivalence can hardly be justified morally (in light of moral law) or politically (in 
light of social contract). On the Kantian liberal account, “chŏngish civil society” is an 
oxymoron, in that chŏng cannot be a form of civility that is essentially individualistic. 
At best, chŏng is akin to social affect of the kind with which Adam Ferguson in his 
defense of the tradition of Gemeinschaft of the Scottish highlanders confronted 
against Adam Smith’s individualistic sentimentalism predicating a modern 
Gesellschaft.27 And as is well-known, Kant was profoundly influenced by Smith (who 
was equally inspired by Rousseau) more than any Scottish moral philosophers.28
                                                 
25 MM, p. 143. 
26 Ibid., p. 105. 
27 On this point, refer to Oz-Salzberger’s introductory essay in Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the 
History of Civil Society, ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 
vii-xxv. But this comparison is not quite accurate, either, because the kind of social affect Ferguson 
advocated was not so much a tender emotion characterizing chŏng as a vehement or militaristic form 




If chŏngish society is opposed to a juridical society as Kantian liberalism 
logically claims, can it be possible for Koreans to develop a chŏngish civil society? 
Or, can it be possible to connect chŏng (social affect) to justice without violating the 
key requirements of civil society, such as the rule of law and individual agency? But, 
first of all, why are Koreans reluctant to embrace the Kantian version of civil society? 
Why is it that they still desperately cling to familial affection, knowing that doing so 
could potentially be detrimental to consolidating a juridical civil society? Kant (and 
modern contractrians for that matter) never considered the familial (not to mention 
the family, if not marriage) in his theory of civil society. Yet, Kant’s (and others’) 
indifference to the familial (and the family) in his moral and political theory is hardly 
surprising considering the Western political tradition’s prolonged prejudice against 
the family (oikos), against its moral and political significance, which is markedly 
contrasted to its obsession with the state (polis). But what if Koreans see the family as 
having its own moral and political telos? What if they see the familial as inherently 
the political? Different conceptualizations of the political require different types of 
civil society. Therefore, investigating the conception of the political in relation to the 
familial in two different political traditions is imperative. 
 
The Concept of the Political: Contractual versus Familial 
 
Political as Contractual 
 
                                                                                                                                           
28 On the intellectual influence of Smith on Kant, see Samuel Fleischacker, “Philosophy in Moral 
Practice: Kant and Adam Smith,” Kant-Studien 82 (1991), pp. 249-269. Also see Knud Haakonssen, 
“Kantian Themes in Smith,” in Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 148-153. 
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In the Western political tradition, family has always remained a residual realm 
isolated from civil society, the realm of freedom, equality, and civic friendship, and 
has been deemed as exclusively concerned with subsistence or vitalizing civil society, 
be it polis, civitas, or modern civil society.29 In The Human Condition, Hannah 
Arendt writes: 
 
The polis was distinguished from the household in that it knew only “equals,” whereas the 
household was the center of the strictest inequality. To be free meant both not to be subject to 
the necessity of life or to the command of another and not to be in command oneself. It meant 
neither to rule nor to be ruled. Thus within the realm of the household, freedom did not exist, 
for the household head, its ruler, was considered to be free only in so far as he had the power 
to leave the household and enter the political realm, where all were equals.30
 
According to Arendt, in the classic Western world, the familial was 
prepolitical, which makes the family a realm of a despotic rule. Arendt contrasts polis 
and oikos by saying that:  
  
To be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and 
persuasion and not through force and violence. In Greek self-understanding, to force people 
by violence, to command rather than persuade, were prepolitical ways to deal with people 
characteristic of life outside the polis, of home and family life, where the household head 
ruled with uncontested, despotic powers, or of life in the barbarian empires of Asia, whose 
despotism was frequently likened to the organization of the household.31
 
But why is it that the ancient Greeks viewed the family as inherently 
womanish (non-civic), unequal, and despotic? More importantly, why did they 
understand the family as prepolitical despite its indispensability to political/civil 
society (polis)? In order to answer these questions, we can enlist a help from 
                                                 
29 Its classical reference is found in Aristotle’s The Politics, book I. My broad usage of the concept 
“civil society” here is drawn on Ehrenberg, Civil Society. 
30 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 32. 
31 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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tragedians, their profound views on human suffering endemic in family (and familial) 
relations. Aeschylus’s Oresteia trilogy (Agamemnon, The liberation Bearers, and The 
Eumenides) is particularly helpful because it deals with a series of family violence of 
one specific family, the House of Atreus. 
In Agamemnon, Agamemnon returns victorious from Troy only to be 
murdered by his wife Clytaemestra, primarily because he had sacrificed their 
daughter Iphigenia for his personal ambition. In The Liberation Bearers, Apollo 
orders Orestes, son of Agammenon and Clytaemestra, to avenge the death of his 
father. With the help of his sister Electra, he kills Clytaemestra and her lover 
Aegisthus, who is also Orestes’ uncle. Immediately after the murders, Orestes suffers 
paranoiac insanity, being chased—or so he believes—by the Furies of his mother. In 
The Eumenides, after realizing that Apollo, who urged him to commit matricide, is 
helpless in rescuing him from the bloodthirsty Furies, Orestes seeks Athena’s 
jurisdiction for justice. Upon a draw, Athena sides with Orestes, setting him free 
while appeasing the outraged Furies by promising them a residence within the city 
where they can stay as guardians of the city. 
Upon a series of the dreadful events, the chorus prophesies:  
 
Almighty Destines, by the will 
of Zeus let these things 
be Done, in the turning of Justice. 
For the word of hatred spoken, let hate 
be a word fulfilled. The spirit of Right 
cries out aloud and extracts atonement 
due: blood stroke for the stroke of blood 
shall be paid. Who acts, shall endure. So speaks 
the voice of the age-old wisdom.32
                                                 
32 Aeschylus, The Liberation Bearers, in Oresteia, trans. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University of 




The phrase “turning of Justice” denotes the fundamental confusion in the 
meaning of justice.33 Who is just – Clytaemestra defending the mother’s principle by 
killing her husband who selfishly sacrificed their daughter, or Orestes drawing on the 
son’s principle by avenging his father’s murder? What about Apollo, the instigator of 
the murder? Is Zeus, the highest god, free from responsibility for this mess? Ironically, 
this fundamental injustice of the world is made manifest (in the audience’s mind) 
when the heroic protagonists become subject to the standards of human relations. And 
obviously, family relation is the most basic form of human relations. Therefore, from 
a familial standpoint, “blood stroke for the stroke of blood” indeed implies the unjust, 
violent, and lawless nature of the family. After all, the Oresteia trilogy demonstrates 
the fragility of family relationships alongside the combustibility of familial affection 
and how necessitous it was to construct a system of justice in the non-familial sphere 
and in non-familial terms.34 Given the (classic understanding of) nature of the family, 
the subjugation of the family under the control of civil society seems only rational. 
                                                 
33 Alford captures this in terms of “the Dionysian Crisis,” the cultural and psychological crisis in the 
face of torn recognition of the incurable contradictions of the world during the democratic transition 
from the heroic era. C. Fred Alford, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Greek Tragedy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992), p. 50. 
34 It is in this context that St. Augustine states, “In fact, who are, in general, more friendly, or at any 
rate ought to be, than those within the walls of the same home? And yet, is anyone perfectly serene in 
that situation, when such grievous ills have so often arisen from the secret treachery of people within 
those walls? And the bitterness of these ills matches the sweetness of the peace that was reckoned 
genuine, when it was in fact only a very clever pretence … Hence also that inspired utterance, ‘A 
man’s enemies are those of his own household’, is heard with deep sorrow of heart.” Augustine, 
Concerning the City f God against the Pagans (London: Penguin, 1984), bk. XIX, par. 5. 
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Returning to Arendt, what should be recalled is that for the ancients, the 
familial (in contradistinction to the political/civil) was thought to be prepolitical and 
thus natural. For them, the familial was a social representation of the natural. In 
effect, oriental despotism that they despised most was the very (yet pseudo-political) 
manifestation of the state of nature.35 The point is that the state of nature signifies a 
certain mode of social condition. Enlightened by Rousseau,36 Kant knew this point 
clearly: “What is opposed to a state of nature is not … a condition that is social and 
that could be called an artificial condition (status artificialis), but rather the civil 
condition (status civilis), that of a society subject to distributive justice. For in the 
state of nature, too, there, can be societies compatible with rights … but no law.”37  
Of course, Kant does not explicitly associate the natural with the familial. But, 
“a society that is not subject to justice” (as Kant defines the state of nature) is one that 
is based on familial affection, as natural affection unmediated and uncontrolled by 
practical reason is thought to be “pathological” according to Kant. Moreover, familial 
affection is far from qualified to become a moral law since it presupposes (in Rawls’s 
language) “the good” over “the right” and its effect is at best momentary. Moral law 
must be antecedently grounded: 
                                                 
35 Famously, in his criticism of Robert Filmer, John Locke likens patriarchal monarchy to the state of 
nature. See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1980), §§ 105-110. 
36 See Rousseau’s criticism of Hobbes’s account of the state of nature in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The 
Social Contract, in Susan Dunn (ed.), The Social Contract and the First and Second Discourses (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 91-94. Famously, C. B. Macpherson in his Possessive 
Individualism recast Hobbes’s (and Locke’s) account(s) of the state of nature in terms of market 
society. But I rather follow Rousseau’s more general social interpretation of the state of nature in 
Hobbes’s social contract theory.  




The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind with a considered and firm resolution to put the 
law of virtue into practice. That is the state of health in the moral life, whereas an affect, even 
one aroused by the thought of what is good, is a momentary, sparkling phenomenon that 
leaves one exhausted … Fantastic virtue is a concern with petty details which, were it 
admitted into the doctrine of virtue, would turn the government of virtue into tyranny.38
 
All the more problematic, morality grounded in affection cannot be a 
universal value for all rational human beings. Therefore, Kant writes 
 
But if it [the happiness of other beings] were the determining ground of the maxim, one would 
have to presuppose that we find not only a natural satisfaction in the well-being of others but 
also a need, such as a sympathetic sensibility brings with it in human beings. But I cannot 
presuppose this need in every rational being (not at all in God). Thus the matter of the maxim 
can indeed remain, but it must not be the condition of maxim since the maxim would then not 
be fit for a law … Thus the law to promote the happiness of others arises … merely from this: 
that the form of universality, which reason requires as the condition of giving to a maxim of 
self-love the objective validity of a law, becomes the determining ground of the will.39
 
Of all sympathetic feelings, familial affection is most pathological because it 
attaches us to particular persons (i.e. family members), leading us to do something 
because of our feelings toward the person rather than because we have chosen the 
action for its own sake by an act of will.40 In familial relationships, affection could 
easily deteriorate into blind attachment. More problematic is that when strong familial 
attachment is allied with power and, worse yet, violence, its consequence is simply 
horrendous as best seen in the House of Atreus. The family should not only be 
despised as a realm of animality preoccupied with the question of “necessity,”41 but 
furthermore, be feared and guarded against because it is saturated with unbridled 
passions. Therefore, from a Kantian perspective, the familial is not merely 
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 167. 
39 CPrR, p. 31. 
40 Alford, Greek Tragedy, p. 146. 
41 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 30. 
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prepolitical; potentially and inherently, it is antipolitical. Accordingly, the civil 
cannot be founded on the familial; the civil (and reason) must be constructed beyond 
the reach of the familial (and passion) as the polis was to be outside the oikos. The 
familial so construed is more akin to the kind of state of nature that Hobbes depicted. 
For Kant, modern civil society ought to be contractual because it is the only 
intellectually available way to save the political, which must be grounded in and 
exercised by the agentic use of practical reason from what Arendt calls “the social” 
(the socioeconomic principle of happiness) – the governing principle of the oikos in 
antiquity, that also become a supreme value in the modern commercial world.42 But, 
more fundamentally, as Kant (like Rousseau and Smith) repeatedly writes in his 
political philosophical works, contractual theory was called forth to rescue practical 
reason and individual agency from passion, then widely called “self-love.”43 That is 
to say, for Kant, social contract was inherently a political contract that utilizes the 
agent’s pure practical reason or Wille (as distinct from Willkür)44 unencumbered by 
passion or “sensible impulses.” 45  Ultimately, a contractual civil society as the 
politico-juridical entity is a home of free, rational, and agentic (self-legislating) 
individuals, who have at the same time become “citizens.” 
                                                 
42 Ibid., pp. 38-49. 
43 MM, p. 209; CPrR, pp. 32-33, 63-64, 72-73, 131. Obviously Kant’s interpretation of social contract 
is directly opposed to possessive individualism.  
44 On the distinction between Wille and Willkür, see Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 129-145. 
45 MM, pp. 12n, 13. John Rawls’s Kantian social contract theory in the original position, too, should be 
understood in this civil-political context as Sandel’s famous interpretation of Rawls’s Theory of 
Justice—albeit implicitly—shows (although Rawls’s later work Political Liberalism gives up Kantian 




The members of such a society who are united for giving law (societas civilis), that is, the 
members of a state, are called citizens of a state (cives). In terms of rights, the attributes of a 
citizen, inseparable from his essence (as a citizen), are: lawful freedom, the attributes of 
obeying no other law than that to which he has given his consent; civil equality, that of not 
recognizing among the people any superior with the moral capacity to bind him as a matter of 
right in a way that he could not in turn bind the other; and third, the attribute of civil 
independence, of owing his commonwealth, not to the choice of another among the people. 
From his independence follows his civil personality, his attribute of not needing to be 
represented by another where rights are concerned.46
 
As such, the implicit equation of the family (and the familial) with the state of 
nature (and the pre- and anti-political) is a persistent feature of the Western political 
tradition with all its ancient and modern liberal fluctuations. Kant is especially 
important, even though he did not offer a contractual model of the family as Hobbes 
and Locke did, because his contract theory most clearly demonstrates where the 
essence of “the political” (as opposed to “the natural” and “the familial”) lies. Only 
once it is understood that modern civil society is predicated on this practical idea of 
the political, can it be clear why modern civil society ought to be a juridical society. 
In the end, a juridical society begins where the familial ends.               
 
Familial as Political 
 
As Adam Smith lamented, the modern civil society was necessitated (hence it was not 
a political ideal as most contemporary social and political theorists take for granted) 
out of the “the most melancholy of all reflections”—the idea that we live in a 
“fatherless world.”47 Smith’s realism, inherited certainly from Hobbes, best represents 
the “melancholy” on which the modern civil society tradition is predicated:  
 
                                                 
46 MM, p. 91. 
47 TMS, VI.ii.3.2. 
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We only regret that it [humanity] is unfit for the world, because the world is unworthy of it, 
and because it must expose who is endowed with it as a prey to the perfidy and ingratitude of 
insinuating falsehood, and to a thousand pains and uneasiness, which, of all men, he the least 
deserve to feel, and which generally too he is, of all men, the least capable of supporting. It is 
quite otherwise with hatred and resentment. Too violent a propensity to those detestable 
passions, renders a person the object of universal dread and abhorrence, who, like a wild beast, 
ought, we think, to be hunted out of all civil society.”48
 
 
That is, behind modern civil society is concealed a chaotic and fatherless state 
of the sort we have seen in Oresteia. No doubt, Kant’s utterly juridical reconstruction 
of civil society is equally embedded in this deep pessimism. 
The Confucian tradition, however, has starkly contrasting stories about the 
family (and family violence). The following conversation between Mencius and his 
disciple Wan Zhang on the legendary sage-king Shun’s hardship, inflicted by his own 
parents and brother before he came to the throne, is highly illustrative in this regard. 
 
WZ: Shun’s parents sent him to repair the barn. Then they removed the ladder and Gusou 
[Shun’s father] set fire to the barn. They sent Shun to dredge the well, set out him and blocked 
up the well over him. Xiang [Shun’s younger brother] said, ‘The credit for plotting against the 
life of Shun goes to me …’ Xiang went into Shun’s house and there Shun was, seated on the 
bed playing on the lute. Xiang, in some embarrassment, said, ‘I was thinking of you.’ Shun 
said, ‘I am thinking of my subjects. You can help me in the task of government.’ I wonder if 
Shun was unaware of Xiang’s intention to kill him. 
 
M: How could he be unaware? He was worried when Xiang was worried, and pleased when 
Xiang was pleased. 
 
WZ: In that case did Shun just pretend to be pleased? 
 
M: No… That only goes to show that a gentleman can be taken in by what is reasonable, but 
cannot be easily hoodwinked by the wrong method. He, Xiang, came as a loving brother, and 
so Shun honestly believed him and was pleased. What need was there for pretence?49
 
Obviously, Xiang did not come to Shun as a loving brother, but Mencius 
claims that Shun believed so. Correspondingly, in The Analects, Confucius is 
reported to have said that “the man who does not count beforehand upon the falsity of 
                                                 
48 TMS, I.ii.4.3. 
49 Mencius, 5A:2. 
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others nor reckon upon promises not being kept … is the true sage.”50 All the more 
puzzling, Shun, after the enthronement, while banishing all the infamous moral 
outcasts, raised Xiang to be the prince of the land of Youbi. Was it because Shun (and 
the Confucians) blindly put consanguinitism over individuality or common good, as 
Liu believes?51 Why did Shun act in the manner he did? Little can be gleaned if we 
approach the case in terms of the personal strife among the family members within 
the family, and, accordingly, if we expect Shun to be quo individual. From a liberal 
standpoint, Mencius’ following explanation would only add confusion:  
 
A benevolent man [a man of ren] never harbors anger or nurses a grudge against a brother. 
All he does is to love him. Because he loves him, he wishes him to enjoy rank; because he 
loves him, he wishes him to enjoy wealth … If as Emperor he were to allow his brother to be 
a nobody, could that be described as loving him?52
 
At issue is not consanguinitism. Mencius’ point is rather that Shun could have 
allowed his malicious brother to be a “nobody” (pifu 匹夫), that is, Shun could have 
seen his brother as if he were nobody worth recognizing. In a more famous passage in 
The Works of Mencius, Mencius uses the term fu 夫 in the same way: in Section Eight 
of the First Book, Mencius refers to both Jie (the last emperor of the Xia dynasty) and 
Zhou (the last emperor of the Shang dynasty), two of the most notorious moral 
outcasts, as nobody (yifu 一夫). Famously, the term “nobody” was introduced as the 
crucial contemporary philosophical lexicon by Arendt in Eichmann in Jerusalem to 
                                                 
50 Analects, 14:33. 
51 Liu, “Confucianism as “Consanguinitism”.” 
52 Mencius 5A:3. 
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make sense of a man like Eichmann who banally commits evil because he does not 
(or cannot) think. 53  In this important book, Arendt contrasts a person (the 
independent and autonomous moral agent) to a Nobody who completely lacks moral 
agency. Originally, Arendt came up with the concept “nobody” to bemoan the loss of 
the polis (or civil society) and to criticize the predominance of the apolitical social 
man (i.e. bourgeois) in the modern and contemporary commercial (non-) world.54 In 
other words, for Arendt, a man autonomously thinks and acts in civil society, while a 
nobody denotes its absolute opposite: a thoughtless and actionless cog. 55  The 
implication of this moral and political contrast is that a nobody does not merit respect 
as a rational human being (due to his incapability of praxis and lexis) and therefore is 
not even qualified to be held responsible for his criminal act because he is thought to 
have not acted. By extension, he is not counted as the legitimate member of civil 
society because, unable to think and act, he is thought incapable of voluntary consent 
to social contract. In short, he is neither a person (morally) nor a citizen (political-
legally).56
Obviously, D. C. Lau’s translation of fu into “nobody” is a misnomer because 
the Chinese character fu by no means translates into or implies the modern 
                                                 
53 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 
1994). 
54 For Arendt, the world is always an actionable world. So in her view, the modern bourgeois is the 
worldless creature or a creature living in the non-world. In the most authentic sense, the polis is the 
only world.  
55 Arendt’s concept “person” is clearly indebted to Kant’s concept “personality.” See CPrR, p. 74 and 
MM, p. 16. 
56 On Arendt’s understanding of the moral and political contrast between person and nobody, see Paul 




bourgeoisie that Arendt despised. It seems that Lau, without embroiling himself in 
Arendt’s inherently Kantian moral philosophy, only takes “nobody” to mean a moral 
outcast. Nevertheless, if we agree on the basic idea that “nobody” refers to a moral 
outcast without complicating it with Kant’s moral philosophy, to understand fu in that 
exact term makes good sense because Mencius in effect employed this particular term 
(originally referring to a common man) to mean a moral defunct in the precisely 
Confucian sense. Again, Mencius’ focus was not on individualism, the premise of 
Arendt’s and Kant’s moral and political philosophy. What is uniquely Confucian in 
the lines quoted above is that Shun’s absolute fraternal responsibility toward Xiang 
nullified the murderous intention of his brother.  
By “nobody,” Mencius means not so much a non-person as “no relationship” 
or “the end of relationship” that once one had with the person (in a neutral sense) 
concerned. In Shun’s case, Xiang could have been a nobody if Shun would have seen 
him as such upon the breakdown of meaningful fraternal relationship. Likewise, in 
the cases of Jie and Zhou, upon the end of the legitimate ren-based relationship 
between king and people, people could see them as if they were nobody. Nobody is 
not of intrinsic moral significance unless it is seen as such by others. It is relationally 
defined. In the Confucian world, nobody is a quality of becoming rather than that of 
being. 
Furthermore, outside relationships are nothing. Evil in Confucian society 
finds its expression in ugly relationships, relationships that violate the expectations of 
harmony inherent in them. Particularly, in the traditional Confucian world, ren-based 
human relationship was articulated in terms of li 禮, often translated in English as 
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propriety, rite, ritual, ceremony, or etiquette. Therefore, after defining li as an 
externalization of ren (personal morality reached through moral self-cultivation) in a 
specific social context, Tu Weiming writes: “Li, accordingly, can be considered as a 
principle of particularism that signifies how the process of ren’s self-actualization is 
to take place. In other words, a Confucianist always carries out his moral self-
cultivation in the social context … His orientation is this-worldly, and he regards this-
worldly activities as both intrinsically valuable and necessary to self-fulfillment.” 
Without li (relation), ren (morality) is void.  
What is important is that in the Confucian ethico-political system predicated 
on the creative tension between ren and li, 57 the family occupies a special place 
because it is where the cardinal human relationships are to be learned, practiced, and 
mastered. The following phrase from Daxue (The Great Learning), one of the Neo-
Confucian Four Books, clearly illustrates a unique position of the family in Confucian 
moralpolitik:   
 
… only when personal lives are cultivated are families regulated; only when families are 
regulated are states governed; only when states are governed is there peace all under Heaven. 
Therefore, from the Son of Heaven to the common people, all, without exception, must take 
self-cultivation as the root.58  
 
Worth noting is that the family is located between the self and the state, a 
place typically held by civil society in the West’s liberal tradition. But, the Confucian 
family was not merely a third sector that functionally mediates between the self and 
                                                 
57 Recently, SangJun Kim has articulated it in terms of “Confucian moralpolitik.” See Kim, “The 
Genealogy.” 
58 Wing-tsit Chan (ed.), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1969), pp. 84-85. 
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the state. As Hahm rightly argued, the Confucian family had its own telos, which both 
philosophically and historically enabled it to become coeval or even superior to the 
state in its ethical significance. 59  And that telos was “filial and fraternal 
responsibility” (xiaodi 孝弟). 
 
Someone asked Confucius, “Why are you not employed in governing?” The Master replied, 
“The Book of Documents says: ‘It is all in filial conduct (xiao 孝)! Just being filial to your 
parents and befriending your brothers is carrying out the work of government.’ In doing this I 
am employed in governing. Why must I be ‘employed in governing’?”60
 
Here Confucius boldly redefines politics as an ethical practice that extends 
filial and fraternal responsibility to broader human (including civil and political) 
relationships. And it is on this ground that Rappa and Tan are persuaded that the 
Confucian family, rather than being a closed parochial and archaic system, is a much 
more fluid and accommodating relational field open to society.61 The point here is 
that the telos of the family constitutes the ethical core of the Confucian politics. What 
is more important, as we have seen in Shun’s case, is that telos, filial and fraternal 
responsibility, is called forth in the course of resolving the situations reminiscent of 
the state of nature (or the fatherless world) as are justice (for external act) and civility 
(for internal willing) in the modern West. In other words, in the Confucian tradition, 
the familial is the political. Here maintaining affective responsibility in social 
                                                 
59 Chaibong Hahm, “Family versus the Individual: The Politics of Marriage Laws in Korea,” in Bell 
and Hahm, Confucianism for the Modern World, p. 358. Also see Sor-hoon Tan, Between Family and 
State: Relational Tensions in Confucian Ethics,” in Alan K.L. Chan (ed.), Mencius: Contexts and 
Interpretations (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), pp. 169-188. 
60 Analects, 2:21. 
61  Antonio L. Rappa and Sor-hoon Tan, “Political Implications of Confucian Familism,” Asian 
Philosophy 13:2/3 (2003), pp. 91-92. 
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relations—rooted in filial and fraternal responsibility practiced in the family—is the 
single most critical goal of politics. 
Of course, in contemporary Korea, the Confucianism that buttressed the entire 
ethical fabric of traditional society has become almost outmoded.62 Nowadays, few 
Koreans identify themselves as Confucian and no political party or civic group 
officially claims to uphold Confucian values. Ostensibly, the rule of law has become 
entrenched as the “only game in town” and the state has grown immensely rational. In 
the meantime, civil society, that is neither the family nor the state but a mediating 
sphere in-between, emerged (or imported) as an important public and ethical realm. 
Democratization crystallizes this drastic change in ethico-political mechanisms in 
Korean society (see Chapter 5). What is notable is that despite remarkable 
modernization, the Confucian, relational, sensibility of evil is still salient in 
contemporary Korea as Alford’s recent study has attested, 63  and, accordingly, 
something traditional or something familial – albeit not precisely the traditional 
Confucian ethical system of ren and li – is operating in the life of ordinary Koreans. 
As I argue, it is chŏng that fills that important ethical lacuna, which widened after 
Confucian moralpolitik collapsed. 
 
Chŏngish Society versus Rational-Juridical Society 
 
Too modernized and too rationalized, Korea’s post-democratic state has considerably 
lost its ethical grip on ordinary Koreans while gaining contractual democratic 
                                                 
62  For the contemporary state of Confucianism in Korea, see Byong-ik Koh, “Confucianism in 
Contemporary Korea,” in Tu, Confucian Traditions, pp. 191-201. 
63 Alford, Think No Evil.  
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legitimacy.64 To be sure, law is not the only mechanism through which the state 
comes to terms with the daily life of ordinary citizenry, but it is definitely the most 
important and most legitimate channel available for the state to do so. And a juridical 
civil society that pivots around liberal individualism has become an indispensable 
societal partner to Korean rechtstaat. The Lee case shows, however, that despite rapid 
rationalization and legalization of Korean society, notwithstanding the relative ease 
and enthusiasm with which Korea has successfully consolidated its democratic 
regime (if not democratic life), Koreans have a certain regret about this remarkable 
“success” upon losing the warmth of social affection, namely, chŏng.   
The chŏngish collective action upon the Lee case reveals a Korean aspiration 
to search for an alternative form of civil society that encompasses both chŏng and the 
rule of law. Unfamiliar with the Hobbesian state of nature or the Smithean fatherless 
world, or never exposed to the “perils of pluralism” (the kind that was unleashed after 
the Reformation), Koreans are puzzled over why law must be so rigorous or 
categorical as Kant believes, even while admitting the importance of rule of law for 
any viable and ordered society. That is, Koreans do not share Smith’s “melancholy” 
that necessitated civil society to be a juridical system. 
Rather, for Koreans, civil society must be an affectionate bulwark against the 
ruthless process of rationalization of society, which renders human relationship to be 
                                                 
64 It is not to justify that the authoritarian regimes had better ethical terms with the Korean people. My 
point is just that after democratization, the Korean society has been actively emulating a Western style 




merely mechanical and human beings mutually alienated.65 No doubt, civil society in 
Korea is a new social phenomenon and hence modern, but it is ambiguously modern. 
And such ambiguity arises from the fact that civil society in Korea is at once a 
modern rational entity of the rule of law and also the cultural bulwark that moderates 
cool rationalism that rule of law promotes. Thus Korea’s chŏngish civil society 
operates with such ambivalent in-betweens: it is modern and public while upholding 
the traditional social affect stemming from Confucian familial relationships.  
From the Kantian liberal standpoint, the collective emotional response by the 
Korean people to the Lee case might appear to be an attempt to circumvent rational 
legal arrangements in favor of fanatic sentimentalism. But for the Korean majority, 
entrusting family violence to criminal law alone is hardly human-like and 
furthermore, doing so is thought to be unimaginable because in attempting to punish 
the evil-doer, the law is ineluctably forced to acknowledge the involvement of evil in 
it. This is because the very execution of the criminal law, however paradoxically, 
renders evil undeniable. In traditional Confucian Korea, the familial annihilated evil, 
so in contemporary post-democratic and post-Confucian Korea the civil society is 
believed to perform that very function. But how can we balance between chŏng and 
rule of law, to create a chŏngish civil society? In the following section, by contrasting 
uri-responsibility to Kant’s individualistic responsibility, I will explore how uri-
responsibility has such a potential.  
                                                 
65 For the Koreans, chŏng is an “enchantment” directly opposed to rationalization. Therefore, Pyong-
choon Hahm observes: “The interpersonal commitment we are here discussing is unconditional and 
total. It is therefore irrational, illogical, inefficient, unproductive, parochial and often unpatriotic. It is 
biological (“animal”) and emotional rather than intellectual or objective.” Hahm, Korean 
Jurisprudence, pp. 168-169. 
132
 
   
Uri-responsibility and Chŏngish Civil Society 
  
Kant’s Individualistic Responsibility 
 
As widely known, Kant’s theory of freedom and responsibility is individualistic, 
corresponding to his equally individualistic moral and political theory of civil society 
and citizenship.66 Yet, Kant’s theory is not straightforward because he explicates 
freedom in metaphysical terms while granting a credit to Spinozian determinism. 
Although Kant fully develops his idea of freedom in his second Critique, it remained 
to be a fundamental issue even in his first Critique when he grappled with the “third 
antinomy,” a fundamental contradiction between theoretical reason and practical 
reason and/or between the law of nature (conditional causality) and freedom 
(unconditional/infinite causality).67  
 
Now even if one believes the action to be determined by these causes [for a given natural 
effect], one nonetheless blames the agent, and not on account of his unhappy natural temper, 
not on account of the circumstances influencing him, not even on account of the life he has 
led previously; for one presupposes that it can be entirely set aside how that life was 
constituted, and that the series of conditions that transpired might not have been, but rather 
that this deed could be regarded as entirely conditioned in regard to the previous state, as 
though with that act the agent has started a series of consequences entirely from himself.68
 
Specifically, the puzzle is this: if, as empiricists (or eudaimonists) claim, a 
man is a purely theoretical (i.e. empirical) being only reacting upon the sense data 
(“representations”)—which turn into passions—impressed in his inner space (res 
                                                 
66 See Andrews Reath, Agency & Autonomy: In Kant’s Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006); Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), ch. 6.  
67 For a more detailed philosophical discussion of Kant’s third antinomy, see Allison, Kant’s Theory of 
Freedom, pp. 11-28.  
68 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 544. 
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cogitans) through the cognitive process of sense-perception of the things-in-
themselves in the external world (res extensa), and therefore his action, inherently 
reactive, is completely determined by the causality of nature, on what ground can he 
be called “free” or be held responsible for his action (which is in effect nothing more 
than a psychological reaction)? Kant asks,  
 
“If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in accordance with the 
natural law of causality, a necessary result of determining grounds in preceding time, then it 
was impossible that it could have been left undone … That is, how can that man be called 
quite free at the same point of time and in regard to the same action in which and in regard to 
which he is nevertheless subject to an unavoidable natural necessity?”69  
 
To resolve this puzzle, Kant reasons that freedom ought to be approached 
from purely practical standpoint; that is, freedom ought to be thought to belong to the 
kingdom of the moral law, which in turn ought to be promulgated solely by the use of 
practical reason. Psychological freedom supported by a will (Willkür) that is 
motivated by sensible impulses originating from the representations can by no means 
be the authentic freedom, because it cannot avoid the infinite regress of the causality 
of action, which makes moral agency hardly identifiable. Such freedom is rather the 
freedom of a turnspit, which, “when once it is wound up, also accomplishes its 
movements of itself.”70 Therefore, freedom ought to be transcendental to the “whole 
chain of appearances” and/or to “the necessity of the connection of events in a time 
series.” Put differently, freedom ought to be independent of natural causality 
(causality as a phenomenon); instead it must be a causa noumenon. 
 
                                                 
69 CPrR, p. 80. 
70 Ibid., p. 82. 
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Yet we are conscious through reason of a law to which all our maxims are subject, as if a 
natural order must at the same time arise from our will. This law must therefore be the idea of 
a nature not given empirically and yet possible through freedom, hence a supersensible nature 
to which we give objective reality at least in a practical respect, since we regard it as an object 
of our will as pure rational beings … Hence the difference between the laws of a nature to 
which the will is subject and of a nature which is subject to a will (as far as the relation of the 
will to its free actions is concerned) rests on this: that in the former the objects must be the 
causes of the representations that determine the will, whereas in the latter the will is to be the 
cause of the objects, so that its causality has its determining ground solely in the pure faculty 
of reason, which can therefore also be called a pure practical reason.71
 
Why Kant “invents” a noumenal definition of freedom is not hard to tell: it is 
solely for the sake of “autonomy,” the quintessential core of the individual’s moral 
(and by implication political) agency. Kant thus says, “The sensible nature of rational 
being in general is their existence under empirically conditioned laws and is thus, for 
reason, heteronomy. The supersensible nature of the same beings, on the other hand, 
is their existence in accordance with laws that are independent of any empirical 
condition and thus belong to the autonomy of pure reason.”72  
More often than not, the distinction between the two worlds (noumenal and 
phenomenal) is seen to be an ontological one. But as Korsgaard has wisely noted, the 
distinction is not between two kinds of beings, “but between the beings of this world 
insofar as they are authentically active and the same beings insofar as we are 
passively receptive to them.” 73  Recently, Kojin Karatani, a renowned Japanese 
scholar, has offered a more succinct explanation, when he rephrases Kant’s antinomy 
as follows: 
 
From the beginning, neither freedom nor responsibility emerges out of the theoretical stance 
that queries the cause. According to Kant, the criminal’s responsibility arises when the 
causality is bracketed, that is, when he is a free agent. In reality, he does not have freedom 
                                                 
71 Ibid., p. 39. 
72 Ibid., p. 38. 
73 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom, p. 203. 
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sensu strico. But, he has to be deemed free in order for him to be responsible. Such is the 
practical standpoint.74
 
By the “theoretical standpoint” Karatani means Kant’s “thesis” that claims the 
law of nature (or law of causality), which he relates to Spinozian determinism, 
whereas the practical standpoint is presented as its “antithesis” that admits the realm 
of freedom. 75  According to Karatani, freedom is engendered by a “pronounced 
parallax” between theoretical and practical standpoints. This means that freedom is 
pronounced only if the theoretical stance, concerned with the causality of the law of 
nature that determines one’s action is bracketed off.76 In this interpretation, freedom 
is a metaphysical construct that is found only ex post facto and its goal is to hold one 
responsible for his or her action, the action that could otherwise be claimed to have 
been occasioned due to “necessitous” circumstances. Put simply, freedom is required 
to stop the infinite chain of regress of the causality of action. Even differently 
constituted natures of different human beings do not count because freedom is 
transcendental to natural contingencies. It is precisely on this ground that Kant 
advances the idea of “deserving punishment.” 
 
There are cases in which human beings … show from childhood such early wickedness and 
progress in it so continuously into their adulthood that they are taken to be born villains and 
quite incapable of improvement as far as their cast of mind is concerned; and nevertheless 
                                                 
74 Kojin Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, trans. Sabu Kohso (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2005), p. 118. 
75 Ibid., p. 115. 
76  Karatani’s interpretation is textually supported because Kant writes, “[The] distinction of the 
principle of happiness from that of morality is not … at once opposition between them, and pure 
practical reason does not require that one should renounce claims to happiness but only that as soon as 
duty is in question one should take no account of them.” CPrR, p. 78. Also see Korsgaard, Creating 
the Kingdom, p. 181. 
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they are so judged for what they do or leave undone that they are censured as guilty of their 
crimes; indeed, they themselves (the children) find these censures as well founded as if, 
despite the hopeless natural constitutions of mind ascribed to them, they remained as 
accountable as any other human being. This could not happen if we did not suppose that 
whatever arises from one’s choice (as every action intentionally performed undoubtedly does) 
has as its basis a free causality, which from early youth expresses its character in its 
appearances (actions); these actions, on account of the uniformity of conduct, make knowable 
a natural connection that does not, however, make the vicious constitution of the will 
necessary but is instead the consequence of the evil and unchangeable principles freely 
adopted, which make it only more culpable and deserving of punishment.77
 
Therefore, Kant says,  
 
a rational being can now rightly say of every unlawful action he performed that he could have 
omitted it even though as appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past and, so far, is 
inevitably necessary; for this action, with all the past which determines it, belongs to a single 
phenomenon of his character, which he gives to himself and in accordance with which he 
imputes to himself, as a cause independent of all sensibility, the causality of those 
appearances.”78  
 
Paradoxically, it is realized that punishment is another form of right because it 
reveals ex post facto that a criminal had had a right to freely act otherwise before he 
committed a crime. Just like the right that is exclusively concerned with the actor’s 
external action, punishment must be purely formal and non-sentimental because it 
supports the justice of the moral law. Punishment is how the criminal restores his 
personhood.  
  
Now, becoming a partaker in happiness cannot be combined with the concept of a punishment 
as such. For, although he who punishes can at the same time have the kindly intention of 
directing the punishment to this end as well, yet it must first be justified in itself as 
punishment, that is, as mere harm, so that he who is punished, if it stopped there and he could 
see no kindness hidden behind this harshness, must himself admit that justice was done to him 
and that what was allotted him was perfectly suited to his conduct. In every punishment as 
such there must first be justice … Thus punishment is a physical harm that, even if it is not 
connected with moral wickedness as a natural consequence, would still have to be connected 
with it as a consequence in accordance with the principles of a moral lawgiving.79
 
                                                 
77 CPrR, pp. 83-84. 
78 Ibid., p. 82. 
79 Ibid., p. 34. 
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Its political implication is apparent. In civil society, crime is under the 
jurisdiction of the justice of the civil law, which is promulgated by the public use of 
pure practical reason. Here, punishment is how a criminal restores his citizenship, 
once suspended upon the crime. 
 
Certainly no human being in a state can be without any dignity, since he at least has the 
dignity of a citizen. The exception is someone who has lost it by his own crime, because of 
which, though he is kept alive, he is made a mere tool of another’s choice (either of the state 
or of another citizen). Whoever is another’s tool (which he can become only by a verdict and 
right) is a bondsman (servus in sensu stricto) and is the property (dominium) of another, who 
is accordingly not merely his master (herus) but also his owner (dominus) and can therefore 
alienate him as a thing, use him as he pleases (only not for shameful purposes), and dispose of 
his powers, though not of his life and members. No one can bind himself to this kind of 
dependence, by which he ceases to be a person, by a contract, since it is only as a person that 
he can make a contract.80    
 
As we have seen already, the attempt to release a criminal on grounds of 
compassion or anything “pathological” is not only morally wrong but also politically 
improper. What is required is a cool citizenship in which fellow citizens respect the 
criminal’s personhood and citizenship by giving him a deserving punishment. 
Accepting the due punishment is absoluetely the wrongdoer’s responsibility. 
In this respect, Hannah Arendt’s concept of “collective responsibility” merits 
close attention given her Kantian orientation, because it appears to provide a new type 
of responsibility, distinct from Kant’s individualistic notion of responsibility. 81  
According to Arendt, there are two types of responsibility. The first is a “moral” (or 
“criminal”) responsibility. It is exactly the Kantian individualistic responsibility we 
have hitherto investigated. Since it is a responsibility held by a free agent for his or 
                                                 
80 MM, p. 104. 
81 Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 
2003), pp. 147-158. 
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her own willingly chosen action, it can alternately be called a “causal” responsibility. 
No doubt, the key to this particular type of responsibility is the agent’s moral 
autonomy.82  
The second is “political” responsibility. Political responsibility is a 
responsibility to which a political community (normally, the state) is to be held for 
any political injustice it has inflicted on another political community (e.g. unjust war 
or international crimes). Arendt particularly calls it “collective” responsibility as 
distinct from the moral responsibility that is individualistic in nature. The prime 
example is the collective responsibility taken by the entire State of Germany for 
WWII. Implicit in the notion of political responsibility in Arendt’s reasoning is that 
the only legitimate collective actor is the state. But the underlying justification of this 
claim is that in a nation’s political action, individual actors are not to be held 
personally responsible, because in most cases they cease to be persons and become 
“nobodies.”    
Seen in this way, Arendt’s two-fold conception of responsibility is still firmly 
built on Kant’s individualistic responsibility because for her collective responsibility 
is at best a residual or parasitic category in her philosophy of morality, a concept 
contrived to explain a domain io which a language of morality (which is Arendt’s 
supreme concern) cannot possibly apply. In the end just like for Kant, moral 
responsibility for Arendt is only an individual responsibility. Morality ceases when it 
                                                 
82 See also Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), where 
Berlin, a forthright Kantian, contrasts Kantian freedom to historical determinism, by focusing on the 




comes to the collective. The non-political collective can in no way come to terms 
with morality. Ultimately, this stark dichotomy between morality and politics is 
traced back to Machiavelli’s famous severance of public and private ethics. In this 
dualism (i.e. public versus private, moral versus political, and individual versus 
collective), there is no room for “collective moral responsibility” that navigates in-
betweens.    
 
Uri-Responsibility as Collective Moral Responsibility  
 
In Korea, democratization has brought to the fore the cultural clash between the 
Gemeinschaft of chŏngish society and the Gesellschaft of rational-juridical society. In 
some sense, as manifested in the Lee case, Koreans today are in a similar situation in 
which Antigone finds herself.  
In his famous interpretations of Sophocles’s Antigone, Hegel interprets 
Antigone as stuck in the tensions between an ethical order and a political order, 
between Divine Law and Human Law, and between the family and the state.83 No 
doubt, this is a Hegelian recapitulation of the Aristotelian dichotomy between oikos 
and polis.84 Evidently, Hegel is convinced that self-consciousness can be constituted 
only if the former categories are overcome by the latter ones. Put differently, 
Antigone must succumb to Creon. This is because, for Hegel, the former categories 
(Antigone, the Divine Law, the family, Women) represent unknowable, unrealized 
                                                 
83  Hegel, Phenomenology, pp. 267-278. According to Jacque Maritain, the “unwritten and 
unchangeable law” that Antigone represents is “natural law.” See Jacque Maritain, Man and the State 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950). 
84 Though, Hegel ultimately revamps this classic dichotomy by adding in between one intermediary 
ethical entity, namely, civil society in The Philosophy of Right. 
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Spirit, that is, “unconsciousness.” And here Hegel sees a fundamental ethical conflict, 
which he names “antithesis”:  
 
For this reason, the opposition between them appears as an unfortunate collision of duty 
merely with a reality which possesses no rights of its own … For the commands of 
government have a universal, public meaning open to the light of day; the will of the other 
law, however, is locked up in the darkness of the neither regions, and in its outer existence 
manifests as the will of an isolated individual which, as contradicting the first, is a wanton 
outrage.85
 
Of course, for Hegel, this ethical antithesis between the unconscious and the 
conscious is only tentative; it is the tension that is eventually to be overcome at the 
end of world history—or was already overcome in Hegel’s view with the advent of 
the modern nation-state, when the universal reason completes its self-actualization 
(that is, when universal reason, once particularized and self-negated, finally achieves 
its ultimate unity through the negation of the negation in the self’s now dialectically 
exalted subjectivity, i.e. moral agency).86 Moral individualism is the counterpart of 
modern nation-state: it is predicated on such a highly ethical state of subjectivity, not 
on subjectivism that is tantamount to archaic atomism.  
The problem is, as seen in Hegel and Kant and later admitted by Rawls, moral 
individualism is predicated on its own comprehensive moral doctrine, namely, 
“liberal metaphysics.”87 Koreans, however, are completely alien to such a peculiarly 
                                                 
85 Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 280. 
86 “[I]t [the will] first puts itself in the opposition between the implicit universal will and the single 
explicitly independent will; and then, through the supersession of this opposition (through the negation 
of the negation), it determines itself in its existence as a will, so that it is a free will not only in itself 
but for itself also, i.e. it determines itself as self-related negativity.” G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of 
Right, trans. T. M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), § 104 (p. 74). 
87 On this, see John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 14:3 (1985), pp. 223-239. 
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liberal philosophical and cultural element. What is interesting, though, is that Koreans 
nevertheless did not remain schizophrenic between chŏng, the Korean equivalent of 
Hegel’s Divine Law or the unconscious, and rule of law, the Human Law or the 
conscious.88 In the face of the psycho-cultural and political predicament generated by 
a “clash of civilizations,” the alternative that Koreans came up with was a special 
ethos of collective responsibility that complements, rather than nullifies, the 
individual’s sense of responsibility (or guilt). One Naver user (ID: sumit200) claimed, 
“Lee’s patricide was indeed the vicarious murder on behalf of the society that had 
been negligent of family violence, and hence the responsibility should be held by 
every single member of our [Korean] society.” Apparently, a uniquely Korean ethos 
of collective moral responsibility, namely, “uri-responsibility” (uri chaegim), was the 
most prevailing response by the multitude of ordinary Koreans. Another netizen (ID: 
voieel) wrote in the Daily Chosun’s on-line forum: 
 
We all know about the situation that drove the middle school student [A] to murder her father. 
Why did we, now able to clearly see [what caused A’s patricide], let it happen? And why had 
we negligently left the father an alcoholic? It is probably because of the mores of our society 
that do not care about anything perhaps but [such a dreadful incident as] a murder (emphases 
added). 
 
One netizen, who submitted an on-line petition on the official website of the 
Gangreung police office, wondered:  
 
No doubt, murder is a crime. But for me it appears that what led up to the incident was due to 
the failure of the law to protect this child. Isn’t it a contradiction that a girl who has not been 
protected by the law should be punished by the same law? What should be blamed is indeed 
                                                 
88  Despite her general respect of Hegel’s dialectics, Benhabib precisely points out the complete 
absence of that method in Hegel’s interpretation of Antigone. See Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: 




the law itself that failed to protect the child. And [ultimately] isn’t it the state that must be 
blamed because it failed to do its job, which was to justly execute the law? 
 
What this ardent petitioner insisted is not to be mistaken as advocating Lee’s 
unconditional acquittal. Rather, like many others, his or her purpose was to point out 
how closely our society, our law, and our state were (and are) associated with the 
salient evil, and therefore how reasonable it would be for us to collectively “share” 
the responsibility, while acknowledging the horrendous fact of murder, thus still 
holding Lee responsible for her own action. 
To many Koreans, Lee was represented as “our” daughter and her misery was 
felt as if it was “ours.” Yet, simultaneously, the brute fact of murder could not be 
dismissed. The Korean breakthrough for this tormenting quandary was to invoke 
chŏng in the public sphere of civil society as is best shown in the petition submitted 
by a netizen who identified herself as a mother of three. Her petition read, “The law is 
said to have in-chŏng, the human chŏng, as well,” and “The law is said to have tears.” 
From a Kantian (and Hegelian) liberal viewpoint that opposes passion to reason, this 
reasoning is not only logically flawed, but, more fundamentally, it is politically 
dangerous, for it does not grant full credit to the liberal individualist moral and 
political basis of civil society. To Hegel, this appealing mother would have been seen 
as a Korean Antigone, a recalcitrant voice against the rational law. 
Unlike Hegel’s Antigone, however, Koreans were not schizophrenically torn 
between two Laws. For them, the antithesis between Divine Law, or chŏng, and 
Human Law, or the criminal law, was simplistic. Likewise, the dichotomy between 
individual moral autonomy and collective responsibility was deemed to be too limited 
in capturing their ethical problems. By invoking uri-responsibility, they were able to 
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bridge Korean chŏng to Western civil society, and thereby collectively confront an 
evil without violating the requirement of modern civil society: an individual’s 
criminality and the rule of law. 89  This new civil ethos therefore is neither 
individualistic nor collectivistic, neither purely Confucian nor unqualifiedly liberal, 
and neither sentimentalist nor legalist; rather, in each instance, it is both. 
Thus understood, uri-responsibility is qualitatively different from Arendt’s 
two Kantian accounts of responsibility. First, uri-responsibility defies a causal 
reasoning characteristic of moral responsibility. That is, where a Kantian moral 
responsibility approaches a personal moral/criminal issue as the agentic question of 
an individual’s volition (Wille), uri-responsibility refuses to attribute the question of 
morality exclusively to the individual (say, the criminal) and instead seeks 
collectively to resolve the moral problems while still holding the actor responsible for 
his or her own action, on the condition that he or she deserves chŏng. 
 Second, that uri-responsibility is a form of collective responsibility does not 
endorse that it is a political responsibility as understood in the Kantian (liberal 
republican) tradition. As we have seen, in Korea’s Confucian tradition, the kind of the 
political that Kant inherited from the British social contract tradition (especially from 
Hobbes) is completely unknown. Instead, Confucians conceive of the political in 
terms of the familial. If uri-responsibility can be called a political responsibility, it is 
so only with reference to the political as the familial. Since Confucian moralpolitik 
                                                 
89 In this regard, Alford’s following observation on the Korean people is very instructive: “Koreans are 
both individualistic and collectivistic, and it is the conflict between their individualistic and 
collectivistic selves that is central to the culture, as well as psyche of every Korean.” Alford, Think No 
Evil, p. 38. 
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does not separate the political from the familial and the political as the familial from 
the moral, uri-responsibility originally rooted in Confucian familism can 
correspondingly be understood as a moral responsibility. Reasoned in this way, uri-
responsibility can be safely identified in terms of a “collective moral responsibility.” 
It is this particular ethos of collective moral responsibility that invigorates an ethical 
civil society in Korea, making it a “chŏngish civil society,” a cultural amalgam 
between chŏngish and juridical societies.     
 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, after redefining the concept “civil society” in terms of the public 
space wherein individual agency and citizenship become co-original, I sought to show, 
first, how Korean individual agency (chŏngish relational selfhood) is qualitatively 
different from liberal (particularly Kantian) individual agency (personhood). 
Secondly, building on the first, I sought to show how the modern West’s liberal civil 
society, namely, a juridical civil society or a moral system of the rule of law, 
predicated on moral individualism is politically impracticable to contemporary 
Koreans, who are still soaked, albeit unwittingly, in the morality of chŏng. The point, 
though, was neither to vindicate a cultural and moral incommensurability between the 
modern West’s juridical/civil society and Korean chŏngish society nor to engage a 
Korean/Confucian communitarian critique of liberal civil society by critiquing the 
former from the latter’s standpoint. Nor was it my intention to demonstrate an utter 
inappropriateness of moral individualism and a juridical society based on it in the 
democratic Korean civil society. My main contention was, rather, that although the 
political democratization of Korea had brought about an unanticipated cultural crisis 
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in Korean society—that is, the clash between traditional chŏngish society and modern 
juridical/civil society, Koreans have found a way to overcome it by creating what I 
called uri-responsibility, a uniquely Korean civil ethos of collective moral 
responsibility, thus moderating the cool individualistic rationalism of the rule of law, 
while not necessarily circumventing its basic moral and political premises. 
In order to show the “political” dimension of chŏng-induced uri-responsibility 
(as distinct from and, in a sense, opposed to the West’s rationalist conception of the 
political), I made a special effort to culturally sensitize and contextualize the concept 
of the political, and argued that even though uri-responsibility could qualify to be a 
neither moral nor political responsibility from a Kantian perspective, it could safely 
be called a moral and political responsibility with reference to the Confucian 
conception of the political as familial. In the next chapter, I investigate how, 
historically, the Confucian ideal of the political as familial proffered a defining 
cultural and political characteristic of traditional Korean politics (especially its 
conception of statehood) and attempt to show how uri-responsibility is indeed greatly 
indebted to Korea’s Confucian past.           
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CHAPTER 5: BEYOND LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP                                        




In the preceding two chapters, I have attempted to show what uri-responsibility is and 
how chŏngish civil society predicated on uri-responsibility is culturally distinct from 
a liberal individualistic civil society pivoted on the rule of law. In this chapter, I 
challenge the liberal idea of citizenship (hereafter “liberal citizenship”) from the 
perspective of chŏng and uri-responsibility. To do so, I start with one recent case 
regarding Korean citizenship. 
On June 29, 2005, the National Assembly in Korea roundly rejected a draft 
law that would strip those who abandoned their Korean citizenship to avoid the draft 
of their status as overseas Koreans, and deprive them of all their rights as Koreans. 
This decision sent most Koreans into a great uproar because the revision to the Act on 
the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (AILSOK) had been regarded 
as a due follow-up of the recent revision to the Nationality Law that bars dual citizens 
from giving up their Korean citizenship unless they complete mandatory military 
service. In fact, the revision to the AILSOK, or “the Draft Dodgers Bill” as the 
Koreans called it, was submitted with tremendous popular support by a lawmaker of 
the opposition party, responding to the long lines formed at Immigration Offices of 
young dual nationals resigning their Korean citizenship before the proposed law 
could go into effect. 
Frustrated, thousands of Koreans demanded that the names of those who voted 
against the bill be publicized—especially those “betrayers” who had supported the 
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bill in the Legislation-Judiciary Committee and then withdrew their original support 
either by opposing it or abstaining from voting. Some radicals even hacked into the 
incumbent Uri Party’s official website, temporarily paralyzing it, and then further 
demanded that the full list of those dodgers who apparently had abused parental love 
by exercising the right to “exit” on behalf of their juvenile children be publicized. 
Others used more orthodox forms of collective action like a candlelight vigil 
demonstration in front of the National Assembly while others rapidly organized civic 
groups (e.g., “6.29 Nation Action”) to pressure the political society to endorse the 
new AILSOK.    
For Korean liberals, however, the national upheaval surrounding the new 
nationality law was troubling.  Indeed, for them the efforts to revamp the AILSOK, 
and the demands to publicize the names of the “draft dodgers” constituted serious 
violations of an individual’s constitutional right to happiness and privacy. It seems 
that Korean liberals’ trepidations are justifiable in light of the fact that cosmopolitan 
norms and universal human rights are gaining greater currency in both international 
law and political philosophy.1 From this perspective even the already-made revision 
                                                 
1 Admittedly, the contemporary interest in cosmopolitanism is inspired by Kant’s two classic articles 
“Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” and “Perpetual Pease: A Philosophical 
Sketch,” both in Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991). For its contemporary discussion, see Brian Barry, “Humanity and Justice in Global 
Perspective,” in J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (eds.), Nomos XXIV: Ethics, Economics and the 
Law (New York: New York University Press, 1982); Chris Brown, “International Political Theory and 
the Idea of World Community,” in K. Booth and S. Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today 
(University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995); Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in 
Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and 
Cosmopolitanism” in J. Cohen (ed.), For Love of Country (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996); Thomas 
Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” in Chris Brown (ed.), Political Restructuring in Europe: 
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to the Nationality Law could be suspected of promoting such illiberal outcomes. As a 
matter of fact, several dual citizens prepared to bring the case to the Korean 
Constitutional Court, while employing the language of constitutional and universal 
rights (i.e., right to happiness and to free movement of residence).2 Moreover, these 
liberals believed that the widely-held public conception amongst Koreans that dual 
citizenship (and, more importantly, its private rights justification) is a kind of a social 
privilege signaled a return to a form of anachronistic “statism” or “nationalism” in the 
era of globalization and cosmopolitan citizenship.  
But, can the liberals’ charge of “nationalism” (or “statism”) be justified?3 I do 
not believe so for two reasons. Firstly, if what we are witnessing in Korea today is a 
                                                                                                                                           
Ethical Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999).  
2 This is what Seyla Benhabib calls “freedom of exit and association,” about which she explains, “The 
Freedom of the individual to exit the ascriptive group must be unrestricted, although exit may be 
accompanied by the loss of certain kinds of formal and informal privilege.” Seyla Benhabib, The 
Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002), p. 19. For the similar universalistic view of citizenship, see Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of 
the Other: Studies in Political Theory, eds. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 1996); Etienne Balibar, We, The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational 
Citizenship, trans. James Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
3  Despite the acknowledged conceptual distinction between “nation” and “state” (and between 
“nationalism” and “statism”), many liberals (not only Korean liberals) often use the two concepts 
confusingly. As a mountain of nationalism studies have revealed, however, nationalism is not in itself 
affiliated with statism. See Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and 
Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 247-264; David Miller, “The Ethical 
Significance of Nationality,” Ethics 98:4, pp. 647-662; David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995); Tamir, Liberal Nationalism; Andrew Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 36-61. According to Hobsbawm, the “nation-
state” was typically a post-French Revolution phenomenon in Europe. E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and 
Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
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form of illiberal nationalism, can we rightly say that it is nationalist to deny, rather 
than endow, national rights to overseas Korean nationals? From a nationalist 
standpoint, the Korean case is rather counterintuitive because historically all the 
negative tenets incorporated by its nationalist movements such as exclusion, 
assimilation, and violence, have been, in the main, exemplary of ethnocentric 
nationalism; a form of nationalism oriented toward other national groups, ethnic 
minorities, or other nation-states. 4  Secondly, Korean liberals’ equation of 
constitutional right with universal/cosmopolitan right is highly problematic. 
Notwithstanding the growing interest in cosmopolitan interpretations of constitutional 
patriotism and/or republicanism in Western political philosophy, why Korean 
citizenship should be approached on these grounds is not given any explanation.5 
Indeed, I argue that Korean liberalism is fundamentally missing an awareness of an 
inherently particularistic, both national and cultural, nature of citizenship.   
In this chapter, I challenge the prevailing liberal perspective that frames the 
current nationality issue in Korea in terms of a dichotomy between “nationalism” and 
“liberalism.”6 I believe that it rests on a problematic assumption that rights-based 
                                                 
4 Most famously, the recent politics of nationality—the political dynamic between the nationalizing 
nationalism, homeland nationalism, and the national minorities—in postcommunist Eastern Europe 
and Eurasia was just about this problem. See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood 
and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
5  For such tendency, see James Bohman, “Republican Cosmopolitanism,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 12:3 (2004), pp. 336-352. Also see Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other.  
6 Most emphatically, the Uri Party congressman Choi Jae-cheon’s defense against the public charge 
best represents such a conventional bias: “In my own opinion, [the outcome of voting] seems to reflect 
a relatively stronger liberal proclivity shared by the members of our party than those of opposition 
Grant National Party, accordingly our respect of diversity and pluralism as opposed to closed 
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liberal individualism is an indispensable element to a new democracy like Korea for 
its democratic consolidation and citizen empowerment.7 Furthermore, and equally 
problematic, is the empirically dubious claim that liberalism and nationalism are 
mutually exclusive, which forecloses any possibility that liberal individuality and 
national collectivity can be mutually constitutive. In this respect, I find Yael Tamir’s 
idea “liberal nationalism” as providing an invaluable conceptual frame by which to 
breakthrough the reified binary of liberalism and nationalism. 
Therefore, I do not—as many political theorists trying to make an East Asian 
(or “Confucian”) case against the hegemonic Western liberalism do—aim to repeat 
the communitarian critique of liberalism despite my general sympathy regarding such 
attempts. 8  My primary purpose lies rather in making a Korean case of liberal 
nationalism through philosophical reflection of the case introduced above. In order to 
do so I pay special attention to the way in which liberal nationalism is actualized in 
post-Confucian Korea by investigating how chŏng—the familial affectionate 
                                                                                                                                           
nationalism,  and our apprehension of Korea’s status in the era of world citizenship and globalization 
superseding state-centrism” (from his official website: http://www.cjc4u.or.kr, my translation). 
7 Such a bias is prevailing in many influential social sciences literature. See, among others, Gellner, 
Conditions of Liberty; Baogang He, “New Moral Foundations of Chinese Democratic Institutional 
Design,” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), China and Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects for a 
Democratic China (New York and London: Routledge, 2000); Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations; 
Alex Inkels et al., “Causes and Consequences of Individual Modernity in China,” China Journal, 37 
(1997), pp. 31-59; Adam Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society. 
8 Daniel A. Bell, “The Limits of Liberal Justice,” Political Theory 26: 4 (1998), pp. 558-582; Daniel A. 
Bell, “Human Rights and Social Criticism in Contemporary Chinese Political Theory,” Political 
Theory 32:3 (2004), pp. 396-408; Daniel A. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (eds.), The East Asian Challenge for 
Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Chaibong Hahm, “The Cultural 
Challenge to Individualism,” Journal of Democracy 11:1 (2000), pp. 127-134.  
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sentiments that are occasionally manifested nationally—helps to generate both a civil-
national collective consciousness and a special sense of collective moral 
responsibility, or as I have earlier defined in terms of uri-responsibility. In short, 
whereas liberal nationalism is an attempt to contextualize the universalism of 
liberalism in the particularism of nationalism, the present chapter seeks to 
contextualize a theory of liberal nationalism in the particularism of post-
Confucianism. 
 
The Politics of Nationality Law in 2005: A Case 
 
On May 4, 2005, the Korean National Assembly passed a revision to the Nationality 
Law that bars dual citizens from giving up their Korean citizenship unless they 
complete mandatory military service. From the drafting stage, the new Nationality 
Law garnered unprecedented nation-wide support, which many liberals found 
unsettlingly nationalistic, and anachronistic considering the universal trend of 
globalization and the parallel dissemination of cosmopolitan citizenship. 
Nevertheless, for the majority Koreans the imminent issue was not the question of 
citizenship per se, but rather how to “punish” those who “abused” their right of dual 
citizenship in shirking the “everyone-fulfilling” military duty. Many ordinary 
Koreans were particularly aggravated by the way dual citizens (especially, Korean-
U.S. dual citizens)—as peculiar subjects—had been manufactured. Most commonly 
Korean parents, upon impending parturition, travel to the United States solely for the 
purpose of securing U.S. citizenship for their children by exploiting the U.S.’s 
principle of jus soli. After returning the children live a normal Korean life up to the 
age of 18 or so, upon which they give up their Korean nationality—upon that moment 
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becoming an overseas national and is still entitled some important legal rights as a 
“Korean”—mainly to avoid military service. Apparently what was at stake was 
military duty, but its far-reaching implications were generally political, specifically 
concerning the meaning of Korean citizenship in the era of globalization.    
The bill backfired, however, when thousands of dual citizens (both young dual 
citizens and their parents), formed long lines at the Immigration Office to resign their 
Korean citizenship before the new policy went into effect on May 24. According to 
the Korean Ministry of Justice (Official Gazette, 6/7/05), the number of those who 
forfeited Korean citizenship amounted to 2,032. Among those, 1,306 did so in Korea, 
while 726 did it at the overseas Korean Embassies. Of the 1,306 in Korea, 1,288 
(98%) were male while 18 (1.4%) were female. Furthermore, 958 were younger than 
15 years old, 341 were 16-17, only seven were over 18. The foreign country of which 
citizenship they chose most was predominantly the U.S. (1,220/ 93%). 
Most “ordinary” Koreans were convinced that those dual citizens willing to 
forsake their nationality did so not out of political protest, but rather to avoid military 
service. All the more frustrating though was the fact that these “dodgers” mainly 
came from the so-called “leading class.” Such frustration is best expressed in one 
netizen’s (ID: chacha4u) reply to the OhmyNews, one of the largest Korean internet 
newspapers: “I do not even expect their noblésse oblíge. I would be greatly satisfied 
if only they would’ve acted just like the ordinary Koreans.” 
The public frustration hit its zenith when a report by the Munhwa 
Broadcasting Corporation’s (MBC) popular current-affairs program “PD Diary” (PD 
Sucheop) revealed the class-status of many of the “dodgers.” Included among them 
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were some former Ministers, a former Secretary-General of president, a former 
president’s secretary, a former Attorney-General, a former governor, some former 
military generals, a few business heavyweights, and hundreds of university professors. 
Koreans were especially shocked to find out that not 11, as publicized by the Ministry 
of Justice, but, actually, 40 public servants in various positions were implicated in this 
scandal.  
As the nationality issue was developing into a colossal social problem, the 
Ministry of Justice had given those “nationality-forsakers an opportunity to reverse 
their original decision by May 31 although it was already a week after the effective 
date of the new law (May 24). It was then revealed that 226 (counted only in Korea) 
dual citizens regained their Korean nationality, yet only one of these was among the 
children of high-ranking officials. It is in this social milieu that an opposition Grand 
National Party’s congressman sponsored the revision to the AILSOK to keep those 
dodgers at bay by stripping them of their status as overseas Koreans and of all their 
rights as Koreans, above all, rights to free economic activity and health insurance 
benefits. 
From the drafting stage, however, the bill was at the center of heated debate. 
For some, the bill was deemed as a due follow-up of the newly revamped Nationality 
Law in light of both legal consistency and extraordinary public support. For others, 
though, both the bill and the new Nationality Law constituted a serious violation of 
basic human rights. For example, one netizen (ID: gomsin 763) posted a note to the 
Uri Party’s official website against the supporters of the bill by arguing, “No one is 
entitled to infringe [others’] basic rights”. Another (ID: bujaengseon) voiced same 
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sort of apprehension by saying that “herein is the danger that anyone who gives up 
Korean nationality could be a victim of public opinion, being condemned as a 
potential dodger of military duty.” 
The controversy reached its apex on June 29 when, against the expectation of 
virtually everyone, the bill failed in the National Assembly. Out of 232 actual voters, 
104 voted for the bill, 60 against it, and 68 abstained. All the more puzzling to 
ordinary Koreans, 28 members of opposition Grand National Party (out of 117 who 
initially participated in the collective proposal of the bill) either voted against the bill 
or abstained. In the wake of this decision a stirred Korean civil society immediately 
opted for collective action to revive the bill, as chronicled above. 
One possible resolution to the problem could be to focus the whole issue 
solely on the question of Korea’s military system—for instance, to reform its 
outmoded facilities and regulations to correspond to the contemporary social 
environment. Nevertheless, amongst many Koreans, although not articulated as such, 
it was realized that the more fundamental and complicated issue concerned the 
seemingly ineluctable conflict between a particularistic principle of citizenship 
grounded in national democracy and a universalistic principle of liberalism in the age 
of globalization. 9   In other words, it became a zero-sum decision between 
                                                 
9  The Koreans’ questioning of the meaning of citizenship in terms of military service is even 
theoretically supported, because as Isin and Turner argue, military service alongside taxation constitute 
one of the two pillars of modern democratic citizenship, which is predicated on the reciprocity of duty 
and right. Isin and Turner thus understand democratic citizenship primarily as a kind of “contributory 
rights.” Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner, “Investigating Citizenship: An Agenda for Citizenship 
Studies,” Citizenship Studies, 11:1 (2007), pp. 5-17. 
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particularistic nationalism and a universalistic idea of constitutional patriotism or 
social contract (albeit their disagreement on the mode of political justification); a 
value that many liberals argue is indispensable to developing an authentic (say, 
liberal) form of democracy. But is nationalism invariably illiberal, non-democratic, 
and/or threatening to the individual?  In other words, is the choice between liberalism 
and nationalism zero sum?  
 
Liberal Nationalism: The Contextual Individual and Embedded Citizenship 
 
As noted earlier, one puzzling aspect in the claim of liberal citizenship is its universal 
justification. That is, liberals seem to have little if no difficulty connecting national 
citizenship (whether predicated on contractualism, republicanism or constitutional 
patriotism) to universal/cosmopolitan citizenship. Vincent calls it “the universalist 
intuition” within liberal citizenship.10 After identifying strong conceptions of agency 
and autonomy as constitutive of liberal citizenship, Vincent submits that “[s]ince 
liberalism, above all social and political theories, embodies a belief in moral and 
political individualism and agency, and citizenship is intrinsically committed to 
individual agency and individualism, then it might be said to follow that liberalism is 
the most succinct modern bearer of citizenship claims.”11 In other words, integral to 
liberal citizenship is the kind of moral agent that Ernest Gellner called a “modal 
self.”12 It is, thus, individual agency that links liberal citizenship to a universalist or 
cosmopolitan ethos. Hence Vincent observes 
 
                                                 
10 Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, p. 63. 
11 Ibid., p. 64. 
12 Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, p. 78. 
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[T]he core values of liberal citizenship—autonomy, agency, individualism, liberty, rights, 
equality, justice, and so forth—are tied to conceptions of reason and humanity which have no 
necessary connection with particular forms of life or political structures. Citizens have rights, 
qua agents, whatever their location … [T]he concepts and values themselves have no intrinsic 
or necessary particularistic connections.13
 
 
From a slightly different perspective, Seligman echoes Vincent’s sentiments 
by arguing that the modern civil society tradition, whose beginning was roughly 
congruent with that of classical liberalism, was built in a uniquely modern-liberal and 
inherently universalist conception of individual moral agency. Therefore after having 
examined the basic tenets of civil society vis-à-vis civic virtue, he comes to the 
conclusion that “from Ferguson to Smith we find a new ‘universal’ and increasingly 
‘individualistically’ defined basis for the construction of communal life: what 
ultimately would emerge as the basis of liberal-individualistic principles of 
citizenship.”14  
Thus, despite its own interest in the communal (i.e., “national”) locus of 
individual life, modern liberalism gave rise to two potentially (if not inherently) 
contradicting elements.  On one hand is liberal-national citizenship alongside the 
invention of the national forum of civil society,15 and on the other hand stands a 
universalist idea of individual agency. The notorious complexity of Kant’s (and 
                                                 
13 Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, p. 64. 
14 Seligman, “Public and Private,” p. 118. 
15 For the national characteristic of modern civil society, see Ernest Gellner, “The Importance of Being 
Modular,” in Hall, Civil Society, pp. 32-55; Shils, The Virtue of Civility. As is now well known, what 
materialized the national development of modern civil society was by means of modern 
communication and universal education, or “the democratization of high culture” according to Gellner. 
See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) and also 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983). 
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Rawls’s) cosmopolitan idea of liberal republicanism originates from this very 
problem; the fact that citizenship is redefined in terms of (universalist) moral 
agency.16 In Rawls, for example, the unencumbered self and liberal citizenship are 
inseparably interconnected.17
Even though contemporary national liberals do not necessarily dismiss the 
value of universal human rights that liberal citizenship tacitly underlies,18 they indeed 
find the liberal mistrust of nationalism as overbearingly homogenizing, exclusive, 
xenophobic, and violent to be largely misguided. It is because such view only 
represents what Hans Kohn identified as Eastern nationalism, an overtly authoritarian, 
closed, inward-looking, particularistic, pathological, bellicose and xenophobic 
nationalism, as opposed to Western nationalism, a more often, plural, and outward-
looking nationalism that is geared towards liberal democracy.19 For the contemporary 
advocates of liberal nationalism, the nineteenth-century Italian nationalist Giuseppe 
Mazzini and the German Hegelian philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder and, 
despite some controversy, John Stuart Mill and Max Weber are included in the list of 
early liberal nationalists.20
                                                 
16  Andrés de Francisco, “A Republican Interpretation of the Late Rawls,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 14:3 (2006), pp. 270-288. 
17 See David Miller, “Citizenship and Pluralism,” Political Studies XLIII (1995), pp. 434-440.  
18 David Miller, “The Ethical Significance of Nationality,” Ethics 98:4 (1988), pp. 647-648; David 
Miller, “Community and Citizenship,” in Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit (eds.), 
Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 99-100; Tamir, 
Liberal Nationalism, pp. 112-116. 
19 Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, p. 87. C.f. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in 
its Origins and Background (New York: Macmillan, 1945).  
20  Throughout Tamir’s Liberal Nationalism, Mazzini is one of the most often referred classic 
inspirations. For others, see respectively, F. M. Bernard, Herder’s Social and Political Thought: From 
158
 
But for liberal nationalists a more serious problem lies in the very liberal 
conception of the self, namely, the unencumbered self, and its relation to the national 
community, in which embeddedness and choice are posited as antithetical. Utilizing 
Taylor’s concept of the strong evaluator, Tamir attempts to show the interplay 
between choice and context and thereby reveal the common ground where liberalism 
and nationalism meet. 
 
The ability of strong evaluators to reflect on and evaluate preferences and interests could be 
seen as a liberal attribute, whereas nationalists might view the evaluators’ embeddnedness in a 
cultural context and the precedence given to social membership as a precondition for choice, 
as an instance of national thinking …[But h]aving begun with a choosing agent and 
progressed through the need for context and socialization, we now find that the liberal self has 
not only lost the antecedent to social affiliations, but is confined to a restricted set of values 
drawn from this background.21
      
 
Once having relocated the liberal moral agent in a national cultural context, 
Tamir is able to redefine such an embedded yet reflective evaluator as the “contextual 
individual.” The virtue of this concept, contends Tamir, is that it “allows for an 
interpretation of liberalism that is aware of the binding, constitutive character of 
cultural and social memberships, together with an interpretation of nationalism that 
conceives of individuals as free and autonomous participants in a communal 
framework, who conceive of national membership in Renan’s terms, as a daily 
plebiscite.”22 Seen in this way, citizenship is not just a matter of possessing rights as 
many liberals assume, but also, as Miller is convinced, a matter of belief and behavior. 
                                                                                                                                           
Enlightenment to Nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); Dale E. Miller, “John Stuart Mill’s 
Civic Liberalism,” History of Political Thought XXI:1 (2000), pp. 88-113; Sung Ho Kim, “Max 
Weber’s Liberal Nationalism,” History of Political Thought XXIII:3 (2002), pp. 432-457. 
21 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 22-23. 




The citizen has to see himself as playing an active role in determining his society’s future, and 
as taking responsibility for the collective decisions that are made. He must be politically 
active … Moreover, he cannot regard politics merely as an arena in which to pursue his 
private interests. He must act as a citizen, that is as a member of a collectivity who is 
committed to advancing its common good.23
 
 
Similarly, MacCormick asserts that “[s]ome form of collective self-
constitution, some kind of active participation in shaping and sustaining the 
institutions of social or communal government whose aim is to advance liberty and 
autonomy, seems to be a necessary part of the whole ensemble of conditions in which 
the autonomy of the contextual individual could be genuinely constituted and 
upheld.”24 Both Miller’s and MacCormick’s participatory and self-creating images of 
national citizenship help to elucidate why nationalism is essentially “a daily 
plebiscite.” Their core claim is that nationalism cannot remain a closed and 
suffocating system of political dogmas nested in a reified national myth that does not 
allow the national members forums for democratic deliberation.25 Correspondingly, 
citizenship is attained via active participation within a national community, not via 
the positing of rational moral agents from a decontextualized “nowhere.”26 Embedded 
                                                 
23 Miller, “Community and Citizenship,” p. 96. For a more detailed discussion on this, see Miller, 
“Citizenship and Pluralism,” pp. 443-450.  
24 Neil MacCormick, “Is Nationalism Philosophically Credible?,” in William Twining (ed.), Issues of 
Self-Determination (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991), pp. 14-15.  
25 Recently, Abizadeh has submitted a very persuasive argument on whether and how national myth 
can be politically justified through democratic deliberation, thus making nationalism liberal democratic. 
Arash Abizadeh, “Historical Truth, National Myths and Liberal Democracy: On the Coherence of 
Liberal Nationalism,” Journal of Political Philosophy 12: 3 (2004), pp. 291-313. Also see Miller, On 
Nationality, pp. 34-35. 
26 Drawing on Arendt, Isin and Turner asserts: “Human rights [of people qua individual humans] that 
cannot be enforced by an authority are mere abstractions … The “right to have rights” only makes 
sense for people who already enjoy membership of a political community … [H]aving an active, 
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citizenship annihilates the conventionally-held antithesis between agency and context 
and leads them to healthy dialectic interplay.  
Therefore, liberal nationalism turns the adherence to culture and the 
supposition of national obligations into voluntary acts rather than inevitable 
consequences of fate. In this regard, to 
 
assume national obligations means acquiring special responsibilities toward fellow nationals, 
contributing to the ongoing existence of the national unit, partaking in the continuous re-
creation of its culture, learning and respecting its traditions, and engaging in a political 
struggle that will ensure the nation a public sphere of its own.27
 
 
As Tamir constantly reminds us, individuals still have a choice. For national 
obligations do not downwardly “obligate” each individual to self-sacrifice. Nor do 
they coercively subordinate one’s well-being and interests to the welfare of the 
collective. 28  As an enduring project, the nation only “encourages individuals to 
remain, by choice, within their national group, to actively participate in the continued 
re-creation of their national culture, and to contribute to the well-being of their fellow 
members.”29
In the remaining part of this chapter, I will attempt to shed light on the politics 
of nationality in Korea in liberal-nationalist terms. However, to avoid the common 
mistake of applying an abstract theory to a rather concrete cultural and political 
                                                                                                                                           
dynamic and vital citizenry is an absolute precondition of democracy that upholds human rights”. Isin 
and Turner, “Investigating Citizenship,” pp. 12-13. 
27 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 88. 
28  This is the defining tenet distinguishing liberal nationalism from what Herr calls “nonliberal 
nationalism” although both agree upon the “nationalism” part affiliated with the concept of the strong 
evaluator. See Ranjoo Seodu Herr, “In Defense of Nonliberal Nationalism,” Political Theory 34:3 
(2006), pp. 304-327. 
29 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 89. 
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reality, I will first investigate the uniquely Confucian origin of the modern Korean 
nation-state. Then, the examination of the contemporary “post-Confucian” Korean 
nation will unfold in reference to its Confucian origin.    
 
The Confucian Ideal of the State and Its National Reinvention in Modern Korea 
 
The fact that Korea never experienced feudalism, a uniquely Western (and Japanese) 
medieval social, economic, cultural, and religious-political arrangement—from whose 
reconfiguration in the early modern period emerged what we now call the modern 
nation-state—makes studying Korea a unique endeavor.30 Furthermore, Confucian 
Korea was seldom encouraged to develop a unique cultural nationness distinct from 
                                                 
30 Michael Oakeshott succinctly captures the emergence of the modern “territorial” nation-state out of 
medieval realms as this: “Here and there, in the early years, a territory of this sort was already marked 
out according to the conventions of the time. It corresponded to the realm of a medieval king, the estate 
of a Duke, a Count, a Margrave, a Landgrave, a Prince-Bishop, or to the territory of a semi-
independent municipality. But, for the most part, the territories of modern states were newly delineated. 
They were the outcome of movements of consolidations in which local independencies were destroyed 
and movements of disintegration in which states emerged from the break-up of medieval realms and 
empires.” Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p. 185. Different time and context notwithstanding, the 
following statement by a Japanese intellectual in the wake of Japanese nation-state building after the 
Meiji Restoration (1868) best illustrates a dramatic image of the birth of the nation-state in modern 
Japan: “The concept ‘foreign nations’ brought forth the concept ‘Japanese nation.’ The day when the 
concept ‘Japanese nation’ arose was the day when the concept ‘han’ vanished. The day when the 
concept ‘han’ vanished was the day when feudal society was overthrown,” quoted from Maruyama, 
Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, pp. 342-343. Although Gellner, a sociologist, emphatically 
argues that nationalism created the nation, most social historians support the reverse. See, among 
others, Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992); Charles Tilly, “Reflection on the History of European-State-Making,” in Charles Tilly 
(ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1975). Political scientists influenced by a recent trend of “constructivism” are somewhat ambivalent 
about this point. See, for example, Heather Rae, State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. 
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Confucian China. In fact, both countries (joined by Vietnam and sometimes Japan) 
formed what can be called the “Corpus Sinica,” comparable to the Respublica 
Christiana in medieval Christian Europe. Traditional Confucian Korea—particularly 
Joseon Korea (1392-1910)—was thus at the interstice between Confucian cultural 
universalism and independent statehood. 
Moreover, due to the absence of any serious military confrontations with 
China from the early fifteenth century onward—the sort of escalating military 
tensions that drove the European medieval kingdoms to the modern nation-states—
and given the underdevelopment of commercialism that eventually propelled the 
West to invent the nation grounded in the concept of popular sovereignty, traditional 
Korea hardly had the chance or motivation to create a new mode of state- and 
nationhood. Indeed, all significant endeavors to do so in the late Joseon period 
failed. 31  For example, the eighteenth-century’s “center-constructing” movement 
embraced by a minority of Confucian intellectuals to cope with the cultural crisis 
generated by the collapse of the Ming dynasty by the “barbarian” Manchurians failed 
because of the mainstream Confucian intellectuals’ strong cultural commitment to the 
then demised Confucian Mecca. Indeed, the Confucian conception of the state as 
kukka 國家 (“family-state”) had remained unchallenged up until the nineteenth-
century when, upon the “Western Impact,” some Western enlightened intellectuals 
began to develop a new Korean statehood. However, notwithstanding the impact of 
                                                 
31 See JaHyun Kim Haboush, “Constructing the Center: The Ritual Controversy and the Search for a 
New Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea,” in JaHyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler (eds.), 
Culture and the State in Late Chosŏn Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Kim, 
“Too Rational To Be Modernized.”  
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the Western enlightenment, the traditional image of the state as kukka played a critical 
role in refashioning Korean statehood.32
Admittedly, Confucianism tends to see the state in familial terms: the monarch 
being a father, the subject a child, neighbors brothers, and so forth. In fact, the image 
of the monarch as a father was one of the most compelling political rhetorical tropes 
during the Joseon dynasty. However, I must caution against identifying the Joseon 
Confucian state as a patrimonial state or an oriental despotism. 33  It is because 
although the meaning of kukka sometimes collapsed into the Joseon monarchy itself, 
there are found the variances in the reference to kukka in the Veritable Annals of the 
Joseon Dynasty (Sillok): the Yi royal house, the government, or the Joseon people.34  
                                                 
32 It should be cautioned that in the pre-modern Confucian Korea, state and nation were hardly 
distinguished. The conceptual distinction of the two is an absolutely contemporary phenomenon in 
Korea.  
33 See Weber, The Religion of China and Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism. Fred Dallmayr problematizes 
such conventional Filmerian interpretations of the Confucian state when he submits that “a common 
mistake made in interpreting traditional Chinese culture—a mistake encouraged by Orientalist 
leanings—is the tendency to equate the “political” ruler-minister dyad with the father-son relationship 
(an equation which would replicate the kind of “parental government” extolled by Robert Filmer). 
What is neglected in this equation is the difference—acknowledged even in classical Confucianism—
between “naturalness” and choice, more specifically between natural, kinship-based “affinity” (ch’in) 
and political “righteousness” (i).” Fred R. Dallmayr, “Confucianism and the Public Sphere: Five 
Relationships Plus One?,” in Bell and Hahm, Confucianism for the Modern World, p. 51. 
34  The possibility of multiple interpretations of the concept of kukka was not just limited to a 
conceptual problem. In fact, during the Joseon period, to define kukka caused a serious political debate 
between the Joseon monarch and Confucian scholar-bureaucrats, and between Confucian scholar-
bureaucrats themselves. On this, see Hansu Yi, Sejonsidae ga-wa gukka [Ka and Kukka in the Court of 
King Sejong] (Seoul: Hanguk haksuljeongbo, 2006). Also see Joseph Chan, “Exploring the 
Nonfamilial in Confucian Political Philosophy,” in Chaihark Hahm and Daniel A. Bell (eds.), The 
Politics of Affective Relations: East Asia and Beyond (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2004), pp. 61-68. 
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The received wisdom that the state and the family were categorically conflated 
in the Confucian tradition should be recast as meaning that in Confucian society the 
state was to be envisioned as if it were the (extended) family to remain culturally and 
ethico-politically legitimate.35 For traditional Koreans, not just the nation as it is to 
modern Westerners, but a “nation-family” (a nation in the image of the family) was 
the essential element of state identity. Hence, the traditional Korean Confucian state 
was the nation-state in its own Confucian terms. In Benedict Anderson’s famous 
language, for the traditional Koreans, “nation-family” represented their “imagined 
community.” Kyung Moon Hwang’s recent study of the Confucian origin of the 
modern Korean state reveals how nineteenth-century Korean intellectuals extended 
this cultural justification of the state to the process of inventing the modern Korean 
nation-state.36
According to Hwang, nineteenth-century Korean enlightenment activists 
creatively appropriated the image of the “kukka-as-family” to re-conceptualize the 
state as a liberal collective entity, thereby resisting the Darwininst view of the state. 
At a crossroads between tradition and modernity and between independence and 
colonization, the advocates of a strong Korean state believed that only when the 
people absolutely submitted to the kukka could a new Korea forge ahead in a Social 
Darwinist world; a struggle between competing kukka. They maintained that, like an 
independent organism, the kukka existed with a purpose of its own, and the people 
                                                 
35 For the ethical tensions inherent in the relation between family and state in Confucianism, see Tan, 
“Between Family and State.” 
36 Kyung Moon Hwang, “Country or State? Reconceptualizing Kukka and the Korean Enlightenment 
Period, 1896-1910,” Korean Studies 24 (2000), pp. 1-24. 
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had no collective say in the existence or character of the kukka. For its growth had 
resulted not from beginnings as an “artificial” construct of the people but rather from 
the gradual conquest of subjects by a central authority that eventually became the 
kukka.37
 Against this Hobbesian aspiration of “self-strengthening” of kukka advocated 
by some intellectuals, those who were inspired by the Confucian idea of “heavenly-
endowed people’s rights” advanced a liberal, people-centered, concept of the 
collective kukka that reconciled political theory with Confucian teachings.38  The 
lessons of the Works of Mencius, in particular, provided the “liberal-collectivists” (i.e., 
liberal-nationalists) with much of their rationale, as Hwang observes that “[l]ike their 
Chinese counterparts, the Korean enlightenment thinkers were drawn to the 
overriding Mencian dictum that the state’s existence was based on the welfare of the 
people.”39
Hwang pays special attention to the liberal activists’ own sense of duty to the 
kukka by arguing that “the enlightenment activists had in mind none other than their 
own turn at continuing this longstanding tradition of heroic contribution to greater 
society, which now took the form of kukka.”40 This uniquely Confucian heroism, 
which, according to de Bary, operated as the “prophetic voice” of the Heaven-
endowed cultural mission, was repossessed by liberal nationalists in their search for a 
new nation-state in the formative stage of modern Korea.41  
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 14. 
38 Ibid., p. 15. 
39 Ibid., p. 16. 
40 Ibid., p. 17. 
41 de Bary, Liberal Tradition, p. 9. 
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In short, the modern Korean nation-state is profoundly its liberal Confucian 
cultural assets. This lingering Confucian influence in modern Korea explains why 
many Koreans still unwittingly conceive the nation in the image of the family. More 
importantly, for nineteenth-century Korean liberal nationalists, liberty and collectivity 
(that is, the nation) were in no way mutually exclusive. Likewise, citizenship was not 
solely a matter of individual right, but rather as a member of the “kukka-as-family.” 
In other words, one’s liberty was deeply integrated into his/her national identity. In 
my judgment, it is this Confucian-inspired liberal nationalist tradition that inspired 
many contemporary Koreans to voice their concerns about the new nationality law 
and its fate. 
 
Democratization and the Crisis of Kukka 
 
In the Confucian tradition the state’s legitimacy depends on its commensurability 
with the image of the family, or kukka. The question then becomes: what exactly 
makes the state, otherwise a mere cluster of bureaucratic organizations, the kukka, a 
culturally meaningful and ethically-justified political entity? 42  Many Confucian 
intellectuals looked to the Mandate of Heaven; a dazzlingly complex neo-Confucian 
cosmology that stipulates a parallel cosmic moral order between the Heavenly Way 
                                                 
42 It should be reminded that in the Confucian tradition, politics was hardly separated from ethical 
religion (say, Confucianism), just as in the medieval West was Christianity deeply integrated into the 
secular politics. This is why I have kept juxtaposing “ethico” with “political” whenever mentioning the 
Confucian state’s political characteristics and justifications. As noted, SangJun Kim theorizes such a 
Confucian fusion of politics and religion (or morals) in terms of Confucian Moralpolitik. In fact, the 
kukka was one of the most important cultural product of Confucian Moralpolitik. See Kim, “The 
Genealogy.”   
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(moral metaphysics) and the Human Way (politics).43 But how were ordinary people 
alienated from the complexities of Confucian philosophy, and yet, nevertheless, 
soaked in their ritualistically routinized Confucian life able to incorporate the kukka 
in their understanding of political and ethical authority? In other words, what was the 
social and psychological medium that helped to make lay Koreans emphatically (if 
not philosophically) tied to the kukka? I am confident that it was chŏng that 
materialized the ethical connection between the people and the state.44
Roughly speaking, chŏng is a uniquely Korean form of social affect which 
originated from familial attachment nurtured in the traditional Confucian family—
what I call “the familial affectionate sentiment.” According to Sang-Chin Choi, 
Koreans understand we to include “identity, oneness, mutual dependence, mutual 
                                                 
43 As the most articulated philosophical justification of the Confucian rulership, the theory of the 
Mandate of Heaven operated on two levels due to its internal conflict. First, since Heaven does not 
speak, its mandate was thought to be revealed by the will of the ruled, the people borne by Heaven 
(“Where the Heaven’s mandate is, so are the people!”). Yet, because of the possibility of the malicious 
manipulation of this theory, that is, because a tyrant could reversely appropriate the Heaven’s mandate 
to justify his de facto ruling authority (“Where the people are, so is the Heaven’s mandate!”), a second 
and more realistic way of justification was pursued. That is, since Heaven was believed to choose the 
most virtuous person as king, the king, regardless of whether or not his throne is from the hereditary 
kingship, must show his splendid moral charisma. Or—this is more important—he was “obligated” to 
reach that level by immersing himself in the “Sage-Learning” prepared ironically by his own 
subjects—the Confucian scholar-bureaucrats. Nevertheless, it is dubious how this “theory,” however 
attractive to the Confucian intellectuals, bore actual ruling legitimacy in the lay people’s daily life 
without being mediated through something socially and psychologically more palpable. For the 
double-edged characteristic of the theory of the Mandate of Heaven, see Wood, Limits to Autocracy, p. 
9 and for its “Sage-Learning” application by the Confucian intellectuals, see Michael C. Kalton, To 
Become a Sage (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
44 My contention is drawn from the recent development on this issue in Korean social psychology. See 
note 23 in Chapter 23. 
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protection, and mutual acceptance.”45 In other words, the Korean’s individual self and 
his/her national collective self overlap. But the Korean “we” or uri does not refer to a 
collectivistic fusion of egos which give rise to a pathological group-ego found most 
notoriously in Nazism and the brand of ultra-nationalism of inter-War Japan. Thus, 
while identifying uri in terms of “inter-ego relationship,” Hahm qualifies its nature by 
calling it only an “overlapping of egos,” which allows each individual self a reflective 
autonomy.46 Chŏng is what makes such an “intersubjective overlapping” possible by 
providing the emotional glue or, to use a psychological concept, a “transitional 
space,” through which individual selves can interact. 
In traditional Korea, the state, or kukka, was considered a national reservoir 
that contained the multilayered communities of chŏng. Or it was believed to be a 
national bastion of chŏng. In short, the kukka was a chŏngish state. It is important to 
note that, up until recently, Koreans have taken chŏng, and not such conceptual 
abstracts like law, justice, or God, as the most humane way that the state can 
“legitimately” come to terms with their lives. A state violating chŏng was considered 
a tyranny. Likewise, a man short of chŏng was seen to be mean-spirited, self-
interested, or cruel, and therefore not a true, ethical being. 
Ironically, recent democratic reforms unwittingly brought colossal change to 
the culture of chŏng and the ethical nature of the kukka in Korea. Democratization 
accompanied by political liberalization in Korea divested the kukka of its traditional 
ethical status as a national container of chŏng. All the more problematic, under the 
title of “democracy”— particularly after the IMF bailout in 1997 and 1998—a version 
                                                 
45 Choi, “Two Perspectives,” p. 246. 
46 Hahm, Korean Jurisprudence, p. 323. 
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of liberal individualism that placed an overwhelming value on individual rights and 
private happiness swept over the then still feeble Korean civil society, destroying 
traditional Korean mores nourished on chŏng. As a result, Korean society underwent 
a liberal (or “libertarian”) separation of private and public geared towards 
individualism, of family and state (and an accompanying deconstruction of the 
traditional family) and, finally, of chŏng and the law. Gradually disenchanted from 
chŏng, Koreans have slowly lost their beloved value of national community and, thus, 
of national-cultural citizenship. It is in this social milieu that liberal citizenship 
justified in terms of individual rights and private happiness has become the defining 
element of citizenship in Korea, especially amongst the well-to-do.47    
In this respect, the recent Korean upheaval around the new nationality law 
illustrates a new, more self-reflected, stage of Korean democratization (or democratic 
consolidation). That is, Koreans have started to take the democratic implications of 
liberal citizenship seriously by disclaiming its liberal individualistic justifications, and 
simultaneously by reclaiming their long-forgotten democratic and national-cultural 
citizenship. In other words, what is happening in Korea is the rediscovery of the 
Korean tradition of liberal nationalism. 
 
                                                 
47 But it is not to argue that the elite and the middle class Koreans do not share the chŏng culture and 
are more affected by other, Western, cultural elements like Protestantism given its predominant role in 
Korea’s modern education. The point is, despite a certain Christianization of the Korean people, the 
Confucian semiotics and ethics (including chŏng culture) have still strong lingering influence on the 
Korean’s interpersonal life as Koh supported by empirical findings concludes that “[o]ur Christians are 
Confucians dressed in Christian robes.” Koh, “Confucianism,” p. 199. This shared Confucian norm, 




Struggle for Chŏngish Nation and Responsible Citizenship 
 
For many liberals, the Korean demand for a rightful measure of punishment of the 
nationality-forsakers might be seen as symptomatic of the tyranny of the majority or 
social conformism that so worried Tocqueville and J. S. Mill. However, this criticism 
can only be justified if Korean society were founded upon a liberal-individualist 
social contract. Only then could it be argued that Koreans have inadvertently 
confused individual right and national cultural right; two incommensurable categories 
in notions of liberal individualist citizenship. 
However, Korean chŏng is antithetical to the liberal conception of 
individuality and citizenship. As has been argued, chŏng mediates morally 
autonomous individuality and national-cultural collectivity; resonating with the 
concept of “contextual individuality.” When the PD Sucheop initially revealed the 
identities of the forsakers, the majority Koreans’ moral outrage was, in the main, 
directed to those who, in Herr’s words, 
 
obviously lack cultural immersion in and/or emotional attachment to the national culture and 
are uninterested in promoting that common good of national survival or flourishing may be 
limited, for example, in the exercise of their liberal individual right of speech within the 
nation to publicly denounce national values cherished by the members and, a fortiori, in their 
participation in national discourses.48
 
 
Furthermore, Koreans were especially enraged by the way in which liberal 
citizenship grounded on the rights discourse was, through its universalist pretext, 
“legally” manipulated for the justification of dual citizenship (particularly, the Korea-
U.S. dual citizenship), thereby exacerbating what Stephen Castles calls a 
                                                 
48 Herr, “Nonliberal Nationalism,” p. 320. 
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“hierarchical citizenship” within their own national community. 49  All the more 
frustrating was that Koreans’ traditional Confucian “shame ethics”—perhaps the only 
weapon that the powerless can avail themselves—was helpless in the face of the 
legally-affirmed systematic manufacturing of dual citizenship that promoted 
hierarchical citizenship amongst Korean nationals.50  Reacting to the fundamental 
inequalities that Korean “liberal democracy” facilitates, one netizen (ID: faced77) 
wondered 
 
Of course, they might say [to us] not to meddle in their private business. But does it make 
sense at all that they let their kids give up the Korean nationality while entertaining all kinds 
of privilege in Korean society? … Watching those families seeing off with tears their sons and 
lovers to the basic training camp, I feel torn. I guess this is the woe of the powerless 
(OhmyNews 6/15/05). 
 
Another netizen (ID: eggcookies00) argued: “Given our national situation [i.e., 
the North-South military confrontation] in which we find ourselves, military duty 
cannot be a choice. It is rather a duty. No matter how [universal] globalization 
(seyehwa) has become, the national boundary of the state still exists … [In my view] 
the incumbent Roh administration appears to be afflicted with moral insensitivity 
intoxicated in the [rosy] ideas of democracy and liberalism” (OhmyNews 6/15/05). 
Whether globalization has any inherent connection with liberal democracy is a 
theoretically unresolved question. What is important in our context is, rather, that by 
referring to globalization, this ardent Korean liberal nationalist wanted to accentuate 
                                                 
49 The concept “hierarchical citizenship” was originally coined to refer to the unequal weight in 
citizenship in a hierarchical nation-state system. See Stephen Castles, “Hierarchical Citizenship in a 
World of Unequal Nation-States,” PS: Political Science and Politics, 38:4 (2005), pp. 689-692. 
50 About the shame ethics in Confucianism, see Jane Geaney, “Guarding Moral Boundaries: Shame in 
Early Confucianism,” Philosophy East and West 54: 2 (2004), pp. 113-142. 
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the tensions between the universalism of liberal citizenship and the particularism of 
national citizenship, and—however vaguely—point to the possibility of a third way, 
namely, liberal nationalism. Underlying his or her statement is the old image of the 
kukka, the traditional Korean national moral community.  
More important, and corresponding to the key assumptions of liberal 
nationalism, was that Koreans’ strong attachment to their national moral community 
envisaged as a national family did not promote an untrammeled cultural nationalism 
potentially transpiring to the wholesale subordination of individual rights to some 
mythical national entity. Instead, while grappling with their national values and 
identity, Koreans exercised their own individual willpower and moral autonomy by 
becoming “strong evaluators.” That is, they began to ask seriously what to do when 
there seemed to be no alternative. One netizen (ID: white04180) wondered, “How 
could they do this [unthinkable thing] as a Korean? … Who would be willing to go to 
the military? Honestly, no one would. Nonetheless, we do so because it is one of our 
duties” (OhmyNews 6/15/05). Another (ID: hhss) submitted, “We do not go to the 
military because we are weak, poor, or without having a network with political 
heavyweights. We do so because that is our duty and because we do not want to be 
ashamed of ourselves. Just because of this, although sometimes grudgingly, 
nonetheless, we do not seek to avoid it.” 
Many Koreans were torn between this helpless reality and their national 
obligations. Nevertheless, they voluntarily reclaimed the ethic of responsibility for 
their national moral community. Expressions like “nonetheless” conveyed the 
complexity of their thoughts, and the core dilemma of the situation. Indeed, it was 
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from a strongly-felt inner torment that the Koreans derived a unique kind of personal 
freedom and moral autonomy. In other words, they transformed the “responsibility of 
nonetheless” into a source of choice and, thus, into freedom. Once having found this 
new freedom, the voice became rather sanguine. 
 
Let us make efforts, with sharp reason and calm judgment, to rebuild our mother country 
Korea on the right foundation and let the deserving leader lead it. [After all,] the true patriots 
of this country are us, [the] people, who silently yet assiduously do what is to be done. 
Shouldn’t it then [be] none other than us that take responsibility to change our country? (ID: 
jkrho777) 
 
In other words, it was they that caused all the problems that we now have to 
suffer—social inequalities, hierarchical citizenship, corruptions, immoralities, and, 
above all, the disruption of chŏng. But, as was widely echoed especially and 
encouragingly among young Koreans, it is we, if not they, that should willingly 
assume a responsibility to rectify such problems that we did not cause. This special 
Korean ethos of collective moral responsibility or “uri-responsibility” was therefore 
by no means a fanatic expression of democratic tyranny or mob rule. Quite the 
contrary, it was a proactive repossession of the ownership of their cultural-national 
and moral-political community. And here I find a remarkable parallel in moral 
“heroism” between contemporary “ordinary” Koreans and nineteenth-century liberal 
nationalists.  
Chŏng, therefore, is not merely a personal attachment. In a profound sense, it 
is an affectionate, yet with full of inner torment, attending to (culturally 
contextualized) human relatedness. To be sure, human relatedness, not to mention a 
particular interpersonal relationship, is not always and not necessarily affectionate as 
best found in the most notorious relationship in Korea—that is, a relationship 
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between daughter-in-law and mother-in-law.51 Nevertheless, for many Koreans, it is 
still held that to break up human relatedness and dissolve it into a matter of pure 
private choice is far from a resolution. For them, doing so has nothing to do with 
freedom, but with an abnegation of responsibility. To destroy the chŏngish network is 
an act of inhumanity.  
  
Chŏngish Citizenship and Universal Citizenship: Comparability? 
 
As Vincent noticed, “liberal nationalism” is a precarious concept as its universalist 
liberal dimension and its particularist national dimension ceaselessly expose it to 
internal tensions. Vincent’s major discontent with liberal nationalism (or any 
particularist case for that matter) is that despite its making the convention (that is, the 
cultural, ethnic or national belief) as primary and the value claim derivative unlike the 
alternative universalist scenario where the value is articulated independently of any 
conventional attachments, a careful examination of it reveals a subtle but significant 
slippage on the question of universals. This is why, as he observes, not all 
particularist thinkers are wholly critical of universalism.52
Vincent’s criticism of liberal nationalism, however, does not justify the 
normative superiority of liberal citizenship. What Vincent (and many other liberals) 
                                                 
51 It is for this reason that “attachment” is an incomplete translation of chŏng. Chŏng includes not only 
affection (goun chŏng) but also affectionate hatred (miun chŏng), which makes the quality of the 
relationship deeper and denser. For this two dimensions of chŏng, see Choi et al., “Jeong (miun jeong 
goun jeong).” 
52 Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, pp. 234-235. He particularly takes issue with Walzer’s 
concept of “reiterative universalism,” a thin universalism which upholds universal human rights while 
essentially holding onto the conventionalist claim of cultural or communal difference. C.f. Michael 
Walzer, “Interpretation and Social Criticism,” in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values, VII (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988).   
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does not take into consideration is that liberal nationalism is primarily a political 
practice.53 Liberal nationalism as political theory has recently been sought to better 
capture too a complex reality of our political life for a liberal theory to adequately 
deal with. In other words, it is its very subject that makes liberal nationalism theory 
somewhat “fuzzier” than its liberal counterpart, which has a pre-political, a-historical, 
and quasi-theological philosophical foundation as its epistemological backdrop.54  
Indeed, the dialectic interplay between the particular and the universal is an essential 
aspect of our political life.55  
Therefore, if attention is paid to the viability of political life, from which 
individual agency cannot be purely distilled and to which political theory should be 
committed, liberal nationalism’s “subtle but significant slippage on the question of 
universals,” rather than becoming its weakness, can provide an important antidote to 
its parochial and potentially homogenizing tendency. At any rate, to gloss over the 
universalist aspect of political life while exclusively emphasizing its particularist 
dimension is also tantamount to a significant misrepresentation of it. Then, can such 
dialectic interplay between the particular and the universal be vindicated in the 
                                                 
53 Neither Herder nor Mazzini came up with a sophisticated political theory of liberal nationalism as, 
for instance, Locke and Kant did for liberal politics. 
54 Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 46-66. 
55 In fact, this is the central theme of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and, admittedly, the early liberal 
nationalists like Herder and Weber were immensely influenced by his philosophical ideas. C.f. Hegel, 
Philosophy of Right, §§ 6, 7, 24, 28, 152, 153, 206, 260, 261, 267, 268, 270. 
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Koreans’ ostensibly particularist nationalist political discourse? Is there any 
universalist dimension in it? If any, what kind?56
When Koreans blamed the irresponsible forsakers of Korean nationality as 
“inhumane,” they indeed implied by that term more than “non-Koreans.” Of course, 
since uri was meant the responsible Korean nationals (as opposed to the irresponsible 
they) and to the extent that they willingly excluded themselves from the “Koreans-as-
uri,” the Koreans’ shared cultural-moral-political identity, they could be legitimately 
considered non-Koreans. But, nevertheless, why was it that Koreans blamed them in 
such universalist moral terms like “inhuman” (that is, non-humans)? As far as we 
cling to the conventional liberal binary between universalism and particularism, 
Koreans could be seen to be self-contradictory, categorically confused between 
Korean particularity and human universality. 
What should be advised here, however, is that a liberal truism that liberal 
individualism is logically intertwined with universalism cannot draw its assumed 
conclusion that universalism is predicated on liberal individualism. What liberals 
largely dismiss is the fact that universalism (both as concept and experience) is an 
essentially cultural, not necessarily narrowly liberal, value. Put differently, the 
received belief that the concept of the universal is transcendent of and thus neutral to 
any specific culture is only a liberal presumption.  
Traditionally, Koreans were educated on Daxue’s (The Great Learning, one of 
key Confucian classics) following famous phrase: 
                                                 
56 For a similar exploration of a culturally-nuanced Confucian notion of universal human rights, see 
Joseph Chan. “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,” in Bauer and Bell, 




The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered 
well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. 
Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their 
persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be 
sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the 
utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. 
  Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, 
their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. 
Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their 
families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. 
Their states being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy. 
 
 
The “whole kingdom” is a translation of the Chinese character天下 (tianxia), 
literally meaning “all under Heaven.” Even though Confucianism is presented in such 
problematic terms like “familism” or, more worse, “consanguinitism,”57 it was indeed 
a highly sophisticated ethico-political system into which the values of the self, of the 
family, (of the village), of the state, and of the world were inextricably integrated. 
Especially, it is important to note that in Confucianism such key ethico-political 
practices as family-governance (qi-jia 齊家) and state-governance or politics (zhi-quo 
治國) revolve around the universalist values of the self and of the world where the 
self’s nature (xing 性) was thought to embody Heaven’s mandate (tian-ming 天命) or 
its cosmic principle (tian-li 天理). This metaphysical connection between human 
nature and Heavenly Principle gave rise to a uniquely Confucian idea of moral 
individualism because, especially after Mencius, all human individuals were thought 
to be capable of ren, the Confucian moral virtue par excellence, since it was believed 
                                                 
57 Liu, “Confucianism as ‘Consanguinitism’.” 
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to be imparted a priori by Heaven. 58  The key moral question in Confucianism 
therefore was whether one would be able to put his or her innate moral potential into 
action. The point I want to make is the political implications of the Confucian moral 
cosmology. That is, there was a uniquely Confucian idea of citizenship, or what A. T. 
Nuyen calls “Heavenly citizenship,” a universal citizenship rooted in ren-centered 
moral individualism.59
In Chapter 3, I interpreted chŏng as a secularized, routinized, and thus 
collectivized mode of ren. If that interpretation is sustained, it is not surprising to find 
that chŏng (particularity) and ren (universality) are not only compatible but, in effect, 
they are mutually supportive. That is to say, even though in contemporary secular 
Korea where the metaphysics of Heaven and the philosophy of ren have gradually 
routinized into a less metaphysical and more particularist social psychological 
discourse of chŏng, among the Koreans, the Confucian universalist moral language is 
still—yet unwittingly—adopted to make moral sense of the particular state of chŏng-
relations. This is why the irresponsible, thus chŏng-disrupting, forsakers of Korean 
nationality were blamed in such a universalist moral term as “inhumane” (or “non-
humans”) as if they were at the same time the despoilers of the Heavenly Principle.   
That Koreans still possess universalist moral sensibility yet in non-liberal 
individualistic Confucian terms—a universalism that is made manifest only by 
mediation of particular chŏng relations—opens a possibility of compatibility between 
                                                 
58 For moral individualism in Confucianism, see de Bary, Liberal Tradition. 
59  A. T. Nuyen, “On the Confucian Idea of Citizenship,” in Sor-hoon Tan (ed.), Challenging 
Citizenship: Group Membership and Cultural Identity in a Global Age (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2005), p. 181. 
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chŏngish citizenship and universal citizenship, with very interesting normative 
implications. A kind of universalism to which chŏngish citizenship could be 
connected is not the one that is singularly devoted to the promotion of individual right 
independent of communal good or that valorizes unencumbered selfhood over 
contextual individuality. The universalism that chŏngish citizenship would support is 
not so much the one that undergirds a liberal-individualistic citizenship, but endorses 
a “particularist” world citizenship (say, “Confucian citizenship”) that heeds full 
attention to the values of family, of community, of state and as well as of (contextual) 
self. It is the kind of universalism that encourages the particular, intersubjective, 
ethical practice pertaining to each distinct (yet ethically continuous) moral realm. 
Albeit too simplistic and still not concrete enough, Nuyen’s idea of Heavenly 
citizenship can be instructive to representing what I have in mind here: 
 
(Here too) Confucianism has much to contribute with its advocacy of an outward expansion of 
the self to encompass the family, the community, the society, and finally the world at large. 
As stated in The Great Learning [Daxue], the idea of learning is to ‘rectify the mind’ in order 
to ‘cultivate the person’, which in turn contributes to the next step, to regulate families, and 
the next step, to govern the country well, and eventually, to make the whole world virtuous. It 
might be said that the Confucian vision is a global one. Indeed, Confucian harmony is 
ultimately harmony with the world and with Heaven itself.60
 
 
My own qualification of the above lines is: particularist chŏngish relations are 
the very place where the universality of Heavenly citizenship or humanness is 
realized. Without chŏng, then there is no Heaven, as without the particular can there 
be no universal. Only when you are a responsible Korean citizen, thence you are an 
authentic human being and entitled world citizenship. The reverse process, however, 
does not hold. Universal (Heavenly) citizenship can be only possible through a 
                                                 
60 Ibid., p. 181. 
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gradual and gradated extension of chŏngish citizenship.61 In effect, this is a Confucian 
vision of rippling waves of interdependent, mutual responsibility extending all the 
levels of moral entity. But the waves emanate from a center—the self, the situated 
self of somewhere.62 And such “somewhere” is primarily and most importantly a 




The primary purpose of this chapter was to show how a chŏngish civil society 
predicated on uri-responsibility, which is, as has been shown in Chapter 4, distinct 
from a juridical civil society grounded in liberal individualism, well supports liberal 
nationalism by developing responsible national citizenship as opposed to liberal 
individualistic citizenship. Special attention was given to whether it could be 
theoretically justified to endorse the liberal claim to cosmopolitan citizenship in 
                                                 
61 Therefore, the dialectic interplay between the universal and the particular in a post-Confucian 
context is essentially “cultural” and “political” rather than metaphysical or philosophical. 
62 One may be suspicious of the practicality of this somewhat idealistic vision of “rippling waves” of 
responsibility. Tamir’s following statement offers one of very persuasive answers: “The spread of care 
thus looks like a set of concentric circles—individuals care most about those in the circle closest to the 
centre, but are not indifferent to the welfare of those who occupy farther positions. Hence, although 
they begin by caring for ten individuals, they find themselves caring about many more, and may 
therefore be involved in protecting the interests and well-being of numerous others who could occupy 
a multitude of positions in the course of their lives. Since they are not “archangels,” individuals are 
unable to estimate with any certainty what positions they should defend. Forced to take into account a 
wide range of interests and conceptions of the good, individuals soon discover that it is irrational for 
them to protect any one particular position or interest. In fact, they find themselves in a position similar 
to that of being ignorant of their own interests. Being risk-averse, it would be logical for them to 
protect the interests of the worst off and to favour the equitable distribution of those primary goods 
needed for the pursuit of any particular conception of the good or life-plan that they or those they care 
for may choose to adopt.” Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 109-110.  
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Korea where particularist national chŏngish citizenship is a most prevalent, almost 
unchallenged, norm amongst its majority members.  In particular, I have refuted as 
both culturally and politically unsubstantiated the liberals’ claim to universal 
citizenship in their appeal to the universalist implications latent in liberal 
individualistic citizenship by arguing that Koreans do not hold a liberal rationalist 
metaphysics that underwrites such implications. On the other hand, though, I also 
emphasized chŏngish citizenship’s universalist implications in its own right by 
revisiting the dynamic (Weberian) relation between ren and chŏng that I had 
explicated in Chapter 3. My central contention was that even though chŏngish 
citizenship does support ren-based Heavenly citizenship, the latter does not entertain 
its universalist (moral and political) status independent of the former, because the 
Hegelian unity of the universal and the particular (or the singular) is completely 
unknown and inapplicable to Korean chŏng culture that defies the idea of the singular.
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CHAPTER 6: BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY                                        





From a larger perspective of the present study, one of the central aims of the 
preceding chapter was to bring to completion what I had only to tantalize in Chapter 
3: that is, the far-reaching “political” implications of uri-responsibility beyond the 
immediate electoral outcome of 2000 General Election. In other words, in Chapter 4 I 
intended to give full justification to the hypothesis that uri-responsibility proactively 
assumed by (mostly young) Koreans in their shared resolutions to deal with the 
bedeviling Korean regionalism in 2002 was indeed geared toward a type of liberal 
nationalism, one that is predicated on and predicates responsible chŏngish citizenship. 
Building on the core argument of the preceding chapters (i.e. the liberal-nationalist 
implications of chŏngish citizenship), however, this chapter slightly shifts a focus of 
discussion by turning to the democratic implications of the Korean chŏngish national 
liberalism. My special interest is to see whether there can be a mutual enhancement 
between liberal nationalism and democratic consolidation in a new democracy like 
Korea. To put it another way, in this chapter I relocate the entire argument made thus 
far in the framework of what empirical political scientists (if not normative political 
theorists) understand to be “democracy study” (i.e. transitology and consolidology). 
The main question to be raised therefore is, Does chŏngish national liberalism 
contribute to democratic consolidation in Korea?  
Although it has been almost two decades since the democratization of Korea, 
the quality of Korean democracy has been under suspicion among the theorists of 
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comparative democratization. 1  Their most imminent discontent with Korean 
democracy after democratization has centered on Korea’s political culture, its 
authoritarian legacies that are found in every nook and corner of Korean society, 
standing in the way to what Linz and Stepan call the “behavioral and attitudinal 
shifts,”2 if not constitutional change itself, that when combined qualify democracy as 
a regime to be the “only game in town.” For many, Korean democracy after 1987 is 
still characterized as an immensely grotesque mixture of a democratic hardware, on 
the one hand, and persistent authoritarian software, on the other.  Accordingly, it is 
seen as a ceaseless clattering and rattling political process. For the consolidation to be 
completed in Korea, it is said, a regime change is a far cry from sufficient; what is 
further required is a fundamental change in political culture, a culture understood as 
an aggregation of individual values,3 hence eventually a total transformation of every 
single Korean. With Samuel Huntington, these scholars see “Confucian democracy” 
as nothing more than an oxymoron given the salient suppression of the value of the 
individual in the Confucian tradition.4
                                                 
1 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13:1 (2002), pp. 5-
21; Larry Diamond et al., “Halting Progress in Korean and Taiwan,” Journal of Democracy 12:1 
(2001), pp. 122-136; Inglehart and Carballo, “A Global Analysis of Cross-Cultural Differences”; 
Jones, “Democratization.” 
2 Linz and Stepan, Problems. 
3 See Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in 
Five Nations (Boston: Little and Brown, 1965). Note that Almond and Verba’s view of political 
culture as an aggregation of individuals’ cognitive, affective, and evaluative values is still pervasive in 
comparative political science. 
4 Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The 
Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 15-16. 
In the comparative democratization literature, the adjective democracies like “Confucian democracy” 
are grouped in terms of “gray zone” or “hybrid regime” or “competitive authoritarianism.  See 
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So, it seems that, consciously or unconsciously, for many students of the 
democratic transition of post-Confucian East Asian countries like Korea, the 
successful consolidation of democracy hinges upon the two-stage process of 
individualization or individual modernization. 5  The first stage requires the self 
enmeshed in what Ernest Gellner calls “the tyranny of cousins” to be liberated and 
become autonomous in thinking and acting.6 Among contemporary political theorists, 
John Rawls offers in his famous original position a perfect portrayal of such 
individuals radically severed from their social and even natural—yet merely 
contingent from a moral perspective—endowments. 7  In this stage, the radically 
situated self should be transformed into an unencumbered and self-choosing moral 
agent.8 The second stage calls for such individual’s strong commitment to democratic 
rules and values: democracy should be chosen and constituted by the individuals and 
democratic values should draw insurmountable attachment from them. Other types of 
life design (or regime type) are barred from a repertoire of choice because doing so 
                                                                                                                                           
Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”; Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” 
Journal of Democracy 13:2 (2002), pp. 21-35; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of 
Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13:2 (2002), pp. 51-65. None of these allows 
the legitimacy and authenticity of non-liberal and non-authoritarian practice of democracy in non-
Western cultures. Even the most sympathetic work like Schaffer’s, albeit implicitly, treads the same 
foot only by attempting to understand politics in an unfamiliar culture, while ruling out a possibility of 
the third way. Frederic C. Schaffer, Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an 
Unfamiliar Culture (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996).   
5 Inkeles et al., “Individual Modernity in China.” 
6  Gellner, “The Importance of Being Modular,” p. 33. According to Kant, the center of the 
Enlightenment lies in man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity, an immaturity defined as 
“dogmas and formulas, those mechanical instruments for rational use (or rather misuse) of his natural 
endowments.” Kant, Political Writings, pp. 54-55.  
7 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
8 See Sandel, Liberalism, pp. 19-21. 
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would be morally inappropriate and political incorrect, making political life 
inauthentic, hence “hybrid” or “gray.”  
What is ironic, however, is the requirement of the second stage cannot be 
insulated from its likely betrayal of the very premise of the first stage, the self-
choosing capability of an autonomous individual.9 Studies supported by individual 
opinions polls and surveys, which themselves are predicated on modern 
individualism, therefore cannot be immune from this political theoretical 
inconvenience. In this respect, despite its fascinating finding that vindicates a 
remarkable abridgment in the disparity between political hardware and cultural 
software in Korean political culture/values, Shin and Wells’ recent study, relying on 
data culled from a survey project, is appreciable only if our goal is solely in achieving 
a well-entrenched democratic regime irrespective of whether it costs an individual’s 
self-choosing moral capability.10    
This is not to deny the value of a democratic regime itself. The problem that I 
want to address is only this: from a moral perspective, to have both a fully democratic 
regime and a fully autonomous agent is not necessarily coincidental, if not 
impossible. In my view, this moral quandary stems from the very premises that 1) 
democracy is primarily a form of government, and 2) democracy as a government is 
pivoted on liberal individualism. But given our moral and political theoretical 
                                                 
9 But, now widely acknowledged, over the 1980s, Rawls tried to give an answer to this dilemma (i.e. 
the ineluctable tension between autonomous moral agency and democratic commitments) by clarifying 
that his theory of justice in effect has liberal democracy (of the West) as its cultural background. For 
this point, see Galston, Liberal Purposes, pp. 130-139.  
10 Shin and Wells, “Is Democracy the Only Game in Town?,” pp. 88-101. For Shin and Wells, the 
system of values amounts to culture. 
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problem, it must be asked, first, Why should democracy be understood as primarily a 
type of government? And second, Why should democracy be coupled with liberal 
individualism? Put differently, why should Korean democracy, for consolidation, be a 
liberal (individualistic) democracy? Why to make democracy safe, Koreans are to be 
pressed to embrace a total transformation of their individual, collective, and cultural 
identities? Can’t there be an alternative? 
I argue that an alternative can be pursued in two—albeit practically 
inseparable—ways. First, we can refuse to adopt the prevailing definition of 
democracy as a government because it risks sacrificing the vibrancy and dynamism 
integral to democracy as a way of life. Of political theorists, this conventional view of 
democracy as distinctive of and alienated from citizenry’s action in ordinary life is 
advanced by John Locke and reinforced by Robert Nozick whose shared minimalist 
view of the state sees the relation between government and the individual in 
fundamentally contractual terms. Instead, drawing on Alexis de Tocqueville and 
Benjamin Barber, who approach democracy in terms of citizen-making, we can 
understand democracy as an open-ended political process wherein individuals 
actively involve themselves to resolve their shared and incumbent problems, thus 
transforming themselves into citizens who live in and for the community. Second, we 
can disavow the received connection between democracy and liberal individualism. 
In effect, it is only a natural corollary of the redefinition of democracy, because now 
it can be agreed that what constitutes and gives a refreshing life to democracy is not 
so much discrete, unencumbered, isolated individuals (or individual voters), but 
mutually caring, attentive, and interdependent citizens.  
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Once it is clarified that viable democracy (or democratic consolidation) hangs 
indispensably on thick citizenship, then our prime question with regard to Korean 
democracy should be what citizenship in its practical sense means to Koreans and 
how they exercise citizenship on their unique cultural terms, without subjecting to 
liberal individualism. In this chapter, I suggest revamping the concept of “democratic 
consolidation” from a participatory perspective to do justice to the liberal-national 
and cultural appropriation of (the meaning of) democracy in post-democratic Korea. 
My contention is that if (consolidated) democracy is redefined in terms of citizen-
empowerment and citizenship-building, Koreans’ cultural/political practice of chŏng 
in a national civil society does not have to constitute a worry because of its apparent 
“deviation” from a liberal individualistic form of democracy of the West. To support 
this thesis, I pay special attention to the Koreans’ collective response to a series of 
events ensued after the deaths of two Korean teenage girls by a U.S. military vehicle 
in June 2002. My focus will be on how Koreans created collective responsibility (uri-
responsibility) out of chŏng and how chŏng-induced uri-responsibility in turn 
propelled them to remarkably active citizenry participation in public affairs, thus 
invigorating civil society and empowering citizens. Therefore, my approach is 
presented in terms of an alternative model of democratic consolidation, namely, 
“chŏngish citizenship,” as distinguished from and as opposed to the legal and 
parchment citizenship predominant in the comparative democratization literature.  
 
From Stability to Empowerment: Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation 
 




Although the earlier project to ground a study of democratic transition (with titles of 
“transitology” and “consolidology”) on “science” has stumbled because of the 
validity of generalization,11 on the one hand, and due to the obvious emergence of the 
“gray zone” or “hybrid regimes,” on the other, the attempt at theory building in 
democracy studies is far from obsolete. Quite the contrary: many devoted students are 
still working on the refinement of theory, and by narrowing down the conditions 
under which the transition begins, unfolds and completes and by specifying the mode 
of transition, they surely have achieved some noticeable improvements.12 But the 
problem in such attempt is that in operationalizing key concepts like “democracy,” 
and “democratic transition,” they have unavoidably stripped them of the vibrancy and 
viability originally attached to them as social experience. “Democratic consolidation” 
is no exception. 
In his recent article, Gerardo Munck has proposed to operationalize 
“democratic consolidation” simply in terms of “stability” to avoid its conflation with 
more equivocal concepts like “legitimacy” or “democratic quality.”13 This suggestion 
                                                 
11 Valerie Bunce, “Should Transitologists Be Grounded?,” Slavic Review 54:1 (1995), pp. 111-127; 
“Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,” Comparative Political Studies 
33:6/7 (2000), pp. 703-734; “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist 
Experience,” World Politics 55 (2003), pp. 167-192. 
12 Helga A. Welsh, “Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe,” Comparative 
Politics 26:4 (1994), pp. 379-394; Gerardo L. Munck, “Democratic Transitions in Comparative 
Perspective,” Comparative Politics 26:3 (1994), pp. 355-375; Gerardo L. Munck and Carol S. Leff, 
“Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative 
Perspective,” Comparative Politics 29:3 (1997), pp. 343-362; Stephan Haggard and Robert R. 
Kaufman, “The Political Economy of Democratic Transition,” Comparative Politics 29:3 (1997), pp. 
263-283. 
13 Gerardo L. Munck, “The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies,” World Politics 
54 (2001), pp. 126-130. A similar request is made by Andreas Schedler when he submits, “[W]e 
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is no doubt for the sake of easier measurement, and ultimately of the scientific quality 
of research. But the substitution of consolidation that as social experience is 
inherently viable in its process with stability bears far-reaching implications beyond 
the improvement of social science research.  
Three things can be addressed. First, the conceptual change from 
consolidation, which is, I would argue, inexplicably associated with legitimacy and 
quality of democracy, to stability is likely to be accompanied by the actual emphasis 
of stability over legitimacy and quality of democracy. The problem is the actual 
legitimizing process of democracy can hardly be stable because unless “democracy” 
remains a written document that merely legalizes free and regular election for the 
people of a new democracy, a period, perhaps a turbulent one, of embodying its social 
meaning to their hearts through variegated social, political, and cultural practices is 
realistically inevitable. More important, if, as will be shown, democracy is by nature 
an open-ended process rather than a liberal constitution or a type of political regime, 
or a freely elected government, the idle belief that sometime in the future a new 
democracy will eventually be stabilized is a mere fancy. When democracy becomes 
                                                                                                                                           
should restrict its use to “negative” notions described above: avoiding democratic breakdown and 
avoiding democratic erosion. The term “democratic consolidation” should refer to expectations of 
regime continuity—and to nothing else. Accordingly, the concept of a “consolidated democracy” 
should describe a democratic regime that relevant observers expect to last well into the future—and 
nothing else.” Andrea Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?,” Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner (eds.), The Global Divergence of Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 2001), p. 161 (emphases added). But is a (consolidated) democracy merely an academic subject 
for “relevant observers”? What about the “people” living in and with democracy? Apparently, this 
“negative” definition enhances a scientific quality of research only at the expense of a serious and 
sympathetic attention to the real life experience of the people of a new democracy. 
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tranquil and where there are no more raucous voices from society, then this is the 
demise of democracy, instead of its consolidation. 
Second, and relatedly, emphasis of stability over viability in a consolidating 
democracy can easily fall victim to political conservatism. As empirically evidenced, 
the smoothest transition from authoritarianism to democracy and accompanying 
stability after its virtual completion has often been occasioned in the cases of 
“transformation” or “transplacement” in Huntington’s neologism in which an 
incumbent authoritarian party still holds partial or overweening power.14 What it 
implies is that to secure stability, the old authoritarian forces are to be allowed a 
considerable amount of power and, in effect, some theorists of democratization are 
not hesitant to recommend these modes of transition as most practicable and 
stabilizing.15  
It is not to deny the importance of stability both in and after transition. True, 
bargaining and compromise lie at the heart of the transition process and the transition 
to democracy is also a transition in the modes of conflict resolution.16 But it is 
cautioned that stability that precludes from its purview room for the citizenry’s 
learning process that accompanies frustration, pain, joy, or jubilation because it might 
be in a slight moment detrimental to social order is by no means “democratic.” After 
all, what the people want is not stability per se that the old regime could have 
                                                 
14 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman 
and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
15  For example, see Russell Bova, “Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A 
Comparative Perspective,” World Politics 44:1 (1991), pp. 113-138. 
16 Welsh, “Political Transition Process,” p. 391. 
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furnished as well, or even better; what they desperately need is a life of dignity and 
full and actual citizenship corresponding to that title written in the constitution. 
 
The Ambiguities of Civil Society in Democracy Studies 
 
Finally and most pertinent to our imminent concern, emphasis of stability and the 
attendant political conservatism could serve as a convenient slogan to suffocate 
burgeoning civil society in a new democracy. Ever since O’Donnell and Schmitter 
mentioned the “resurrection of civil society” as a likely generalized mobilization once 
some change has occurred at regime level, civil society has captured a center of 
attention of comparative political scientists, with special respect to its constitutive 
role in regime change. 17  Especially, after its immensely subversive power was 
evidenced in the process of 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe18 and 
partly in East Asia of the same time,19 the importance of civil society has been 
broadly accepted even by such conservative political scientists like Larry Diamond. 
In a sense, for Diamond, attention to civil society20 is indispensable when he 
persuades us to “see democratization not simply as a limited period of transition from 
one set of formal regime rules to another, but rather as an ongoing process, a 
                                                 
17 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
pp. 48-56. 
18 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics. 
19 Larry Diamond et al., Consolidating the Third Wave Democratization: Themes and Perspectives 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Kim, Politics of Democratization. 
20 According to Diamond, civil society is defined as “the realm of organized social life that is open, 
voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a 
legal order or set of shared rules.” Diamond, Developing Democracy, p. 221. But this is just another 
conventional definition and hence does not merit special attention. More important is how comparative 
political scientists use this concept. 
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perpetual challenge, a recurrent struggle.”21 In the most positivist sense, civil society 
is even necessitous because of its often pivotal role in helping to effect a transition to 
democracy. But ultimately, for Diamond, civil society must be limited once it has 
completed its catalytic role of igniting the flame of action in the mass public because  
 
[d]emocratic governability and democratic responsiveness and accountability are facilitated 
by “cycles of citizen involvement, elite response, and citizen withdrawal.”22
 
 
Drawing on Almond and Verba’s Aristotelian notion of a “mixed political 
culture,”23 Diamond pinpoints the polarization of civil society along partisan lines of 
division as the expression of parochialism. Despite its contribution to “bringing the 
downfall of an authoritarian regime, the reform of a decadent and occluded 
democratic system, the permanent expansion of participation and enlargement of civil 
liberties, the impeachment and removal of a corrupt president from office, [and] the 
cancellation of a fraudulent election,” continues Diamond, civil society must be 
limited because “democracy cannot function indefinitely on the basis of crisis, 
polarization, and pervasive civic and political mobilization by every type of 
organization imaginable.”24
Theoretically speaking, it is highly arguable whether the polarization of civil 
society could be called “parochial” and whether the polarization along lines of 
political or religious orthodoxy really impairs the authenticity of “civic” society, for 
at least some parts of the West, civil society and pluralism grew out of sectarian 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 219. 
22 Ibid., p. 224. 
23 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 16-30. 
24 Diamond, Developing Democracy, p. 225. 
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orthodoxy and competition. In those regions, pluralism was not the opposite pole of 
orthodoxy.25 Hence, it is equally arguable whether Diamond’s call for a polarized 
civil society’s “return to normality” can be justified. But my more serious problem 
with Diamond’s discussion of civil society consists in his heavily limited view of 
democracy and thereof civil society. According to his logic, whereas democratization 
is an ongoing process, a perpetual challenge, and a recurrent struggle, democracy is 
subjugated to what he calls “democratic governability” or “normality.”  But who 
governs whom? Why is it that “normality” begins when citizens withdraw from the 
public scene? 
A similar problem is seen in an otherwise interesting study by Marc Howard.26 
Howard’s research question is why the grand civil society vitalized in the 1989 
revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe has significantly shrunken into the 
particularly low levels of civic participation in the post-Communist era. According to 
Howard, a lack of the desire to participate in voluntary organizations in the post-
Communist people entails from their past life experience under the rigidly petrified 
bureaucratic authoritarian regime that widened the gap between authentic private and 
hypocritical public lives, deepened the mistrust of formal political organizations, and 
                                                 
25  Seligman, Innerworldly Individualism; Cho, “Historical Origin.” In his interesting case study, 
Varshney challenges a view of civil society of the kind (or a liberal-pluralist civil society) presented by 
Diamond by arguing that “the purpose of activity rather than the forms of organization should be the 
critical test of civic life … Both informal group activities and ascriptive associations should be 
considered part of civil society so long as they connect individuals, build trust, encourage reciprocity, 
and facilitate the exchange of view on matters of public concern—economic, political, cultural, and 
social.” Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond,” World Politics 53 
(2001), pp. 369-370. 
26 Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society. 
194
 
fostered friendship networks in the private sphere. But it is dubious whether Howard 
uses the concept “civil society” consistently, because the civil societies he would 
want to find in post-Communist Europe are of the kind presented by Diamond, or by 
Seymour Lipset27 and Linz and Stepan28—namely, intermediary phenomena standing 
between the private sphere and the state. Put differently, what Howard takes to be 
civil societies are inherently market-oriented, 29  conservative, regime-stabilizing 
subregime organizations, things absolutely alien to the societies where the very idea 
of “organized interest” or “market” has never held positive or constructive 
implications.  
Hungarian politician and scholar G. M. Tamás captures the fundamental 
difference between the East European notion of civil society and its liberal-pluralist 
counterpart as this: 
 
[Thus,] the East European notion of civil society was pitched against the state, whereas the 
Whig idea was to complement the enfeebled state, to find new reasons for obedience and 
conformity after the wane of divinely anointed authority. The Whig idea was that voluntary, 
self-governing entities help to build a relatively non-coercive order, while the East European 
dissidents’ idea was that they might help to destroy an overly coercive order. In a work, the 
Burkean-Hegelian-Tocquevillian, or Whig idea was a political one; the East European 
dissident idea was anti-political.30  
 
 
For East Europeans, civil society was the parallel polis distinguished from the 
crushing preponderance, the all-pervasive omnipresence of the police state where 
they must live within a lie.31 As Timothy Ash states, the revolution of 1989 was “a 
                                                 
27 Lipset, “Social Requisites.” 
28 Linz and Stepan, Problems.  
29 See Diamond, “Democracy Reconsidered,” pp. 123-125; Diamond, Developing Democracy, p. 221; 
Lipset, “Social Requisites,” pp. 2-3. 
30 Tamás, “The Legacy of Dissent,” pp. 189-190. 
31 Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” p. 31. 
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springtime of nations, but not necessarily of nationalism; of societies, aspiring to be 
civil; and above all, of citizens.”32 In short, the parallel polis of 1989 was an “ethical” 
and “national” civil society in which truth is triumphant over a procrastinating 
hypocrisy and a lie. 
What the Western comparative political scientists take to be “normality” of 
civil society is what East Europeans are having trouble with most. It is because now a 
pivotal challenge for them is whether and how to shift their claim to “truth” to the 
concern with “interest” and to transform (or “degenerate”) “societies” and/or 
“nations” to “(interest) groups.”33 They are eager to have democracy but troubled to 
embrace the form of life a liberal-pluralist civil society requires.34 Howard should 
have asked, How to revitalize the post-Communist people’s passion to live in truth 
and How to empower their aspiration to citizenship in a novel social and political 
environment, namely, democracy, instead of How to subdue their passions and 
aspirations and channel them into an organized interest in order to conserve a market-
supporting political regime. Albeit implicitly, for Howard, just like for Diamond, 
normality is achieved when people come into the controllable boundary of 
governance and civil society holds relevance to politics only if it facilitates such 
governability. Otherwise put, civil society is not so much the end in itself, but a 
means to governability and stability. Likewise, citizenship or citizenry’s authentic 
political life in community and in nation is in no case the end as such; it is simply 
                                                 
32 Ash, “The Year of Truth,” p. 119. 
33 Linz and Stepan, Problems, pp. 271-272. 
34  By “liberal pluralism” I mean the concept that political scientists casually use in democracy 
literature, which is clearly distinguished from the “morality of pluralism” in liberal political theory.  
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given with the establishment—in fact importation—of democracy. And the civil 
society par excellence is a market, and the most overriding definition of citizenship 
stems from a business partnership.   
What then should be done? In a study of social ties in the post-Communist 
Poland for instance, Wlodzimierz Wesolowski presents three conceivable forms: 
associative ties, communal ties, and communitarian ties.35 Drawing on Ferdinand 
Tönnies’ classic dichotomy, Wesolowski equates associative ties with Gesellschaft 
(the equivalent of a liberal-pluralist civil society) and communal ties with 
Gemeinschaft (the equivalent of ethical civil society), and opts for communitarian ties 
as the most practicable alternative to either extreme. Although I am not quite clear of 
how in practice being communitarian could be vividly distinguished from being 
communal in the reality of Polish democracy and of why Poland’s parallel polis 
should be regarded as Gemeinschaft (hence something other than a modern form of 
civil society), I find in this third way a possibility of liberal nationalism that can 
promote thick democratic citizenship. If our ultimate goal is how to enhance 
citizenship, invigorate civil society, and empower democracy, the strategy should 
focus on the revitalization of ethical civil society and the promotion of citizenship 
within a democratic framework, to which a rule of law should be creatively 
accommodated as I suggested in Chapter 4.  
In this respect, the confrontational view of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft and 
the conventional belief that when Gemeinschaft recedes does Gesellschaft come or 
that Gesellschaft alone constitutes the center of civil society are at its best naïve. 
                                                 
35 Wesolowski, “Poland after Solidarity.” 
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Furthermore, the underlying assumption that nationalism is not compatible with 
liberal democracy, and, accordingly, a national civil society must be pulverized into 
pluralist civil societies (or contractual associations) is one-dimensional. From a 
culturalist standpoint, however, liberal individualism geared on the possessive quest 
for interest does not necessarily have to be the precondition of civil society. 
Collectivism (including nationalism) that does not choke individuality, but rather 
furnishes political and psychological reality for it is by no means an enemy of civil 
society, but its great fertilizer. Just like the dichotomy of Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft, a stark binary between collectivity and individuality is nothing but 
simple-minded.   
That the key challenge that the democratization poses to non-Western 
societies is the cultural pressure of shifting Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, and, yet, 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft do not indeed have to be opposed each other to make 
democracy (and civil society) safe opens the possibility that Korean chŏng culture can 
be conducive, rather than detrimental, to democratic consolidation in a uniquely 
Korean way. Since I have redefined democratic consolidation in terms of citizen-
making, it is particularly the possibility of thick democratic citizenship predicated on 
chŏng. The case that I will present later is indeed an illustration of such possibility. 
But how can we theoretically underpin our discussion on democratic consolidation, 
civil society, and citizenship thus far? In the following section, I recast a 
Tocquevillian justification of a liberal-pluralist account of civil society by re-
examining Tocqueville’s political theory of civil society, and, drawing on Barber’s 
198
 
theory of strong democracy, I then revamp a theory of democratic consolidation in 
terms of participatory politics.  
 
A Participatory Perspective of Civil Society and Its Implications for Democratic 
Consolidation 
 
Tocqueville’s Art of Association and Citizenship as Freedom 
 
It is interesting that many political scientists of civil society single out as their 
classical inspiration Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.36 What captures 
their most enthusiastic attention is what Tocqueville calls an “art of association.” The 
most oft-quoted phrase is as follows: 
 
Americans of all ages, all conditions, all minds constantly unite. Not only do they have 
commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but they also have a thousand 
other kinds: religious, moral, grave, futile, very general and very particular, immense and very 
small … In America I encountered sorts of associations of which, I confess, I had no idea, I 
often admired the infinite art with which the inhabitants of the United States managed to fix a 
common goal to the efforts of many men and to get them to advance it freely.37
 
 
As noted, champions of a liberal-pluralist view of civil society take for granted 
that civic associations are inherently market-oriented and their most important 
function is to offer a regime-legitimizing societal leverage to the state and the market 
that it serves. In fact, it is the modern liberal vision of the state and of civil society 
pioneered by Hobbes and articulated by Locke.38  For Locke, for instance, civil 
society exists as an artificially constructed league of bourgeoisie, and the state (or the 
government) erected by civil society plays a watchman role of providing a legal 
                                                 
36 Diamond, “Democracy Reconsidered,” p. 123; Lipset, “Social Requisites,” p. 12; Putnam, Bowling 
Alone, p. 48. 
37 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 489. 
38 Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 
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protection of private property now being equaled to the person itself. The seamless 
nexus between property, market, civil society, and the state constitutes the core of 
Locke’s political theory.39  
Even though Tocqueville’s civic association does not exclude business 
associations, or organized interests, for him, unlike for Locke, the central purpose of 
association is by no means in the service of the state or in the protection of right to 
private property, or of the market. Nor is it subject to inculcating a spirit of 
individualism and democratic freedom or equality. What frightens him most is, rather, 
a society where everyone is completely absorbed in one’s daily private life and 
diligent pursuit of self-interests; a democracy where, amid an irrevocable process of 
individualization and equality of condition, freedom is confused with equality and for 
equality, people have such an ardent, insatiable, eternal, invincible passion that they 
rather want equality in freedom, and, if they cannot get it, they will want it in 
slavery.40
Individuals, when atomized and alienated from an intimate social context and 
when they are all nearly equal, “it becomes difficult for them to defend their 
independence against the aggressions of power. Since no one among them is strong 
                                                 
39 Famously, the most radical version of Lockean civil society is inherited by theorists like Robert 
Nozick and Milton Friedman (Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia; Friedman, Capitalism and 
Freedom). Although I concur with Macpherson that Locke’s idea of civil society indeed justifies a 
liberal (or libertarian) civil society as I claim here, I am not arguing that this possessive individualistic 
interpretation exhausts Locke’s theory of civil society. Recently, John Dunn has corrected this 
conventional view in “The Contemporary Political Significance of John Locke’s Conception of Civil 
Society,” in Kaviraj and Khilnani, Civil Society, pp. 39-57. Nevertheless, I do believe Macpherson’s 
interpretation of Locke still holds good as far as the cooperative relation between civil society and the 
market is concerned.    
40 Tocqueville, Democracy, p.  482. 
200
 
enough then to struggle alone to advantage, it is only the combination of the forces of 
all that can guarantee freedom.”41 Not only for the protection of one’s independence 
from external aggressions of power, but, more importantly, freedom functions as a 
heroic bulwark against the tyranny of majority camouflaged in terms of equality in 
freedom or equality of condition. 
 
Princes had so to speak made violence material; democratic republics in our day have 
rendered it just as intellectual as the human will that it wants to constrain. Under the absolute 
government of one alone, despotism struck the body crudely, so as to reach the soul; and the 
soul, escaping from those blows, rose gloriously above it; but in democratic republics, tyranny 
does not proceed in this way; it leaves the body and goes straight for the soul. The master no 
longer says to it: You shall think as I do or you shall die; he says: You are free not to think as 




The art of association is called for not to fortify individualism but to 
counterbalance it, not to protect a permanent demand for equality but to moderate it 
with a lofty ideal of an aristocratic liberty. In fact, in Tocqueville’s judgment, there 
are no countries where associations are more necessary to prevent the despotism of 
any kind than those in which the social state is democratic, for whereas in aristocratic 
nations, secondary bodies form natural associations that halt abuses of power, in 
countries where such associations do not exist, if particular persons cannot create 
artificially and temporarily something that resembles them, there would be no dike of 
any sort against tyranny.43  
                                                 
41 Ibid., p. 52. 
42 Ibid., p. 244. 
43 Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
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Thus understood, Tocqueville’s civil society is the democratic approximation 
of feudal corporate orders, or intermediary bodies, of the ancien régime. 44  
Individuals, otherwise atomized and vulnerable, gather in small assemblies by 
engaging themselves in local, small-scale, quotidian, and voluntary associational life, 
and, in the gravest and most general and immense sense, form “a separate nation 
inside the nation, a government inside the government.”45 What Tocqueville cautions 
is this: the parchment citizenship that one believes to be naturally given by the 
constitution is nothing but abstract and at best ideological, rather than real; a 
citizenship as bestowed in the form of a “right” is only reinforcing the abstract notion 
of individual that is deprived of any relevant historical, political, and psychological 
content.46 A real citizenship is something that is acquired by one’s own action, one’s 
voluntary participation in associational life. And it is there that one can exercise real 
freedom and attain a dignity of living.  
Therefore, in Tocqueville, our individual and political agency is empowered 
only if we become a citizen. In citizenship, the binary between individuality and 
collectivity and/or between negative freedom and positive freedom dissolves or 
becomes irrelevant, not because of one’s complete submission to the other, but 
because, now, the otherwise dichotomous relation between seemingly opposing 
values turn out to be dialectic. Empowered individuals are those who are embedded in 
the social context and who are versed in the art of relationship with others, because 
                                                 
44 Sung Ho Kim, “Democracy in Korea and the Myth of Civil Society,” in Bell and Hahm, Politics of 
Affective Relations, pp. 201-214. 
45 Tocqueville, Democracy, p. 182. 
46 Michael Sandel voices the same worry. See Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, part 1. 
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only through legitimate relationality one’s liberty can grow full-fledged. Herein lies 
the gist of Tocquevillian democracy: the art of association is at the heart of the public 
life and, in the most profound sense, there can be no other legitimate form of politics 
than that which promotes democratic citizenship. All in all, for Tocqueville, civil 
society is not merely one subsystem that helps to impart legitimacy or necessitous 
stability to the macropolitical—predominantly representative—system, but it indeed 
constitutes the very definition of democratic politics. By focusing on a regime and by 
dealing with civil society as an auxiliary political entity, democracy studies in 
comparative politics have significantly forfeited a grip on the study of civil society 
pertinent to our everyday life.  
Barber’s Strong Democracy and Democratic Consolidation 
 
However, it should be cautioned that, after all, the society (i.e., the nineteenth-century 
American society) that attracted Tocqueville’s critical attention was one that was 
dashing toward the irrevocable course of modernization in the absence of feudal and 
aristocratic backdrops that could have provided a necessitous transmission to control 
the speed and extent of social change. For Tocqueville, individualism—however 
socially void and politically impoverished—was an unavoidable social fact in itself 
and, as a result, his major concern was with how to artificially construct a semblance 
of genuine social relationship and authentic individuality furnished with honor and 
liberty where there seemed to be no such things possible. Yet, because of this 
entrenched individualism, albeit ironically, as a point of departure in his political 
theory, it appears, Tocqueville’s civil society—the kind I called “liberal pluralism” or 
“the morality of pluralism” in Chapter 2 as distinct from “national civil society”—can 
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hardly be applicable to democratizing or consolidating democracies of the third wave 
in which modern liberal individualism is still foreign to their political culture and 
everyday life. Put differently, the Tocquevillian conception of civil society (i.e., 
voluntary associations) is useful in that it takes culture seriously and helps to promote 
active citizenship in the actual boundary of social life. But, it should also be noted, on 
the other hand, it is limited because it cannot avail itself of the same theoretical 
sharpness when it comes to what Benjamin Barber calls “unitary democracy” in 
which consensus is norm and unity is a superb value.47
In Strong Democracy, Barber takes pains to strike a theoretical middle ground 
between unitary democracy and representative democracy. His “strong democracy” is 
presented as a mediating form that is neither too thick, as is unitary democracy, nor 
too thin, as is representative democracy. As such, strong democracy is defined as 
politics “where conflict is resolved in the absence of an independent ground through a 
participatory process of ongoing, proximate self-legislation and the creation of a 
political community capable of transforming dependent, private individuals into free 
citizens and partial and private interests into public goods.”48 Therefore, in practice, 
Barber’s greatest concern is with, given pervasive political apathy and decline of 
civic activity in contemporary American society, how to make society civil and 
democracy strong by transforming a private man into a voluntary citizen.49  
At first glance, as far as democratization is concerned, Barber seems to fall 
into the same drawback found in Tocqueville in that his project of self-transformation 
                                                 
47 Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 148-150. 
48 Ibid., p. 132. 
49 Also see Barber, A Place for Us. 
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(from a private individual to a public citizen) also takes up liberal individualism as a 
starting point of theorization albeit ultimately aiming at its amelioration. Moreover, 
Barber’s taxonomy of unitary democracy, strong democracy, and representative 
democracy (and their corresponding forms of civil society, communitarian civil 
society, strong civil society, and libertarian civil society50) is not designed to explain 
democratic consolidation as such.51 In fact, transforming unitary democracy into 
strong democracy hardly constitutes Barber’s most imminent concern. 
Nevertheless, considering the actual course of democratic consolidation in 
countries like Poland and Korea, it seems not far-fetched to regard unitary democracy, 
originally an ideal type, as an actual historical form of democracy. By placing it 
within the context of democratic consolidation, we can recast new light on the overall 
process of democratic consolidation. First, democratic consolidation conventionalized 
in democracy studies in comparative politics can be recapitulated as shown in 
FIGURE 6.1. 
 
                                                 
50 For Barber’s discussion of three kinds of civil society that in my view correspond to the three kinds 
of democracy he presents in Strong Democracy, see Ibid., pp. 12-37. To clarify, it should be noted that 
in Barber’s categorization, the equivalent of what Wesolowski calls “communitarian ties” is closer to 
strong democratic civil society rather than communitarian civil society that is akin to “communal ties” 
in Wesolowski’s framework. In fact, Wesolowski’s communitarian ties are closer to civic 
republicanism (or communitarianism) of the kind that Michael Sandel celebrates. At some point, 
Barber acknowledges that strong democratic civil society is akin to civic republicanism. Ibid., p. 44.  
51 But in the preface to the twentieth anniversary edition of Strong Democracy, Barber hints the 
relevance of using strong democracy as a litmus test of democratic consolidation. See Barber, Strong 
Democracy, pp. xvii-xvix.  
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FIGURE 6.1. Democratic Consolidation in terms of Liberal Democratic Theory 
 




Representative Democracy (with Libertarian Civil Society) 
 
 
Yet, Figure 1 is far from sufficient in capturing democracy as an open-ended 
process, a permanent struggle for citizenship, for it is predicated on the teleological 
view that democratic consolidation is achieved when it has become institutionally 
stabilized. Here, democracy is primarily one of the regime types. In marked contrast, 
our reformulation of democratic consolidation with reference to active political 
participation understands democracy as a way of living. Such democracy is not so 
different from the political condition depicted by Michael Oakeshott when he wrote 
of sailors on “a boundless sea [where] there is neither harbor for shelter nor floor for 
anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination, [and where] the enterprise 
is to keep afloat on an even keel.”52 FIGURE 6.2 illustrates this reformulation of 
democratic consolidation. 
 
FIGURE 6.2. Democratic Consolidation with reference to Barber’s Strong Democracy 
 








Representative Democracy (with Libertarian Civil Society) 
 
 
                                                 
52 Reprinted in Barber, Strong Democracy, p. 120. 
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In forcing unitary democracy onto representative democracy, once rekindled 
political action and participation are likely to be compelled to relapse, and politics is 
prone to be restored as another zoo-keeping by the intermediary of expertise in formal 
system, be it bureaucracy or legislature.53 Strong democracy as a third way endorses 
the “politics of amateurs” in the sense that herein politics is understood as its own 
university, citizenship its own training ground, and participation its own tutor.54  
Strong democracy relies on participation that creates “our world” or “our will” in the 
Rousseauian sense (whereas composed of the wills of autonomous citizens), and the 
viability of “our world” hangs on a talk of every kind (cognitive, prudential, 
exploratory, conversational, and affective) that can enhance empathy, because 
according to Barber, “there is perhaps no stronger social bond and no more significant 
ally of public thinking than the one fashioned by empathy.”55
Korean democracy after democratization has been evaluated exclusively from 
a regime perspective and consequently her grand civil society that broke down the 
military authoritarian regime has been under staggering pressure to transform itself 
into petty private associations or interest groups. With regard to its quality, a disparity 
between democratic institution and political culture has been singled out as the most 
                                                 
53 Famously, a completely opposite view on representative democracy was offered by Kateb in his The 
Inner Ocean, chapters 1 & 2. According to Kateb, representative democracy is normatively superior to 
participatory democracy because of what he calls “moral phenomena” or “culture of democratic 
individuality” it produces. Kateb’s argument, however, can be justified only if the supreme value of 
rights-based individualism is taken for granted, which Kateb fails to. For strong democrats (and liberal 
nationalists), the political and cultural interconnection between rights-based individualism and 
representative democracy that Kateb valorizes renders representative democracy to be unpalatable 
precisely because of its (inherent) connection with rights-based individualism that they oppose. 
54 Barber, Strong Democracy, p. 152. 
55 Ibid., p. 188. 
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critical obstacle to its consolidation. But, in the following, drawing on our new 
definition of democratic consolidation and of democracy as a primarily participatory 
form, I will attempt to shed new light on the quality of Korean democracy and on an 
enormous political viability and civic participation nourished on its unique cultural 
resources. In order to do so, I first present a case that I find is fascinatingly pertinent 
to and suggestive of the character of Korean democracy.    
 
Democratic Consolidation as Citizen-Empowerment: A Case 
 
The Politics of Candlelight in 2002 
 
On June 13, 2002, two Korean teenage girls (Shin Hyosun and Shim Miseon), 
walking on a local road of Yangju, north of Seoul, were struck by a U.S. military 
vehicle returning from an official duty. According to the witnesses, a 3.67m-wide 
minesweeping vehicle was running on a 3.4 meter-wide local road and, at the moment 
of the accident, it was trying to avoid a collision with another military vehicle coming 
from the other direction. It was reported that no functional problem was detected in 
the communication equipment of the vehicle and the crew of the other vehicle did 
signal to it about the presence of the girls. Nevertheless, how the accident happened 
and whether the crew in the vehicle were responsible for it was to await trial. The 
problem was, according to SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement)56 contracted between 
the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1966, as far as an accident 
having taken place during official duties is concerned, the U.S. Army has the right of 
initial investigation and the jurisdiction over the soldiers unless an objection is raised 
                                                 
56 Its official title is “The Agreement under Article 4 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the 
Republic of Korea and the United States of America regarding Facilities and Areas and the States of 
Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea.”  
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by the Korean government. For the Korean government to have jurisdiction, it should 
request the relinquishment of the right of the U.S. government within three weeks of 
the incident. Of course, it is entirely up to the U.S. government whether to hand over 
jurisdiction. Over the last decades, however, the Korean government has never 
actually claimed that right, not to mention the actual exercise of jurisdiction, despite 
many similar incidents. 
Soon, a joint committee composed of civic groups and citizens was 
voluntarily organized in order to resolve the issue. Reacting to the lack of a 
satisfactory explanation from the U.S. Army and to the lukewarm reaction by the 
Korean government, which apparently was reluctant to implicate itself in the US 
soldier-related crime, on June 26 the committee held the first national campaign in 
front of the U.S. military camp at Uijeongbu, to which the soldiers then under custody 
belonged. Since the issue had been trivialized in the major newspapers, conservative 
and pro-U.S., the approximately 200 participants—mostly high-school and college 
students—attained the information about the campaign from alternative sources such 
websites like “Voice of People” (www.voiceofpeople.org) or “Ohmynews” 
(www.ohmynews.com), and through word of mouth. 
In a written protest that was sent to the division commander on the same day, 
six demands were made: 1) a public apology by the division commander, the 
commander of the US-ROK Joint Army, and the US ambassador; 2) the U.S. Army’s 
participation in the fact-finding committee organized by the victims’ families and 
Korean civic groups; 3) a relinquishment of the jurisdiction to the Korean 
government; 4) rapid compensation; 5) the erection of a monument for the victims; 
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and finally 6) the prohibition of military training that passes through the road of the 
accident in order to prevent a recurrence of a similar incident, and the closing of the 
training field. Although the campaign was entitled “National,” the citizenry 
movement thus far had been more of a local reaction and its focus was primarily on 
resolving the local problems the incident had generated. Despite the second national 
campaign on June 29, Korea’s major political parties still remained silent on the 
issue, and the majority of Korean people appeared to be absorbed in the World Cup 
soccer games taking place in their home. 
However, by July 7, when the joint committee held the fourth national 
campaign at Uijeongbu, wherein more than 1,500 citizens showed up, the issue was 
not merely local, as a series of similar protests had been organized in over 20 
different places across the country. By then the demands focused on an official 
apology from President Bush and, more urgently, the relinquishment of jurisdiction 
by the U.S. government. In response to this national citizenry outrage, the Korean 
Ministry of Justice, for the first time in history, officially filed a request of the U.S.’s 
relinquishment of jurisdiction to the Korean judiciary authority on July 10. Hereafter 
and until August 7, when the U.S. Army officially refused that request, all kinds of 
civic associations and political organizations—regional and national high-school 
students organizations, various university student activity groups, and numerous 
organizations formed by teachers, artists, women, and religious leaders of divergent 
backgrounds—mushroomed in such variegated forms as street demonstration, public 
memorial service, artistic performance, and candlelight vigil. The following interview 
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with a high-school student captures the flaming spirit of civility expressed by Korean 
citizens. 
 
If any of my school teachers dissuades a student like me from coming to this kind of place [of 
demonstration], I would say to him or her that we students, as elucidated both in our 
constitution and in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, are also a citizen who has 
the right to freedom of assembly and association and [furthermore] persuade him or her to 
join us in letting others know the deaths of Hyosun and Miseon.57
 
Placards raised by high-school students in the street stating “Hyosun and 
Miseon are Our Younger Sisters” stirred up the whole nation. When it was broadcast 
on television, the entire nation finally turned into a sea of tears, tears of deep remorse 
for the indifference to the incident thus far, and, albeit puzzling, for the incident itself 
for which they seemed to have no responsibility at all. For many Koreans, Hyosun 
and Miseon were not so much ill-fated victims in Uijeongbu, but our daughters and 
our sisters that represented our weakness, our suffering, and our misery. Put 
differently, in sharing the tears of remorse, Koreans, otherwise disjointed and 
isolated, created “our world.” 
On November 22, when the two accused U.S. soldiers were finally found not 
guilty and the Korean government officially expressed a respect for that judgment, at 
stake was no longer an official apology from President Bush, but Korean sovereignty 
and Korean citizenship, or the true meaning of being a Korean and of having a 
Korean government. Practically, this enlightened awareness of citizenship and 
sovereignty led to the unflinching demand for the revision of SOFA, which drove 24 
congressmen of the Korean National Assembly to announce a joint statement making 
three demands: the establishment of guilt by a retrial, President Bush’s official 
                                                 
57 Ohmynews, 7/17/2002. 
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apology, and the revision of SOFA.58 At the same time, no less pressure was placed 
on the presidential candidates of the major parties to clarify their view on the issue 
and whether they would endeavor to revamp SOFA once elected in December. 
Amid a series of protests and assemblies nationwide, the suggestion of one 
netizen (known as “angma”) to hold a citizen-led candlelight vigil in Gwanghwamun 
square in downtown Seoul, where millions of Korean people had experienced the joy 
and national pride in the successful hosting of the World Cup in the very summer 
when Hyosun and Miseon vanished, ignited a flame of collective civil action and 
public exercise of citizenship. A part of it reads: 
 
The soul of the dead is said to become a firefly. Let’s fill Gwanghwamun with our souls. Let’s 
become thousands and millions of fireflies with Miseon and Hyosun in Gwanghwamun. 6 
o’clock on Saturday and Sunday, let’s [voluntarily] give up our cozy private tranquility. 
Please prepare a candle while dressed in black. Please light a candle, coming out of the door. 
When asked, please let him or her know that we go out to repose the souls of our deceased 
sisters. Let’s walk down Gwanghwamun with candlelights. Let’s cherish the memory of 
Miseon and Hyosun that we forgot in the joy of last June … One person would be enough. 
[For] we can greet to each other. [Then] we will talk about our country where Miseon and 
Hyosun can have an eternal rest. I would start by myself this week and the following week. 
Let’s fill Gwanghwamun with our candlelights.59
  
 
On November 30, more than 15,000 citizens holding candles showed up in 
order to solemnly declare Korean citizenship and protest against any kind of 
oppression and violence. This time, it was not just a meeting in tears but, as ironical 
as it may sound, a celebration of hope, as expressed by a teenage student of Hyosun’s 
and Miseon’s age: “As a matter of fact, the number of the people [who actually 
showed up in Gwanghwamun] was less than we saw back in the time of the World 
                                                 
58 Ohmynews, 11/24/2002. 
59 Hangyeore Shinmun, 11/27/2002. 
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Cup. But [nevertheless] I was deeply impressed. I shed tears upon the frustrating 
reality on the one hand, but on the other I also wore a smile. Yes, smile, although it 
would not seem to be suitable for today’s memorial service. But, certainly, there was 
a smile in it. For [I guess] we have found a hope in people who gathered to repose 
Hyosun’s and Miseon’s souls.”60  
The nation-wide and citizens-led candlelight vigil reached its apex on 
December 14, when, echoing the demand of the revision of SOFA made by the 
survived patriots who had fought for national independence against Japanese 
colonialism, more than 100,000 people gathered at Gwanghwamun to declare a “Day 
of Second Independence,” an independence not only from the US’s universal and 
globalizing power but, in deepest truth, from their previous negligence of citizenship. 
Finally, on February 5, 2003, an agreement on the basic guidelines on the revision of 
SOFA was signed by both the U.S. and South Korea and its details were publicized to 
the Korean news media. Certainly, it was an unprecedented achievement, but it was in 
no way the end of the Koreans’ quest of justice and citizenship. Rather, the strenuous 
demand for truth of the summer of 2002 is still an ongoing and eye-catching concern 
of Korean civil society. In effect, once rekindled citizenship has never been 
extinguished in Korean civil society.     
 
Chŏng as the Vehicle of Korean Citizenship 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, South Korea’s military authoritarian regime was 
broken down by the grand civil society that represented the “voice of nation” in the 
turbulent summer of 1987. Certainly, it is not difficult to see a tremendous continuity 
                                                 
60 Ohmynews, 11/30/2002. 
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between 1987 and 2002, especially in terms of the grandiosity and intensity of civil 
society. Yet, more compelling is the massive continuity in the character of civil 
society, that is, its immensely “ethical” nature.61 However, for many students of 
democracy who are disposed to see the entrenchment of liberal-pluralist civil 
societies as a critical sign of democratic consolidation, this conspicuous continuity is 
a source of embarrassment and, at worst, of frustration. For it paradoxically reveals 
the hopeless underdevelopment of articulated interests, social pluralism, cultural 
diversity, and finally political difference. In other words, the great continuity between 
1987 and 2002 demonstrates the radical absence of civil society of the kind Marc 
Howard would find in post-Communist Europe in a virtual plethora of civility and 
political actions. For many, what is called a “mass-ascendant” mode of 
democratization62 is still pervasive in Korea, and to that extent what Korea is now 
undergoing can hardly be grasped in terms of democratic consolidation. 
But if the focus is placed on the learning or repossessing process of 
citizenship and on viability and dynamism that it generates, or if democracy as a way 
of living is our truest goal, Korean civil society in 2002 presents a landmark change 
in both political function and democratic quality. In 2002, Koreans were no more the 
masses than the citizens in every capacity that disseminated information that would 
have gone unnoticed, associated themselves into variegated voluntary groups, and, 
most important, educated themselves by questioning the meaning of “becoming” a 
Korean citizen. What is to be asked then is: what made otherwise private individual 
                                                 
61 See Kim, “South Korea.” 




Koreans think of “us” and drove them to create “our” world parallel to the state that 
apparently failed to serve “our” common interest? Simply put, what prompted them to 
re-evaluate the question of citizenship and repossess it through active participation? 
On June, 13, 2003, the first anniversary of the incident, a poem that cherishes 
the memory of Hyosun and Miseon was dedicated. A part of it reads 
 
If [you] were guilty, [it is because] in this wrong country  
That could not protect and [rather] overrode her own people’s dignity and life 
In this ill-fated country, you were born 
It is because you called it a mother country, the colony of imperialistic America,                                    
the divided land  
This country’s self-seeking politicians 
[And] all successive military governments let you die 
This country’s all presidents let you die, that lived off America and only tried to read her 
mind. 
No! It is ourselves that let you die 
It is this feeble land that called forth your deaths (emphasis added) 
 
Why do Koreans believe that the deaths of Hyosun and Miseon are due to my 
fault, our country’s weakness, and ultimately because of us? Why do Koreans believe 
that the losses of these two young girls are our responsibility? Why do we feel guilty 
about the deaths of those who we did not hate? How should we make sense of this 
strange responsibility that obviously refutes the liberal notion that is fundamentally 
causal,63 which speaks, “when you do wrong, then it is no other than you and you 
alone that should take responsibility for it”? 
In The Question of German Guilt, Karl Jaspers presents “metaphysical guilt” 
as distinguished from criminal guilt, political guilt, and moral guilt when he writes: 
 
                                                 
63 See Leo Katz, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal Law (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1987).  
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There exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co-responsible for 
every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for crimes committed in his presence 
or with his knowledge. If I fail to do whatever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty.64
 
Simply put, metaphysical guilt is something that weighs upon me as indelible 
guilt when I live after a horrible thing like the Holocaust. As a Kantian philosopher, 
Jaspers could not but call this special sense of guilt “metaphysical” in the sense that it 
is universally felt by all rational human beings. Since, for you to feel this guilt, you 
must bracket off all empirical or experiential contingencies that inevitably lead you to 
call forth the question of causality (“whether I have done that or others have”), it 
ought to be metaphysical. But a sense of guilt or responsibility that Koreans 
collectively (not “universally”) felt was hardly metaphysical as Jaspers would claim it 
to be. The collective responsibility that many Koreans shared was rather palpable, 
experiential, and historical. It is not what you as a rational human being are forced to 
feel because you find yourself vulnerable and helpless when you could do nothing for 
the injustice or crime done to innocent others (i.e. other human beings). What 
Koreans felt in the face of two young girls’ innocent deaths was what you as a 
Korean cannot but confront, who understands the historicity of one’s national self: 
her sorrow, her humiliation, her suffering as well as her joy, her glory, and her hope. 
This at once historical and cultural, and essentially politico-psychological 
moral sensibility is (now obviously) “uri-responsibility, a uniquely Korean collective 
moral responsibility. In Chapter 4, I examined the basic characteristics of uri-
responsibility by contrasting it to two Kantian accounts of responsibility: moral 
                                                 




(individual) responsibility and political (collective) responsibility. It is now to be 
added that uri-responsibility peculiar to Korean chŏng culture is also differentiated 
from metaphysical guilt (or responsibility) due to its particularist, “cultural” and 
“national,” implications. Apparently, metaphysical guilt, too, just like uri-
responsibility, is a form of collective and moral responsibility and this is indeed what 
distinguishes Jaspers, a Kantian, from Kant (and Arendt) himself, the Machiavellian 
dualist of moral and political. Strictly speaking and from a cultural perspective, 
however, the “collective” dimension of Jaspers’ metaphysical guilt is far from certain. 
It is because for Jaspers “collectivity” strictly and only means the abstract body of 
“humanity” as an aggregation of rational individuals. Which means, logically, 
Jaspers’ idea of humanity is firmly grounded in Kantian individualism. In short, just 
like Kant (and Arendt), in his discussions of forms of responsibility (criminal, moral, 
political, and metaphysical), Jaspers does not allow room for a collective mode of 
moral responsibility, assumed by non-political (meaning “non-governmental”), 
“social” group(s). From Jaspers’ viewpoint, uri-responsibility, which is deeply 
wedded to a particularist national culture, say, chŏng culture can never be qualified to 
be an authentic responsibility of any kind.   
That chŏng creates a familial collective identity in Korea helps us understand 
why so many Korean citizens were inexplicably and immensely affected by the 
deaths of the two young girls. By awakening chŏng in the public space, which turned 
into a sea of tears, Koreans could see Hyosun and Miseon as our sisters and/or our 
daughters whose misfortune had everything to do with their collective and, hence, 
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public life. 65  For them, citizenship could be acquired only if one is capable of 
inculcating chŏng and then exercising it in the all-seeing public space by participating 
in collective action. What frustrated ordinary Koreans most was the apparent absence 
of chŏng in the Korean government and major news media, which took pains to 
assuage or distract the civil outrage by all means, especially in the pretext of national 
interest that is alleged to be massively intertwined with Korea’s relationship with the 
U.S. When the government and conservative news-makers were found hopelessly 
impregnable, Koreans had to find an alternative institutional outlet that could channel 
chŏng throughout every single Korean heart across the country. In 2002, Korean civil 
society assumed that heroic role by functioning as the powerful affectionate bulwark 
for “chŏngish citizenship.” 
    
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to re-evaluate the quality of democratic 
consolidation in Korea from a participatory democracy perspective. In order to do so, 
I first redefined democratic consolidation in terms of citizenry’s self-education of 
citizenship and the political dynamism that it breeds rather than in terms of stability, 
as is often the case in contemporary democracy studies, which overly prefer a liberal-
pluralist civil society that is essentially market-oriented, regime-legitimizing, and 
hence politically conservative to a more active, vibrant, and thus sometimes 
                                                 
65 One may wonder whether it was moral indignation rather than chŏng that mobilized Korean civil 
society. But moral indignation, just like metaphysical guilt, is a universal concept and therefore is 
limited in fully capturing the uniqueness of the nature and intensity of indignation or frustration that 
the Koreans collectively experienced. Moreover, moral indignation, as abstract as it is, can hardly 
explain why Koreans employed a certain type of rhetoric (i.e. the family metaphor) from amongst 
various other cultural repertories available. For this point, see Swidler, “Culture in Action.” 
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intractable form of civil society. With reference to Tocqueville’s and Barber’s 
justifications of participatory democracy (and strong democratic civil society), I then 
recast a process of democratic consolidation as an open-ended, non-teleological, and 
perennial struggle for citizenship that neither unitary democracy, the kind that 
Korea’s grand national (yet elite-led) civil society had upheld during and after 
democratization, nor representative democracy, pivoted on liberal individualism, can 
fully come to terms with. Finally, by examining a recent upheaval of Korean civil 
society after the deaths of two teenage girls struck by a U.S. military vehicle, I 
demonstrated how Koreans empower both individuality (chŏng-contextual and 
reflective agency) and collective identity (chŏng-induced we-ness), thus invigorating 
civil society by the collective practice of uri-responsibility, and citizenship by active 
political participation.    
The challenge for Korea then is not to theorize and build a thin liberal 
representative democracy (and a liberal-pluralist civil society) by transforming and 
suppressing a thick unitary democracy (and a national-communitarian civil society), 
risking a clash of civilization in a citizenry’s actual political and cultural life, but to 
accommodate a national-communitarian culture with democratic civil society that 
empowers individuality through the inculcation of citizenship rather than that forcibly 
absorbs it in collectivity. As bad as forced conformity to collectivism is an imposition 
of what Kateb calls “democratic culture” predicated on rights-based individualism to 
the non-individualistic cultural community. Even though political scientists are not 
acutely aware of, yet, as liberal individualists like George Kateb rightly observe, 
precisely because democracy is not merely a political-institutional arrangement, but, 
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more fundamentally, a culture, and, again as Kateb argues, because a constitutional 
representative democracy (as opposed to a participatory, liberal-national, and 
communitarian democracy) and liberal individualism are mutually constitutive, 
“living” (if not “having”) democracy not only brings a joy of liberation but also poses 
a fear of cultural clash to many non-Westerners, of course including Koreans. If, for 
non-Westerners, democratization (including democratic consolidation) is experienced 
as more than a regime change, hence as a drastic transformation of  a Gemeinschaft of 
their thick cultural-national identity into a contractual Gesellschaft of liberal 
individualism, democratic theory is obliged to be cross-cultural and comparative, and 
it must be open to the possibility of an indigenization of democracy. Finally, Kateb’s 
claim that “[t]he possibly nonindividualist experience of democracy outside America 
must be treated circumspectly”66 must be rejected. There is no Democracy, only 
democracies. Democracy of chŏngish citizenship is in this respect not oxymoronic. In 
my view, and for many ordinary Koreans as I believe, chŏngish citizenship is the 
most culturally relevant and politically practicable model for Korean democracy. And 
it is this form of democracy that Koreans might want to take pains to consolidate. 
 
                                                 
66 Kateb, Inner Ocean, p. 77. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
 
Particularity and Universality 
 
This study began by asking the question of what would be the culturally relevant and 
politically practicable condition upon which Korean democracy can flourish and 
Korean individuals can entertain both strong individual (moral and political) agency 
and empowered citizen identity particularly in its post-Confucian cultural context. 
Two directions were established for the purpose and have guided this study: first, to 
approach such a political and cultural condition in terms of “civil society”; second, to 
provide theoretical accounts of the distinctive character and compelling practice of 
the post-Confucian civil society in contemporary Korea by way of a cross-cultural 
comparison with the liberal-individualistic civil society that has been a critical 
constituent of liberal democracies in the West since the Enlightenment, and one that 
has thus become a universal, yet procrustean, model for the new democratic civil 
societies of the third wave. Correspondingly, there were two particular concerns in 
this study: first, following Tocqueville’s lead, to understand democracy as a form of 
social life rather than a form of government as many empirical political scientists do; 
second, to recast the process of democratic transition and consolidation—primarily a 
“political” phenomenon in the political science literature, in light of cultural change 
that includes complex processes of acculturation between the elements of the 
traditional Korean Gemeinschaft, having been intact at large over the authoritarian 
periods, and those of the contractual Gesellschaft, gushed in after an abrupt 
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democratization. The search for and vindication of a post-Confucian civil society 
throughout the study was my own way of resolving these two critical concerns.  
As we have seen, my key argument was that chŏng as a quintessential feature 
of Korean Gemeinschaft could meet the cultural challenge of Western individualism 
and its contractual culture by creating a uniquely Korean and post-Confucian type of 
civil society—a “chŏngish civil society.” Special attention was placed on how Korean 
democratic consolidation as a process of acculturation was indeed accompanied by 
and capable of a chŏng-induced democratic and liberal-collectivistic civil ethos (i.e. 
uri-responsibility) that I find is indispensable to invigorating collective self-
determination and democratic citizen-making of the Korean people. 
Even though this study set out to search for a Korean model of democratic 
civil society, I must stress that it also attempted to provide coherent accounts for 
distinctive political theoretical questions such as democratic transition and 
consolidation, liberal nationalism, and participatory democracy from the post-
Confucian cultural perspective. But this far-reaching theoretical quest may raise an 
important problem reminiscent of the particularist-universalist tension with which I 
have grappled in Chapter 5. This is the question of whether it is valid to draw a 
general theory of post-Confucian civil society from a particularity of the Korean case. 
After all, isn’t chŏng a particularly Korean asset, and hence by definition lacking in 
other post-Confucian societies, like Taiwan or Japan? Indeed, in Chapter 3 I 
conceptually distinguished post-Confucian civil society from Confucian civil society, 
with Taiwan in mind as a comparative counterpart. Then, one may legitimately ask 
where my intention actually lies: Is it to advocate a cultural relativism of Korean 
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national democratic theory? Or to advance a Confucian critique of liberal 
individualism, and hence to champion an alternative ideal of universalism?1
Admittedly, this study began as a defense of the Korean democratic practice 
and a search for the possibility of the Korean model of democratic civil society, rather 
than a comprehensive cultural critique of Western liberalism from the Confucian 
perspective. To be sure, a great deal of East Asian apologists of Asian Values were 
drawn to the second strategy over the last decade—not merely because that was the 
easiest way to highlight East Asian cultural identity, promote cultural nationalism, or, 
at worst, justify the authoritarian political systems of their home countries. But it was 
primarily because they failed to formulate a constructive normative political theory 
that could contribute to proactively rebuild a form of Confucian democracy or any 
other political alternatives in its own right. Thus, in their enthusiastic commitment to 
a cultural challenge to Western liberalism, many East Asian scholars unwittingly (or 
sometimes intentionally) made the mistake of simplifying the rich tradition of 
Western liberalism solely in terms of “individualism”—yet of the kind Tocqueville 
criticized by calling it “selfishness”, not the kind which he was ambivalent towards.2 
                                                 
1 In my view, this particularist-universalist tension is endemic in recent “Confucian Democracy” quests. 
See Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy; David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Democracy of the Dead: 
Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1997); Tan, 
Confucian Democracy. 
2  In his celebrated chapter on “Individualism,” Tocqueville distinguishes individualism from 
selfishness as follows: “Selfishness is a passionate and exaggerated love of self that brings man to 
relate everything to himself alone and to prefer himself to everything. Individualism is a reflective 
peaceable sentiment that disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of those like him and to 
withdraw to one side with his family and his friends …” Tocqueville, Democracy, p. 482. Recently, 
there have been increasing demands for a subtler reading of Tocqueville’s idea of individualism. See 
Villa, “Individualism.”; Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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That is to say, moral individualism that undergirds the backbone of modern liberal 
civil society has rarely been presented as a valid counterpart of comparison.3
 East Asian apologists neglected the fact that modern liberalism grounded in 
moral individualism has its own image of moral community and the moral qualities 
indispensable to its sustenance. In other words, the inextricable connection between 
moral individualism and civil society and civility (which I examined in Chapter 2) 
was not given sufficient attention. While pinpointing the negative aspects of Western 
individualism such as atomism, social anomie, alienation, egoism, destruction of 
family values, and yet dismissing what Talyor calls the ethics of authenticity and the 
virtue of civility inherent in modern individualism, the previous Asian Values debates 
waged by East Asian scholars fell short of maintaining the balance of comparison and 
the rigor of criticism. If concepts like Asian Values and Confucian Democracy are to 
be held dear only as alternatives to the decadence of liberal individualism in its 
celebrated emphasis on human relationship, sociability, civic virtue, family values, 
                                                                                                                                           
University Press, 1991). The reason Tocqueville had to be ambivalent towards modern individualism 
was because it could easily dry up public virtues, eventually relegating to selfishness, notwithstanding 
its own uniquely modern moral quality.  
3 For instance, Chaibong Hahm, Talgeundae-wa yugyo [Postmodernism and Confucianism] (Seoul: 
Nanamchulpan, 1998); Chaibong Hahm, “Family versus the Individual: The Politics of Marriage Laws 
in Korea,” in Bell and Hahm, Confucianism for the Modern World; Henry Rosemont Jr., “Rights-
Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons,” in Mary I. Bockover (ed.) Rules, Rituals, and 
Responsibility (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991). Or, on the other extreme, the very opposite endeavor 
has also been the case: that is to unearth the values of human rights and liberal individualism in the 
Confucian tradition. See D. W. Y. Kwok, “On the Rites and Rights of Being Human,” in Wm. 
Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming (eds.), Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998). But, both interpretations share the received belief that modern liberalism (or 
modernity in general) is committed to the value of rights-bearing individualism without thoroughly 
examining its far-reaching moral implications. 
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and so forth, what then is its theoretical and practical use when western liberal 
scholarship is vigorously rediscovering the value of civility and liberal virtues?4  
The potential charge of “cultural relativism” or “cultural universalism” upon 
this study must be discarded. For it is premised on a misguided assumption that 
Western liberal and East Asian Confucian cultures are mutually incommensurable, 
and thus that the only alternative available to the latter that has long suffered the 
political and cultural domination by the former is either to recede to the 
claustrophobia of cultural relativism (and nationalism) or to entertain the hubris of 
Confucian universalism to replace Western liberalism. Notwithstanding differing 
political expressions, both ideas are rooted in the same twisted image of the West. 
Another no less important reason that the previous Confucian political studies 
were entangled in such a stark dichotomy was that they were not as empirically 
grounded as they were politically motivated.5 Even though early champions of Asian 
Values like former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew pretended that the 
Confucianism they cherished was the natural outgrowth of their cultural-political 
entities, their concern was singularly maintaining the authoritarian government they 
then entertained as the surest vehicle for economic development. For instance, 
compared with other post-Confucian societies, Singapore was the least Confucian in 
its cultural characteristic, and the Confucianism Lee propagandized was one of 
                                                 
4 Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism; Cahoone, Civil Society; Galston, Liberal 
Purposes; Macedo, Liberal Virtues; Shils, The Virtue of Civility; Nathan Tarcov, Locke’s Education 
for Liberty (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1998). 
5 Most famously, Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign 
Affairs 73:2 (1994), pp. 109-126. 
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ideological manufactures by the government—hardly embedded in the hearts of the 
Singapore people.6
On the one hand, there is a misconceived binary of Western liberalism versus 
Eastern Confucianism and the accompanying dichotomy of cultural relativism and 
cultural universalism; on the other hand, an authoritarian agenda of the previous 
(state-centered) empirical justifications of “Asian Values.” In order to overcome the 
discrepancy, this study called upon a proactive reconstruction of a model of East 
Asian democracy upon a live political culture manifested in the habits and engraved 
in the heart of an ordinary East Asian. 
Perhaps this does not fully exonerate this study from what social scientists call 
the problem of generalization—a leap from a single Korean case study to a general 
theory of post-Confucian civil society in East Asia. However, this methodological 
suspicion can be valid only if I purported to use the Korean cases as a “scientific” 
method, one that aims to draw a causal inference by examining the relations between 
independent and dependent variables. I never intended the Korean cases to be an 
independent variable purely for an explanatory purpose. Rather, my principal 
methodological guide was an Aristotelian “evaluative explanation,” in which 
empirical explanation and reflective evaluation (and normative prescription) are 
entwined. My general theory of post-Confucian civil society, therefore, is to be 
approached only against the backdrop of a particular Korean national-cultural politics. 
                                                 
6 To be accurate, what Lee Kuan Yew practiced is much closer to Legalism, rather than Confucianism. 
Recently, Hahm and Paik attempted to justify Lee’s feigned Confucianism in terms of “Legalistic 
Confucianism” that according to them originated from Xunzi. Hahm and Paik, “Legalistic 
Confucianism.” But, in my judgment, the fact that Xunzi’s political theory is more realistic than, say, 
Mencius’ does not make his Confucian commitment “Legalistic.”   
226
 
Of course, we can still compare Korean politics with Taiwanese politics or Korean 
civil society with Western civil society to better understand or improve Korean polity, 
but this does not mean that a reflective evaluation of Korean politics must be directed 
under some external and/or transcendental criteria. A reflective evaluation of any 
political entity must be conducted primarily under its preexisting political 
configuration and cultural tradition. It is especially so for a country like Korea, where 
cultural and political identities have been and still is deeply entwined.            
 
The Problem of Objectivity and the Politics of Regret      
 
This last point may lead to a serious liberal challenge concerning the nature of 
political philosophy itself. If every political culture has its own distinctive core7 and 
every political entity has to be evaluated with reference to that very politico-cultural 
core, which is the central position of the method of “evaluative explanation,” how can 
we secure an objective ground upon which to cast a critical eye on the existing 
culture-politics matrix? Using my particular Korean case, the criticism can be phrased 
as follows: If a chŏngish civil society as an empirical reality, vindicated with some 
evidence, can be affirmed as a prescriptive normative ideal, how can we criticize it? 
Or how can it be epistemologically possible that we can detect the wrongs of our 
national politico-cultural community without assuming an existence of a certain 
transcendental, universal, or objective ground? In this regard, William Galston’s 
following statement is highly suggestive. 
                                                 
7 The distinctive core of a particular political culture has been the persistent concern of the political 
scientist Lucian W. Pye. See, among many his works, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992) and The Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Cultures (Ann 




When we attend to these phenomena [the actual phenomena of society], we cannot but 
noticing way in which moral and social thought breaks through the bounds of specific 
community practices, not in response to some external and exorcisable metaphysical need, but 
rather in accordance with its own inner and inescapable activity.8
 
 
Galston advances his reasoning with a classical metaphor: we all live in 
Plato’s cave. But instead of searching for the way out, which does not exist, he 
advises that we settle down to the real business of describing the shadows on the 
walls of the cave, to cast new ones, or to make our subterranean abode more decent 
and commodious.9 But such a cave is hardly a sphere where coherent agreement 
prevails. The reality is that around core social principles to which the overwhelming 
majority of a particular community subscribes, there always exist tensions amongst 
beliefs held within communities. Galston calls such intrasocial tensions inescapable 
social contradictions. A few critical examples of such contradictions include tensions 
between core principles and its actual practices, tensions between core principles 
themselves, and tensions between differing ideas of interpreting and applying 
principles not perceived as controversial.10  
It is this experience of practical contradiction that gives rise to the demand for 
increased coherence of both practice and belief. And this, according to Galston, draws 
us to the need of political philosophy. 
 
Political philosophy as I understand it is in the consequence of the interaction of the two basic 
phenomena just described: the inner contradictions of practice and belief on the part at least of 
reflective individuals within particular societies.11
 
                                                 
8 Galston, Liberal Purposes, p. 24. 
9 Ibid., p. 23. 
10 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 




What is important is that reflection is promoted “not by some exogenous and 
dispensable metaphysical itch but by the inner contradictions of daily life.”12 We may 
call it an “embedded reflection”—as opposed to Rawls’s “reflective equilibrium,” a 
philosophical gaze transcendental to the particular cultural, political, or moral 
context.13             
Galston is not alone in this track of political philosophy. Indeed, Walzer in his 
classic 1981 essay “Philosophy and Democracy” has touched the same issue. Like 
Galston, Walzer begins his argument with the tension between philosophy (the realm 
of truth) and democracy (the realm of opinions)—the political equivalent to Plato’s 
cave.14 In Walzer’s judgment, the philosopher concerned with the unchanging and 
single truth “is and must be an outsider; standing apart, not occasionally (in 
judgment) but systematically (in thought).” 15  If one wants to be a political 
philosopher, he must detach himself from it, not physically, but intellectually and 
sometimes, morally. Only then, can he be heroically empowered with contemplation 
and analysis—two intellectual tools of radical detachment.16  
The problem with these philosophical methods, however, is that it fears 
citizenry fellowship. More problematic is that the philosopher, a total stranger to the 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 30. 
13 For one of the powerful criticisms of Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium, see Jürgen Habermas, 
The Inclusion of the Other, pp. 60-61. 
14 Walzer writes, “Truth is one, but the people have many opinions; truth is eternal, but the people 
continually change their minds. Here in its simplest form is the tension between philosophy and 
democracy.” Michael Walzer, “Philosophy and Democracy,” Political Theory 9:3 (1981), p. 383. 
15 Ibid., p. 379. 
16 Ibid., p. 380. 
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political community, is likely to have an extreme ambition. While he is preoccupied 
with an authoritative business of philosophical (re)founding and/or social engineering, 
he hardly has a taste for political bargaining and mutual accommodation that aims at a 
modest and pragmatic improvement of the existing political system.  
In stark contrast, according to Walzer, the essence of democracy lies in the 
discursive capability of the people (i.e. citizens), which enables such bargaining and 
accommodation. Democratic sovereignty that is pivoted on common citizenship, says 
Walzer, “is always sovereignty somewhere and with regard to some things, not 
everywhere and with regard to everything.”17 Certainly, democratic decision is not 
immune to criticism. After all, democracy is predicated on the free exchange of 
differing, sometimes conflicting, opinions. But such criticism is by no means 
generated from a philosophical “nowhere” (hence, by implication, a point of 
“everywhere”). In democracy, a critic is not so much a detached philosopher but an 
engaged citizen. Democracy, in other words, is self-regulative and subject to self-
criticism.18
But in precisely what sense can democracy be self-regulative? Democrats like 
Walzer and Barber demand more democracy to cure democracy’s own illness. But 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p. 385. 
18 No one has provided a more enthusiastic rejoinder to Walzer than Benjamin Barber when he 
compares: “While philosophical question may take the form “What is true and how do we know it to 
be so?” and a moral question the form “What is right and how do I act in accord with the good?” a 
political question takes the form: “What shall we do when something has to be done that will affect us 
all an we wish to be reasonable, yet we disagree on means and ends and are without independent 
grounds by which we might arbitrate our differences?” This formulation makes clear that the real 
political problem is one of action under conditions of uncertainty, not one of truth or even justice in the 
abstract.” Barber, The Conquest of Politics, p. 206. 
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how can this tautological reasoning be a real help for democracy’s worst nightmare – 
a mob rule, or in Tocqueville’s (and Mill’s) famous language, a tyranny of majority? 
In the last pages of Strong Democracy, Barber tries to resolve this very problem: 
 
The uncertainty of all knowledge and the foibles of women and men—which may but do not 
necessarily lessen with their transformation into citizens—impose on the strong democrat a 
responsibility to institutionalize regret: to build into his reforms limits on the will to change 
and to build into mechanisms of public choice limits on all political will.19
    
            
In the same spirit, Walzer is convinced that “on the democratic view, it is right 
that they [citizens] make the laws – even if they make them wrongly.”20 Controversial 
as it may seem, Walzer’s Rousseauian argument should be read only against the 
backdrop of democracy’s commitment to institutionalize regret—a collective will to 
rectify. 21  And of course, such regret is possible only when ardently engaged 
democratic citizens are also reflective individuals who are keenly aware of the 
inevitability of social contradictions within their political community. 
 
The Judicialization of Politics and the Ascendance of Liberal Hegemony 
 
On one level, the overarching concern of these three democratic theorists seems to 
concentrate on one of the most unresolved and agonizing subjects in the history of 
Western political thought—the perennial tension between philosophy and politics 
                                                 
19 Barber, Strong Democracy, p. 308. 
20 Walzer, “Philosophy and Democracy,” p. 386. 
21 Walzer interprets the central message of Rousseau’s controversial claim of general will as this: “The 
argument has the effect of making law a function of popular will and not of reason as it had hitherto 
been understood, the reason of wise men, sages, and judges. The people are the successors of gods and 
absolutist kings, but not of philosophers. They may not know the right thing to do, but they claim a 




(especially democratic politics); and thus the nature, or even the possibility, of 
political philosophy.22  Yet, what indeed propelled them to revisit such a heroic 
question was the practical problem America faced—that is, the invasion of 
philosophy into democratic politics in American public discourses. As a matter of fact, 
all three authors have advanced and refined their democratic political theories by 
wrestling with the contemporary phenomenon of the philosophization of politics 
championed by John Rawls, author of A Theory of Justice (if not as the author of 
Political Liberalism), 23 where such a phenomenon is reflected in his problematic 
concepts like original position, veil of ignorance, and reflective equilibrium. All these 
concepts are based on the liberal assumption that the right precedes the good and that 
the state is an ultimate defender of individual rights and a neutral bystander regarding 
the contending claims of the good.  
                                                 
22 Especially, this subject caught the hearts of two giants in contemporary political philosophy, Leo 
Strauss and Michael Oakeshott. For Strauss’ position, see Leo Strauss, “What is Political 
Philosophy?,” in What is Political Philosophy? and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988) and for Oakeshott’s, see Bhikhu Parekh, “Oakeshott’s Theory of Civil Association,” 
Ethics 106:1 (1995), pp. 163-168.   
23 Despite Political Liberalism’s famous catchphrase “Political, Not Metaphysical” (an article bearing 
this as a title was originally published in Philosophy and Public Affairs 14:3 (1985), pp. 223-251), 
whether Rawls’s neutral liberal position has fundamentally changed is still controversial. It seems that 
Sandel, one of great critics of Rawls’s earlier work, and Habermas still remain unconvinced, while 
Rorty and Galston, once critics, are welcoming Rawls’s “political” turn (although Galston still has 
certain reservation). See Sandel, Liberalism, pp. 184-218; Habermas, Inclusion of the Other, pp. 75-
101; Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), pp. 57-58; Galston, Liberal Purposes, pp. 118-139.   
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Practically, what worries these theorists most regarding the ascendance of 
political philosophies a la Rawls24 is the judicialization of politics in America. For 
judicial review has increasingly been functioning as a final and undisputed arbiter of 
political conflicts, helping to circumvent (often prolonged) discursive democratic 
processes in both legislature and civil society.25 To the democrats, in the predominant 
liberal legal and political theory and practice, judges occupy a special status—as a 
living embodiment of unencumbered, free, and autonomously reflective individuals in 
the original position that Rawls idealized for theoretical (yet far from actual political) 
convenience. Thus, at some point, Walzer had to complain that “[t]he tension 
between judicial review and democracy directly parallels the tension between 
philosophy and democracy.”26
What, then, are the political implications of the discussions thus far on Korean 
democracy? Two points can be made. First, in post-transitional Korea the 
judicialization of politics that is in effect a legal disguise of the conquest of politics 
by philosophy has been well underway, curtailing the democratic power of party 
politics and, more seriously, discouraging active political debates amongst citizens on 
important political and moral issues in civil society.  
                                                 
24  Most famously, see Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1978). 
25 Sandel observes that in America the Court has come in recent decades to view the Constitution as “a 
neutral framework of rights within which persons can pursue their own ends, consistent with a similar 
liberty for other,” rather than read it as endorsing a particular moral or religious or economic doctrine 
that is alleged to have underpinned the American political community. Sandel, Democracy’s 
Discontent, pp. 28-54.  
26 Walzer, “Philosophy and Democracy,” p. 388. 
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In Korea, the Constitutional Court was established as the crucial element of 
the new Constitution that reopened the way to direct presidential election in the 
course of settling the 1987 crisis that we have observed in Chapter 3. According to 
Article 111, the Court is given the power to: 1) review the constitutionality of statues; 
2) rule on the final disposition of impeachment cases brought against high-ranking 
officials, including the president; 3) dissolve political parties for having 
unconstitutional purposes or engaging in unconstitutional activities; 4) adjudicate 
jurisdictional disputes between state and agencies; and 5) rule on constitutional 
petitions. To be sure, the Court has played a remarkable role, especially in the 
formative period of democratic transition as Hahm and Kim have well documented. 
Not only has the Court stood by what the general public considered to be progressive 
causes, for example, striking down laws authorizing the censorship of films and 
attorney-client communications and restricting the scope of application of the 
National Security Law, but it has also improved the electoral process and promoted 
greater political accountability by striking down the election law that had prevented 
the freedoms of political participation and expression as well as electoral fairness. 
Moreover, in a series of subsequent rulings, the Court has firmly upheld the 
inviolability of private property rights against the intrusive practices of the 
developmental state.27                     
But the most salient feature of Korea’s Constitutional Court over the last 
decade has been that it has emerged as a liberal sanctum of human rights. The Court 
                                                 
27 For a detailed account of the active role that the Court played in the periods of democratic transition 
and consolidation, see Chaihark Hahm and Sung Ho Kim, “Constitutionalism on Trial in South 
Korea,” Journal of Democracy 16:2 (2005), pp. 31-33.  
234
 
is now aided in part by the system of constitutional petitions, which may be filed by 
any citizen claiming the violation of his or her constitutional rights. What is worth 
questioning, however, is whether or not the Korean constitutional rights can 
immediately translate in terms of universal human rights. First of all, why Korea 
entertained a glorious wedding between democracy and constitutionalism in the 
transitional period is not hard to understand. During that period, it became self-
evident that the historicity and the political legitimacy of the 1987 constitutional 
system was painfully achieved by Koreans’ life-risking struggle against the 
authoritarian forces served by non-democratic elements in the old constitution. In 
other words, Koreans cherished the 1987 Constitution by identifying it as the 
incarnation of their collective political—and also “cultural” for the reasons that I have 
shown in Chapter 3—identity, which is the very democratic definition of the 
constitution according to Sheldon Wolin.28
Therefore, when the Court ruled for human rights in the name of 
constitutional rights in the earlier period of democratic transition, such a conceptual 
confusion scarcely constituted a critical problem. Just having been freed from 
authoritarian rule, the people tacitly agreed that the Court had an impending political 
agenda that they commonly endorsed—to protect the citizens who have suffered or 
might suffer political injustice. Now, when democratic consolidation has progressed 
well, the Court’s confusion between human rights and constitutional rights poses a 
critical cultural challenge to Korean national cultural-political identity, of which the 
                                                 
28 Wolin, The Presence of the Past, pp. 8-31. 
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Court does not seem to be aware.29 The Court’s recent decision to strike down the 
family law that maintained the traditional Korean Confucian family structure based 
on the family head system is the case in point. Pressured by liberal feminists 
upholding gender equality on the one hand, and committed to the liberal principles of 
rights to individual freedom and to private happiness on the other, the Court raised 
the hands of liberals on the issue that was still being vigorously contested in civil 
society.30
This is not to suggest that the old family law must be valued in itself simply 
because it has come down as tradition. The attention should rather be drawn to the 
fact that the Court has emerged as a trusted neutral (while in actuality liberal) arbiter 
regarding controversial moral, political, and cultural issues, of which far-reaching 
implications go beyond the domain of the legal, narrowly understood. Moreover, the 
idea that the Court’s definition of “civil” authoritatively dictates what forms the social 
meaning of “the civil” in Korean civil society is quite uncivil. What is worse, the 
Court’s implicit liberal assumption that civil society begins when the traditional 
family structure is deconstructed is misguided, not to mention lacking in historical 
consciousness and cultural commitment. For as we have seen, this particular 
understanding of civil society, to which values like individual autonomy, value 
pluralism, and gender equality are central, underpins only one of many practices of 
                                                 
29 On some important constitutional decisions towards such a trend, see Chaihark Hahm, “Negotiating 
Confucian Civility through Constitutional Discourse,” in Hahm and Bell, The Politics of Affective 
Relations.  
30 For the political and philosophical implications of the new family law in Korea, see Sungmoon Kim, 
“Family, Affection, and Confucian Civil Society: The Politico-Philosophical Implications of the New 
Family Law in Korea,” International Studies in Philosophy 39:4 (forthcoming in Winter 2007). 
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civil society. To see the Constitutional Court in terms of a magic apparatus of deus ex 
machina in Euripides’ tragedy, which brings otherwise complicated human conflicts 
to a sudden and fantastic resolution, is to make the Court equivalent to Plato’s 
Nocturnal Council, the authoritative league of all-seeing philosophers. Thus 
understood, in the consolidating Korean society, the ascendance of the legal (and the 
philosophical) over the political threatens to seriously curtail the citizens’ democratic 
discursive capacity and the national cultural-political collective identity of the Korean 
people. 
However, a far-more serious threat endangering Korea’s chŏngish civil 
society is coming from the ascendance of liberal hegemony in every nook and cranny 
of Korean society, beyond the Constitutional Court. This is the second point I want to 
make.  
In a sense, the recent liberal decisions of the Court can be understood to be a 
faithful reflection to the law of the drastic cultural and moral transformation, or the 
“cultural liberalization,” ushered in after the democratization of Korean society. What 
is most distinctive in this transformation is that it has dramatically weakened the 
traditional Confucian social semiotics and ethics, while enthusiastically embracing 
liberal norms and ideals supported by the rights discourse in their stead. And thus, in 
various public settings in Korea, the justifications based on freedom of personal 
consciousness and right to private happiness are gaining more purchase than those 
based on collective cultural identity and the public good. In this social milieu, a 
misconceived belief has been unwittingly entrenched that democracy is by nature a 
liberal democracy – the political system devoted to safeguard individual rights. That 
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is to say, democracy and liberalism, originally distinct social practices, have become 
too intermingled to conceptually separate. Oftentimes, arguments upholding 
collective identity and the commonality of the people are mistaken to support the old 
authoritarian and pathological slogans of national identification and cultural purity 
and, accordingly, easily cast under the suspicion of nationalism, as we have observed 
in Chapter 5.  
But what is more troubling from a democratic perspective is a certain 
philosophical stance the self-claimed liberals often take: From a 7-year old 1st 
grader’s right to his or her hair length to a 20-year-old college student’s freedom of 
expression in the library; from a teenager’s right to keep a cell phone on at school to a 
prisoner’s right to happiness. The liberals are indeed untiring in re-founding the 
Korean society on the unalloyed liberal individualistic footing, which they believe to 
be the core of an authentic democracy and civil society. Yet, this unflinching zeal for 
social engineering is what any self-conscious democrat must refrain from. Since such 
liberals do not approach Korean society from within its particularist cultural, 
historical, and moral context (hence thinking from “nowhere”), their philosophical 
enthusiasm is abstract and far from practicable. It is rather subversive because it 
attempts to radically uproot or deracinate chŏng culture and other Confucian cultural 
heritages from the existing Korean society. Such zeal is uncivil because it prevents a 
meaningful and productive discussion between the dissenting parties. Last but not 
least, the liberal aspiration for radical social change inherently discriminates because 
it tends to see the non-liberal “ordinary” Koreans, still embedded in chŏngish 
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relations, as heteronomous and thus a target of self-transformation (i.e. individual 
modernization), and by implication as a second-class citizen. 





Civil society is a complex middle ground between Gesellschaft and 
Gemeinschaft and for non-Westerners living in the rapidly westernizing world, it may 
exist somewhere between Western and their indigenous ways of life. In any case, 
civil society as a public sphere mediating between the private sphere and the state is 
essentially a social practice rather than a fixed or reified social entity, which can and 
should be culturally rearticulated, reformulated, and even reinvented. The ethical 
project of the cultural reinvention of civil society is especially critical to non-Western 
societies like South Korea, that despite remarkable capitalization and the relatively 
firm institutionalization of democracy, the corresponding ethical civil society has yet 
to be articulated. As John Dewey was convinced, and I believe Confucius would 
agree with him, if democracy is not the political regime per se, but is a form of social 
life in its most profound sense, and accordingly, if what is central to democratic living 
is not just voting but citizenship, the centrality of civil society to democracy is self-
evident, for it defines the nature and the quality of citizenship. It is for this reason that 
Koreans should take pains to maintain and further ameliorate their own ethical civil 
society that is politically practicable and culturally relevant, instead of hastily 
replacing it with rights-based and interest-seeking civil societies as the liberal-
pluralist account of civil society dictates. In this respect, the value of the cultural 
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practice of chŏng and uri-responsibility in Korean society for its democratic 











chŏng                           정  
goun chŏng                  고운정 
in chŏng                       인정 
kukka                           국가    
miun chŏng                  미운정 
mu chŏng                     무정 
seyehwa                       세계화 
simin undong               시민운동 
uri                                우리  
uri chaegim                  우리 책임 
 
2. Chinese 
ce yin zhi xin               惻隱之心 
ci rang zhi xin              辭讓之心 
dao                               道 
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dao tung                       道統 
Daxue                          大學
fu                                  夫 
hao jie zhi shi               豪傑之士 
i                                    義 
li                                   禮 
li                                   理 
Lunyu                          論語         
pifu                              匹夫 
qi jia                             齊家 
ren                                仁  
shi fei zhi xin               是非之心 
si wen                           斯文 
tian                               天 
tian dao                        天道 
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tian li                            天理 
tian ming                      天命 
tian xia                         天下 
wang tung                    王統 
wen                           文 
xiao                              孝 
xiao di                          孝弟 
xing                              性 
xiu wu zhi xin              羞惡之心 
yifu                               一夫 
zhi                                 智 
zhi quo                          治國 
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